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Employment creation is often seen as a key benefit of investment in natural resources. However, 
this benefit sometimes falls short: job estimates may be inflated, governmental policies may fail 
to maximize employment generation, and, in some cases, investments may lead to net 
livelihood losses. A more thorough examination of employment tied to mining and agricultural 
investments is thus useful for assessing whether and how employment from natural resource 
investments contributes to sustainable economic development—a particularly timely topic as 
countries consider how they will achieve the Sustainable Development Goals adopted in 2015. 
This report aims to clarify the processes and impacts of job creation driven by large-scale 
mining and agricultural investments,1 and to suggest how policies can improve employment 
outcomes. While investments in mining and agriculture share some characteristics, including 
reliance on natural resources and some location-specificity, they also differ in significant ways. 
The report does not aim for a full comparison of such investments, but rather identifies 
similarities or differences that can contribute to a better understanding of their respective roles 
for employment.   
 
Employment numbers: Terminology, methodology, and context 
Assessing or comparing employment impacts from natural resource investments is 
complicated. There is no universal standard for measuring job creation. 
Employment generated through natural resource investments can be created directly, indirectly, 
or through induced effects. Direct employment generally counts the investor’s employees and 
on-site contractors, while indirect employment includes off-site contractors, suppliers and their 
workers, and jobs that arise in relation to social investment activities. Induced employment 
results from the spending effect of direct and indirect employment and can often be far higher 
than the direct or indirect effects. Large projects may also lead to additional employment 
through linkages other than those flowing from production or consumption, such as through 
                                                             
1 The discussion of agricultural investments focuses primarily on large-scale investments that require some transfer 
of land use rights, such as concessions for plantation agriculture. Sometimes described as “large-scale land-based 
investments” or “large-scale land acquisitions,” such investments also occasionally incorporate business relationships 
with smallholder farmers, such as through outgrower programs. We focus on these types of investments both 
because proponents of such investments, which are not without controversy, often point to employment creation as 
one related benefit, and because such investments share more commonalities with mining investments than other 
types of investment in agriculture, such as pure contract farming schemes. 
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infrastructure investment. The lack of a universal standard regarding how employment 
numbers are counted within each of these different types of employment complicates 
assessments and comparisons of anticipated or actual job creation arising from investments.  
Additional complications arise from the complexities inherent in calculating the multiplier 
effect. Multipliers are used to estimate how an initial increase in economic activity—for 
instance, an increase in the output of a particular commodity—reverberates throughout the 
economy and translates into more indirect and induced employment. While multiplier 
calculations of indirect and induced employment from mining and agricultural investments can 
offer useful estimates, they should be viewed with caution, particularly since it is difficult to 
compare results between projects.  
In the mining industry, factors influencing the job creation potential of an investment include:  
x the type of ownership, with publicly-owned mines often employing more workers than 
market-driven companies; 
x the size of the mine; 
x the mining life cycle phase, as employment levels are much higher during the 
construction phase than during the production phase, with the types of jobs also 
changing as a project shifts phases;  
x the type of mining operation, as underground mining typically generates higher 
employment than open-pit mining;  
x the type of commodity being extracted, as well as the mineral grade; and   
x the mine’s need for the construction of ancillary infrastructure. 
 
For investments in large-scale agricultural projects, factors that affect the number of jobs 
generated include: 
x the types of crops, as the labor intensity linked to different crops leads to widely 
divergent employment needs; 
x the level of mechanization, with highly mechanized projects generating fewer direct jobs 
per hectare; 
x other methods of production, such as the high use of  inputs, which can decrease labor 
requirements; 
x specific project contexts, such as soil fertility or water availability;  
x links to agro-processing, as value-addition or processing activities can create greater 
employment opportunities; and 
x the incorporation of opportunities for smallholders, such as outgrower schemes, which 
may decrease the numbers of waged jobs but can dramatically increase the number of 
livelihoods supported by a project. 
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These various factors complicate generalizations regarding the job creation impact of 
investment in mining or agricultural projects. 
 
Mining employment: Nuances and complications 
In addition to understanding the types of employment generated by investments in the mining 
sector, it is also important to examine who benefits from such jobs, as well as what happens to 
the economic and social fabric of a mining region when investment occurs. While host 
communities reap economic and social benefits due to, for example, higher incomes, negative 
consequences can also arise.  
 
What jobs and for whom?  
While many mining projects commit to hiring local workers through preferential employment 
policies, the meaning of the term “local” varies. At the national level, “local” may simply refer 
to a citizen of the country; yet within the project area, the term may be interpreted to describe a 
person originating from and resident in the area in which the project is situated. In this context, 
recruitment may well be conducted locally, but it may not be a “local” who is recruited.  
Local disappointment with employment opportunities is thus common. Despite a mine 
opening, local unemployment may persist due to a mismatch between the skills required by the 
investor or its sub-contractors and the skills possessed by the local population. Indeed, trends 
towards increased mechanization and automation mean that less manual labor is needed and 
that remaining jobs increasingly require sophisticated training. In addition, labor needs shift 
depending on the project phase, with low-skill labor needed primarily during the construction 
phase. The share of the local population that succeeds in finding employment with the mine 
might thus be relatively small.  
Disappointment in job opportunities may be exacerbated by the potential for increased income 
inequality at the local level, as mining-generated employment has the potential to increase 
income beyond what could have been earned in alternative livelihoods. To mitigate this 
potential friction, some companies have adopted recruitment policies that aim to spread income 
more evenly, such as by distributing jobs between households and between different local 
groups.  
A lack of requisite skills or access to finance in local communities can also limit the magnitude 
of indirect employment creation in the local area. If companies believe that their procurement 
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needs cannot be met in the host country, they may look to source from abroad, thus reducing 
indirect employment generation at the national and local levels. 
 
Socio-economic change and net employment impact 
Large-scale mining has drastic socio-economic impacts on the surrounding area.  Employment 
and other opportunities often draw people to a mining region, leading to economic, physical, 
environmental, and social changes.  
In-migration can bring benefits to local communities. For example, increased demand for goods 
and services can provide a boost to local businesses and the local economy, while in-migrants 
that bring new skills and resources can help host communities expand their capacities, skills, 
and knowledge. Not all aspects of in-migration are positive, however. Negative impacts include 
increased competition over jobs and resources; higher local inflation; and strains on 
infrastructure and on the environment.  
When mining companies appropriate inhabited land for their operations, local communities are 
usually displaced and resettled. Resettlement—particularly when not carefully designed and if 
not coupled with the provision of comparable or better land, or other efforts to support 
renewed livelihoods—can severely disrupt livelihoods.  
Artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) can play a vital role in reducing poverty, although is 
often associated with environmental damage and other negative impacts. The development and 
operation of a large-scale mine can lead to significant losses of ASM jobs, which are generally 
not offset by increased employment in large-scale mining.  
Every phase of mining, from exploration to closure, poses potential environmental threats to 
local livelihoods. Readying mine sites frequently requires clearing land and displacing surface 
and groundwater. Extracting and beneficiating ores, as well as subsequent waste disposal, uses 
significant amounts of water, and also holds the potential to contaminate water sources. These 
and other negative environmental spillovers of mining projects can disrupt local livelihoods 
and forms of subsistence and income. 
Large-scale mining projects generally offer few direct employment opportunities for women, 
due in part to mismatched skills and a lack of accommodation for family and childcare 
responsibilities. This can be especially problematic given that women may be particularly 
affected by land loss resulting from mining projects. However, women often fill indirect and 
induced jobs tied to mining, such as laundry, catering, and agricultural production. Thus, the 
opening of a new mine can lead to localized structural changes in labor participation for 
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women, with a decline in agricultural self-employment leading women to either shift to the 
service sector or leave the labor market altogether. Such structural changes are not necessarily 
reversible once a mine closes. Women are not the only ones who feel the effects of a mine 
closure, of course, and stakeholders are not always prepared for this phase and its 
corresponding reduction in employment opportunities.  
 
Employment from large-scale agricultural investments: Nuances and 
complications 
Understanding the socio-economic issues tied to employment is equally important in the 
context of large-scale agricultural investment. These issues, which can affect sustainable 
development outcomes, should be incorporated into any assessment of the potential job 
creation impacts of large agricultural investments. However, local job impacts and job quality 
can be very context specific, and efforts to generalize often mask critical nuances. Assessments 
are further complicated by other factors: for example, over which timeframes should one 
measure outcomes, or from which perspectives should a situation be evaluated?  
 
What jobs and for whom? 
Job estimates for agricultural investments often do not specify whether the jobs that will be 
created are permanent or casual, year-round or seasonal, yet research indicates that casual or 
seasonal labor comprises a significant proportion of the jobs created through large agricultural 
investments. While seasonal jobs can sometimes provide a complementary livelihood strategy 
for rural dwellers, workers who rely on such jobs generally find themselves in insecure 
employment situations. In addition, agricultural jobs often pay low and inadequate wages, 
although whether wages are more or less attractive than other existing options remains highly 
context-specific.  
As with mining investments, the jobs created through agricultural investments may not always 
benefit workers from the local community. This is particularly true for any higher skilled jobs 
that are created. Yet significant numbers of low-skilled jobs are also often taken by domestic or 
foreign migrants. In such situations, the corresponding in-migration can have both positive and 




Socio-economic change and net employment impact 
Assessments of the employment impact of large-scale agricultural investments should consider 
whether waged job creation arises at the cost of destroying non-waged labor opportunities. In 
some cases, the number of livelihoods affected by the investment might be diminished rather 
than augmented.  
Understanding the longer-term labor impact of large-scale agricultural investments is difficult: 
direct jobs may increase or decrease as operations are established, while indirect and induced 
employment creation will help shape, and in turn will be shaped by, an increasingly monetized 
local economy. Yet existing qualitative assessments highlight the real possibility of net 
livelihood losses—at least in the short-term—when agricultural investments take place on land 
that was previously used for smallholder agricultural production or other livelihood activities.  
Moreover, not only might livelihood loss lead to fewer individuals being able to sustain their 
livelihood strategies, but it may also mean that, in some contexts, former smallholder farmers 
who have transitioned to waged work on the plantations created by the investment earn less 
than they had as smallholders. The situation is rendered more complex when jobs created by an 
investment are not offered to those who have lost the most due to it, leaving some individuals 
better off as waged workers and others in the same area worse off, having lost land or suffered 
“economic displacement” through other disruptions to livelihood strategies. 
Large-scale agricultural investments can affect women differently than men. In many low- and 
middle-income countries, women play significant roles in agricultural production, through both 
independent farming and waged labor, giving rise to what has been described as the 
“feminization” of agriculture. Whether women benefit from employment opportunities arising 
from agricultural investment is context specific, influenced by preexisting social norms and 
practices around labor. In addition, the gendered ways in which some commercial farms 
employ women and men can have both positive and negative impacts. For example, gendered 
roles may encourage the increased employment of women, but may limit such employment to 
work that is more hazardous or less compensated. Aside from questions of waged labor, large-
scale agricultural investments can have particular impacts on women’s livelihood when the 
investments impede access to productive resources on which women rely. Any specific 
investment can thus have mixed impacts for local women, providing some benefits (such as 
new sources of cash income) while simultaneously producing certain harms (such as livelihood 
losses or increased labor burdens).  
Although many agricultural projects could theoretically last indefinitely, they do close (or fail) 
for various reasons. These closures affect linked employment opportunities. Just as with mining 
investments, post-closure planning thus constitutes an important best practice for agricultural 
 10 
investments. Host governments and other stakeholders should pay particular attention to what 
will happen to the land once a project ends; in many cases, providing mechanisms for formerly 
displaced people to gain renewed access to the land may be the most appropriate option.  
 
Government policies for job creation  
For governments seeking to increase the employment impacts of natural resource investments, 
realistic assessments of the potential employment effects are an important starting point. This 
includes considering the potential direct, indirect, and induced employment impacts, as well as 
the corresponding socio-economic concerns and potential negative consequences for 
livelihoods.    
Against this backdrop, governments can strive to design appropriate policies, plans, and 
strategies that strengthen positive impacts and mitigate negative ones associated with 
investment in mining or agriculture. In terms of strengthening positive employment impacts, 
such policies may aim to increase the number of direct jobs supported by an investment, to 
generate indirect or induced employment, or to tie investments to local development more 
generally.  
To maximize the creation of direct jobs tied to mining and agricultural investment, governments 
can: 
x consider cost–effective policies to attract responsible investment that leads to increased 
employment; 
x support subnational-level governments in managing their share of revenues, including 
through policies focused on employment impacts; and 
x cooperate, in partnership with companies, on training programs that support 
individuals’ abilities to benefit from the job opportunities offered by investment projects, 
potentially coupling such programs with agreed targets that encourage the employment 
of local or national workers. 
 
To maximize the creation of indirect jobs tied to mining and agricultural investment, 
governments can: 
x focus on policies aimed at increasing linkages, either backward through local content 
requirements or forward through measures intended to increase further processing, 
while ensuring that such policies are based on realistic assessments of local capabilities 
and are in conformity with relevant international rules; and   
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x refrain from granting investors the right to import inputs duty-free where such goods 
are available locally. 
 
To maximize the creation of induced jobs tied to mining and agricultural investment, 
governments can: 
x support subnational-level governments in developing capacity to plan for diversified 
economic development, as well as to deliver the public services that are needed by 
citizens and required for economic growth;  
x support or encourage infrastructure investment tied to mining or agricultural projects, 
which can help other sectors to grow and/or can support improved livelihood activities; 
and 
x ensure that appropriate consultation mechanisms underpin local development planning.  
 
In addition, governments can require sustainable closure plans for any large-scale investment, 
including strategies for mitigating the negative employment impacts of project closure or 
failure. To address the particularly dramatic impacts of commodity price downturns, 
governments can also work with companies to establish programs focused on mitigating job 
loss in such contexts. 
Moreover, governments working to develop policies to improve employment generation from 
natural resource investments can ensure that such policies are grounded in and shaped by 
consultations with communities. This can strengthen such policies while also managing 
community expectations. 
In the context of agricultural investment, policymakers should also keep in mind that 
agricultural investment predicated on land acquisition is only one of many approaches for 
investment in agriculture. As the type of agricultural investment model used may affect its 
impact on job creation and livelihoods, governments should think carefully about the type of 
investment they wish to attract and encourage. Apart from investments that require land 
transactions, other options for public or private investment include investing in smallholder 
production, or using a more inclusive business approach to incorporate and support 
smallholder farmers. Such models may be more beneficial from a number of perspectives, 
including employment outcomes. 
As employment impacts are context-specific, so are policy solutions. Efforts to optimize the 
employment impact of investments thus must be tailored to the particular contexts for which 
they are proposed. In some situations, this may require a more nuanced understanding of the 
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margins of maneuver for investors in terms of adapting their employment practices to national 
and local needs. In other situations, governments may need to undertake more targeted efforts 
to ensure that local development planning is used to maximize the potential employment and 
growth impact that can result from induced employment, which is not always sufficiently 
incorporated in such planning. A thorough understanding by governments of the relevant 
contextual variables related to employment from natural resource investments can help both in 
designing policies and evaluating potential investments. 
 
Conclusion 
Large-scale mining and agricultural investments create jobs, but how many and with what 
impact is not always clear. A deeper understanding of the topic helps policymakers, citizens, 
and others assess employment claims made in the context of investment in mining or large-scale 
agricultural projects. It also presents governments with a difficult task: developing approaches 
that are aligned with best practices but fine-tuned to local contexts, and which improve the 
direct, indirect, and induced job creation outcomes of investments while addressing the 
disparate needs and expectations of both investors and citizens. Although complicated, such 
efforts are important for ensuring that the expected employment benefits of such investments 





The employment potential of investments in extractives and agricultural projects is 
often advanced both by governments and investors in support of large-scale 
investments in natural resources. However, investments do not always deliver their 
promised benefits, as a result of inflated job estimates or poor policy planning. In some 
cases, greater clarity is needed in how employment estimates are calculated in order to 
facilitate more informed assessments by the public. Even where benefits correspond to 
expectations, however, better-targeted policies on the part of both governments and 
investors 2  would allow the full potential for employment generation to be better 
realized. In any case, the formulation and analysis of policies for employment in large-
scale mining and agricultural investment cannot aim at simply maximizing 
employment numbers. Policymakers and other stakeholders need to consider 
qualitative factors and additional nuances, such as the quality of jobs, including job 
security and wages; distributional impact and who benefits; and the net livelihood 
impacts of investments.  
This report examines the arguments made about the job creation impact of mining and 
large-scale agricultural investments, as well as how such employment contributes to 
sustainable economic development.  
We explore these issues in three ways. First, we review the definitions, terminology, 
and methodologies used to describe and analyze job creation in both industries, as well 
as factors that influence job creation (Section 1). Second, we address the “net value” of 
job creation, underlying which are questions about the socioeconomic impacts of such 
investments and their broader influence on sustainable economic development 
(Sections 2 and 3). Third, we examine how governments have attempted to ensure that 
investments result in sustained job creation and development, and suggest policy 
recommendations to help improve such efforts (Section 4). We conclude with some 
policy recommendations (Section 5). 
Our objective is to clarify the processes and impacts of job creation driven by large-scale 
mining and agricultural investments,3 and to suggest ways in which public sector actors 
                                                             
2 This report uses “investors” and “companies” interchangeably, with “companies” (or “operators”) used more in the 
mining context and “investors” used more in the agricultural context to reflect the more commonly used terminology 
within these spheres. 
3 Our discussion of agricultural investments focuses primarily on large-scale investments that require some transfer 
of land use rights, such as through a concession, lease or purchase. These investments, such as for plantation 
agriculture, are sometimes described as “large-scale land-based investments” or “large-scale land acquisitions.” Such 
investments sometimes incorporate business relationships with smallholder farmers, such as through outgrower 
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can tailor policies to improve employment outcomes from such investments. We do not 
attempt to systematically compare investments in mining and agriculture, but we 
identify similarities or differences where we believe that they may contribute to a better 
understanding of the two industries with respect to their role for employment creation.   
At this point, it would be interesting and useful to provide some reasonably reliable 
estimate of the global magnitude of employment due to large-scale mining and 
agricultural investments. Unfortunately, there are no good sources for such statistics. 
National employment statistics exist in most countries. However, differences in 
definitions and specificity mean that it is not possible to aggregate the numbers. Take, 
for example, mining employment statistics. Unlike the case of, for instance, an 
automobile factory, where everybody is counted as employed in vehicle manufacturing, 
not everyone working on a mine site is always counted as employed in mining. Rather, 
some may be counted as construction workers, because construction companies often 
carry out a large part of the work in building and operating a mine, or as transportation 
employees, because they operate equipment used to transport the finished mineral 
product.  
Moreover, since relevant employment numbers usually include both mining and 
quarrying, they are of limited use in determining the numbers directly attributable to 
large-scale mining. Sources of worldwide statistics, such as the International Labour 
Organization (ILO)’s LABORSTA database, cover only some countries and are often 
between five and ten years old. A relatively recent estimate put global direct 
employment in formal mining at 2.5 million and 15-20 million in informal artisanal 
mining.4 This looks like a fairly accurate estimate, and our own rough calculations 
arrive at a similar result.5  Notably, employment has probably increased over the past 
decade along with the dramatic increase in production—at least until the commodity 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
programs. While debate over this type of investment has been ongoing for some time, some proponents of such 
investment continue to point to employment creation as a potential key benefit. Where we seek to distinguish land-
reliant investment from other types of large-scale agricultural investment, such as large investment in pure contract 
farming schemes, the distinction is noted explicitly.   
4 International Council on Metals and Mining, “The role of mining in national economies,” 2nd edition (2014), p. 6.    
5 Starting with the reasonable assumption that six metals (aluminum/bauxite, copper, gold, iron ore, lead, and zinc) 
account for the vast majority of employment in metals mining, we selected four mines that we believe are roughly 
representative in terms of production per employee globally (CBG in Guinea for bauxite, Antamina in Peru for 
copper, LKAB in Sweden for iron ore, and Tara in Ireland for lead and zinc). We then estimated total world 
employment in mining by multiplying the number of employees of these mines with the inverse of their share of 
world production. For gold, we used an estimate by the World Gold Council (WGC, “The social and economic 
impact of gold mining,” 2015). The total employee number calculated this way is 1.8 million. Adding the metals not 
included (chromium, nickel, platinum, etcetera) should give around 2 million. Since total production volume of non-
metallic minerals such as phosphates is about half of metal mining, we add another million. Finally, we add one 
million for coal mining, which accounts for about the same volume as metals mining, but which is more mechanized, 
for a total of 4 million.  
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price slump began to take effect late 2014/early 2015. Outside China, employment is 
actually likely to have increased at a higher rate than production, since there has been 
an observed decline in labor productivity for most minerals. This fall has been 
attributed mainly to the effect of higher prices, which have made possible the mining of 
resources that earlier would not have been considered exploitable (for example, because 
of low grades) and where productivity is therefore lower.6  
Clarity around the employment generated by large-scale agricultural investments is 
even worse. While there are estimates of the number of people employed in agriculture 
on a global scale—approximately one billion7—there is no reliable estimate of the 
proportion of that number attributable to large-scale agricultural investments. It is 
presumably an extremely small percentage, given the limited role of foreign private 
investors, who are the most associated with the types of large-scale investments 
discussed in this report, in overall agricultural investment in low- and middle-income 
countries.8 Due to the lack of transparency around recent and on-going large-scale 
agricultural investments, however, it is impossible to determine how many investments 
have occurred or are taking place,9 let alone to estimate how many people are employed 
through them. Even assuming reasonably reliable data on land transactions for 
agricultural investments, reliable employment estimates would be difficult to develop, 
requiring additional knowledge of how much land has actually been put into 
operation.10 Other complicating factors, such as the context-specificity of job creation 
tied to agricultural investment, are discussed in the following section. 
                                                             
6 See J.E. Tilton, “Cyclical and secular determinants of productivity in the copper, aluminum, iron ore and coal 
industries,” 27(1) Mineral Economics 1-19 (2014). Restructuring of the Chinese mining industry is likely to have led to a 
rise in labor productivity in that country, but we do not know if that effect fully offsets the productivity decline in the 
rest of the world.   
7 The ILO Global Employment Trends 2014 sector dataset notes that, globally, there were 990,916,000 people 
employed in agriculture in 2012, a predicted 1,001,364,000 employed in agriculture in 2013, and a predicted 
998,133,000 in 2014. Dataset available at: http://ilo.org/global/research/global-reports/global-employment-
trends/2014/WCMS_234879/lang--en/index.htm (last visited June 26, 2016). 
8 In low- and middle-income countries, farmers themselves are the biggest investors in agriculture, followed by 
governments. Foreign private investors, such as corporations, represent a much smaller proportion of investors in 
agriculture. Sarah K. Lowder, Brian Carisma and Jakob Skoet, “Who invests in agriculture and how much? An 
empirical review of the relative size of various investments in agriculture in low- and middle-income countries,” ESA 
Working Paper No. 12-09 (December 2012), p. 4.  
9 Indeed, there are no accurate numbers regarding the extent of large-scale land acquisitions, and numbers used by 
academics vary widely. The best effort to collect this information to date, the Land Matrix, claims to have information 
regarding more than 61 million has of land under concluded or intended deals. However, it also notes that its “data 
should not be taken as a reliable representation of reality.” For more information, visit www.landmatrix.org. 
10 For example, taking the Land Matrix information at face value, one could presumably match concession sizes with 
types of crops planned and then, using crop-and-location-specific estimates of jobs per ha, calculate a rough estimate 
of how many jobs might be generated under known land transactions. However, investors do not always intend to 
use their entire concession area for production; for instance, only a small portion of a 100,000-hectare concession 
might be put into production at any given point. Estimates based on areas transferred under land transactions could 
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Section 1. Employment numbers: Terminology, methodology 
and context  
 
There is no universal standard for describing or measuring job creation. This 
complicates assessments and comparisons of the impact that mining or large-scale 
agricultural projects have on job creation. There is not even a universal standard for 
what constitutes a “job” or “employment”: while both are sometimes used more 
narrowly to refer only to waged labor, they are usually used more broadly to 
encompass any income-generating activity, whether salaried or not, including where 
income is not measured in monetary terms. While this report uses the latter definition, 
some employment calculations are limited to the former (which is usually easier to 
estimate). 
The following section describes the various ways that employment is created and the 
difficulties of measuring and comparing employment numbers,  particularly given 
differences in calculating multiplier effects. This section also draws on cases reported in 
the literature to illustrate the importance of context, as employment generated from 
mining and large-scale agricultural projects is influenced by a number of factors.    
 
1.1  Direct, indirect, and induced employment and other linkage effects  
Employment linked to an investment is primarily created in three ways: directly, 
indirectly, or through an induced effect.  
x Direct employment normally includes the mining company’s or the agricultural 
investor’s employees and any on-site contractors.11 Already at this level, the 
reality and the representation can vary from project to project and from study to 
study. For examples, studies of mining jobs may count only full-time jobs or both 
full-time and part-time jobs as direct employment.12  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
thus grossly overestimate the number of jobs that might be created through the investment. Given our caution 
regarding overhyped job numbers, we decline to attempt such calculations ourselves. 
11 International Council on Mining and Metals, Mining: Partnerships for Development Toolkit (London: International 
Council on Mining and Metals, 2011), p. 103. 
12 For instance the Government’s Office of Planning and Budget Utah (Utah State Governor’s Office of Planning and 
Budget, Multipliers for Utah, Utah State and Local Government Fiscal Impact Model (Salt Lake City: Jul 2001), p. 3.) 
explains that in their records Employment includes full-time and part-time jobs and no adjustment is made for hours 
worked on the job whereas the ICMM’s toolkit (International Council on Mining and Metals, 2011, op. cit., p. 103.), 
states that only full-time employment counts. 
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x Indirect employment comprises three components: 1) off-site contractors 
working for the project; 2) suppliers, subcontractors, and their workers whose 
employment is attributable to business generated by the operation; and 3) 
employment generated in the region by social investment activities, including 
local business development, in which the mining operator or agricultural 
investor participates.13 
 
x Induced employment results from the spending effect of direct and indirect 
employment. In other words, an induced effect occurs when direct and indirect 
employees spend their wages (for example, in shops, or on transport and public 
services. For mining projects in particular, the induced effect is generally far 
higher than the indirect effect, especially in the area immediately surrounding 
the mine. For instance, for the year 2007 in the Sepon mine in Laos, a study by 
the International Council on Mining & Metals (ICMM) reports an induced 
employment of 13,110 versus 3,155 people indirectly employed.14 For the Obuasi 
mine in Ghana, another ICMM study describes an induced employment of 
20,000-50,000 versus 1,000-5,000 in indirect employment.15 This induced effect, 
however, may be lower (and direct or indirect employment correspondingly 
higher) if the mine or plantation provides its employees with accommodation, 
food, leisure, or other services, as employees then would not spend on such 
services, which instead would be provided or procured by the company.  
When discussing employment effects, the terms backward and forward linkages are 
often used to describe the relationships between different economic sectors in a national 
or regional economy. Backward and forward linkages signify sectors that respectively 
deliver to and take deliveries from a particular sector. 
One common problem when discussing the anticipated or actual job creation arising 
from investments, or even the number of existing jobs within a country’s specific 
industry, is the frequent lack of clarity around whether employment numbers refer 
solely to direct employment, or also include indirect and induced employment. For 
example, researchers analyzing the employment generation of the Kenyan export-
oriented horticulture sector have noted that it was “often cited that 500 000 people are 
employed in the horticulture industry in Kenya. However, the manner in which this 
figure was calculated is unknown. Worse still, it is not entirely clear what the figure 
                                                             
13 International Council on Mining and Metals, Mining: Partnerships for Development Toolkit (London: International 
Council on Mining and Metals, 2011), p. 86. 
14 International Council on Mining and Metals, “Utilizing mining and mineral resources to foster the sustainable 
development of the Lao PDR,” Mining: Partnerships for Development, (April 2011). 
15 International Council on Mining and Metals, “Ghana: The Challenge of Mineral Wealth: Using Resource 
Endowments to Foster Sustainable Development,” (July 2007). 
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refers to.”16 The researchers explained that the uncertainty extended to whether this 
number discussed employment in the entire industry or just linked to export 
production, whether it was focused only on direct employment or also included indirect 
or induced employment, and whether it counted only full-time workers or also 
encompassed casual, temporary, or seasonal workers. Using firm-level data, the 
researchers estimated that fewer than 100,000 workers were directly employed in the 
Kenyan horticulture industry, a number “considerably below the often-cited figure of 
500 000, suggesting that the latter figure may reflect the total number of beneficiaries of 
horticultural employment (either through multiplier effects [described below] or 
through being in the same household as someone employed in the sector), rather than 
the number of direct employees.”17  
Large projects may also lead to additional employment through linkages other than 
those flowing from production or consumption. For instance, large mining projects 
typically require substantial investment in infrastructure, which often reduces transport 
and other transaction costs and therefore opens up commercial opportunities for local 
businesses with potential employment increases (see Box 1).  
 
Box 1. Development corridors 
Regional development and industrialization policies in southern Africa have relied heavily on 
the concept of development corridors, formalized in the “Spatial Development Initiative” (SDI) 
model. This model is meant to address constraints imposed by infrastructure inadequacy, 
particularly related to transport and energy, which makes many natural resources 
uneconomical to extract. Corridors that group “stranded” but high-rent projects (generally for 
minerals and energy) could help collectively underpin necessary infrastructure investments 
through “use-or-pay” contracts with infrastructure providers.18 Such corridors also offer 
opportunities to capitalize on mining investments in order to support agriculture.19 Yet the 
requisite pooling of usage ideally requires cross-border collaboration, as resource terrains 
seldom follow political boundaries. Corridor development has been included in the Action Plan 
for the implementation of the African Mining Vision, and efforts to initiate integrated multi-
state development corridors have been attempted across sub-Saharan Africa. Yet such corridors 
                                                             
16 John Humphrey, Neil McCulloch, and Masako Ota, “The Impact of European Market Changes on Employment in 
the Kenyan Horticulture Sector,” 16 Journal of International Development 63-80 (2004), pp. 72-73. 
17 Humphrey, McCulloch, and Ota, 2004, op. cit., p. 72-73.  
18 P. Jourdan, “Plan of Action for African Acceleration of Industrialisation: Promoting Resource-Based 
Industrialisation: A Way Forward.” Paper prepared for the African Union Commission, Addis Ababa (August 2008). 
19 Although not without controversy, as corridors have been accused of promoting land grabbing and other modes of 
investment that do not benefit smallholders. See, e.g., CGIAR, Independent Science and Partnership Council, 
ECDPM, and NEPAD, “Corridors, Clusters, and Spatial Development Initiatives in African Agriculture: Workshop 
Report” (Durban, Nov. 30, 2015).  
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have achieved limited success to date, mainly due to problems around cross-border 
coordination.20 
The Maputo Development Corridor (MDC) is generally considered to be one of the more 
successful corridors. Built around the Mozal aluminum smelter near Maputo,21 the corridor 
incorporated a local enterprise development program that aimed to promote the participation 
of local communities and to strengthen local supply chains. This program trained and mentored 
local small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to enable them to bid, win, and deliver on 
construction contracts in conformance with the requisite standards for the Mozal project. By 
some measures, this support to develop backward linkages has been successful. Factors 
underpinning this apparent success include the backing given by the Mozal smelter to direct its 
very large procurement spend to qualifying SMEs, as well as its involvement from the project’s 
early stages. Notably, the program has involved screening and then selecting for industrial 
upgrading local SMEs where some initial supply capacity existed.  
However, many of the participating SMEs were simply registered in Mozambique while 
importing most of their goods from South Africa (on average, about two-thirds of expenditure 
spent on “Mozambican” companies has gone into imports from South Africa).22  Furthermore, it 
has been questioned if the MDC has achieved all of its objectives, particularly regarding broader 
based development: “…it emerges that the main focus and achievement of the MDC has been 
infrastructure development (the toll road, Maputo port, electricity, and the railway line) and the 
Mozal aluminium smelter (large-scale capital intensive with limited employment). Due to the 
transformation process and lack of capacity, the involvement of provincial and local 
government and institutions of civil society in local economic development and poverty 
alleviation as part of the MDC has been minimal...”23 
 
Less tangible linkages that can help increase employment include the creation of 
synergies, such as clustering effects that lead to a geographic concentration of 
interconnected suppliers and associated institutions, and knowledge transfer.      
Indirect and induced employment, as well as other linkages, are different expressions of 
the multiplier effect of direct job creation. Multipliers are estimates of how an initial 
increase in economic activity, for instance an increase in the output of a particular 
                                                             
20 H. Mtegha, P. Leeuw, S. Naicker, and M. Molepo, “Resources corridors: Experiences, economics and engagement; 
A typology of Sub-Saharan African corridors,” EI Sourcebook (2012). 
21 This description is drawn from R. Goode, “Getting the Basics Right: Towards Optimizing Africa’s Mineral Socio-
Economic Linkages,” paper prepared for the International Study Group on Review of African Mining Regimes (2009). 
22 C. N. Castel-Branco and N. Goldin, “Impacts of the MOZAL aluminum smelter on the Mozambican economy: final 
report,” (Maputo, September 21, 2003), available at: 
http://www.iese.ac.mz/lib/cncb/Mozal_and_economic_development.pdf (last visited October 10, 2013). 
23 M.J. Roodt, “Borderlands and spatial development initiatives – The impact of regional integration initiatives in a 
Southern African crossborder region: The Maputo Development Corridor,” in Instituto de Estudios Sociais e 
Económicos, Southern Africa and Challenges for Mozambique (2009). 
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commodity, reverberates throughout the economy and translates into more indirect and 
induced employment.  
When calculated in the same manner, the multiplier effect enables relative comparisons 
of mining and large-scale agricultural projects. Indeed, in theory, within the limits of 
severe constraints that will be addressed in the following sub-section, the multiplier 
effect provides the ability to ascertain which mining or agricultural activities will have 
the largest economic impact.24  While specific country and project contexts will dictate 
the linkages between various sectors, and thus the indirect and induced job creation 
resulting from investments, using the same method of calculating potential job creation 
facilitates generalized findings within countries. 
 
1.2 Comparing multipliers  
Multipliers are calculated in different ways and generated by different models, 
principally input-output (I-O) models or computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
models. The following paragraphs describe the complexities and difficulties of 
estimating multiplier effects and the resulting uncertainties surrounding estimates of 
employment impact and comparisons between projects. The aim is not to provide an 
exhaustive analysis of the problems associated with different ways of calculating 
multipliers, but to illustrate how different results can be obtained depending on the 
inherent assumptions of the technique used.   
First, multiplier effects are often quantified using an input-output model. The I-O 
model “estimates the total economic impact of a project or economic shock by 
presenting estimates of direct, indirect, and induced impacts associated with the project 
or shock.” 25  The model uses input, output and final demand tables to capture a 
snapshot of an entire economy and the interrelationships of its industrial sectors at that 
point in time. The model relies on four rigid assumptions, which are often criticized for 
                                                             
24 Comparisons are nearly always misleading since ceteris paribus almost never holds, so one should be cautious in 
any such undertaking. But, for example, a series of studies undertaken for the International Finance Corporation 
using the same methodology to estimate the number of jobs and value-added that flowed from the IFC’s actual 
investments in Ghana and Jordan, as well as hypothetical investments in Tunisia and Sri Lanka, reveals that 
investment in labor-intensive sectors such as agriculture generally supports a higher number of jobs than investment 
in capital-intensive sectors such as mining. However, jobs in capital-intensive sectors were generally of higher 
productivity, so while investing in agriculture in countries with high unemployment levels may result in more 
significant job creation, investing in mining or other capital-intensive sectors “may lead to more long-term wealth 
creation and possible transformational effects.”  Steward Redqueen, “Summary of Main Findings: Estimating the 
Socioeconomic Impact of IFC Financing: Macro Case Studies from Ghana, Jordan, Sri Lanka and Tunisia,” Case studies 
for International Finance Corporation (2012).  
25 Northwest Territories Bureau of Statistics, “NWT Input-Output Model – An Overview,” Government of the 
Northwest Territories (June 2006), p. 8. 
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being unrealistic: there is no supply constraint (and no opportunity cost of 
employment),26 constant returns to scale, fixed input structure for each industry, and 
fixed output ratios among products produced. Yet in the context of mining 
development, for example, those assumptions are often not met: estimates of effects 
based on linear relationships estimated from historical data do not take into account the 
transformative impact of mining or scale effects. Nevertheless, I-O models often yield 
reasonably good estimates of employment effects and provide an anchor for the 
analysis of these effects.27 More specifically, Armstrong and Taylor’s seminal study 
suggest that input-output models may overestimate short-term output and employment 
effects but are good predictors of such effects over the long run.28 
Computable general equilibrium models, which are less frequently used than I-O 
models and which use only national level data, do not suffer from the same constraints 
as I-O models. While CGE models use I-O tables to show the movement of commodities 
between industries, households, governments, importers, and exporters, they also 
employ a range of elasticity parameters to estimate economic impacts, thus avoiding the 
limitation of linear relationships.29 This means that “a carefully constructed CGE model 
can represent more of the relationships among sectors in a national economy than an I-
O Model (…).”30 
The main limitation of CGE models is that there is no wide consensus around their 
appropriate structure and assumptions. In addition, the CGE structure and assumptions 
used by the model builder are rarely published. This opacity, described by some as a 
“black box,” casts suspicion on the method.31 Moreover, a CGE model requires better 
data, and the cost of acquiring higher quality data means that simple I-O models are 
often preferred in practice – and even those models are often considered ambitious.  
Second, job classifications and outsourcing strategies disrupt the analysis. National 
accounts generally classify jobs according to the business of the employing company 
rather than the job performed. For instance, employees of civil engineering companies 
                                                             
26 O. Östensson, “The Employment Effect of Mine Employees’ Local Expenditure,” 27 Mineral Economics, Combined 2-
3 (2014): "[...] the people employed would otherwise be unemployed and (...) therefore the opportunity cost of 
employing them does not have to be taken into account." 
27 Östensson, 2014, op. cit. 
28 H. Armstrong and J. Taylor, Regional Economics & Policy (Wiley, 2000). 
29 Douglas Frechtling and Egon Smeral, “Measuring and Interpreting the Economic Impact of Tourism: 20/20 
Hindsight and Foresight” in Tourism Research: A 20-20 Vision (Oxford, England: Goodfellow Publishing, 2010), p. 5. 
30 Douglas C. Frechtling, “Exploring the Full Economic Impact of Tourism for Policy Making: Extending the Use of 
the Tourism Satellite Account through Macroeconomic Analysis Tools,” UNTWO, available at: 
http://cf.cdn.unwto.org/sites/all/files/unwto_paper_t20_france.pdf (last visited June 26, 2016). 
31 Ian Sue Wing, “Computable General Equilibrium Models and Their Use in Economy-Wide Policy Analysis: 
Everything You Ever Wanted to Know (But Were Afraid to Ask),” Cambridge, MA: MIT Joint Program on the 
Science and Policy of Global Change (September 2004), p. 2. 
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contracted by the mine are usually not classified as employed in mining.32 Similarly, a 
company that outsources little is counted as making a large contribution to direct 
sectorial employment, but is seen as creating few indirect jobs, whereas a company that 
outsources a lot makes only a small contribution to direct employment but will appear 
to generate many indirect jobs.33 For instance, the difference between the high multiplier 
effect (including induced effect) of the open-pit large-scale Escondida copper mine (5.7) 
as compared to its counterparts, such as the Candelaria mine (1.76), which is another 
large-scale copper mine that is partly underground, is explained by the fact that 
Escondida subcontracts many activities.34 It is therefore difficult to compare the job 
impact of a mining investment based only on the creation of direct employment or 
based only on the multiplier effect of the project. 
Third, it is inherently difficult to assess job impacts in places with limited data 
collection, including where the informal economy is significant. Employment that 
mining companies or agricultural investors do not track is often not documented, for 
example, employment with contractors and subcontractors. This affects the accuracy of 
the calculation of the indirect impact. Similarly, tracking the spending effect of direct 
employees is also difficult when they are likely to spend a substantial part of their 
salary in the informal economy. This influences the accuracy of the induced impact 
calculations.35  
Fourth, the causal link between the mining or agricultural activity and the creation of 
employment may be overestimated, given that other changes occur in the economy at 
the same time and might also contribute to job creation. Indeed, “[i]n the absence of a 
counter factual, it may be difficult to draw conclusions – and it is almost always 
impossible to find a control that meets reasonable requirements of independence.”36 
Fifth, given that multipliers only measure short-term economic changes and are static, 
they do not account for longer-term impacts on a region’s economy. This is an inherent 
limitation, considering that the best horizon to assess mining in particular is the long-
term, especially in areas where the capacity of the potential local supply chain needs to 
be built up over time. One way of calculating longer-term effects is to include 
multipliers in dynamic simulation models, although there are few examples of this 
being done in practice.  
                                                             
32 Östensson, 2014, op. cit. 
33 ISG report 
34 Gary McMahon and Felix Remy, Large Mines and the Community: Socioeconomic and Environmental Effects in Latin 
America, Canada and Spain (Ottawa, Canada: International Development Research Centre and The World Bank, 2001), 
p. 16. 
35 Östensson, 2014, op. cit. 
36 Östensson, 2014, op. cit. 
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Finally, when comparing multipliers, including induced effects,37 one needs to consider 
the geographical scale as well as the level of development of the particular economies 
studied. The multiplier will be lower at the local level than at the national level both 
because inputs are often sourced from elsewhere in the country, and employees are 
purchasing products made elsewhere.38 In addition, the share of income that is spent 
locally is often related to income levels and the degree of diversification of the local 
economy: lower-income individuals tend to spend more of their income on locally-
produced goods, which would have the effect of raising the multiplier effect. At the 
same time, however, local economies in low-income countries tend to offer less of a 
choice of locally-produced products, which again tends to lower the multiplier effect. 
Thus, while multiplier calculations can assist with estimates of the short-to-medium 
term impact of mining and agricultural investments on job creation, the complexities 
related to calculating and comparing their respective impact mean that any analysis is 
likely to be incomplete. The calculations of potential indirect and induced employment 
from mining and agricultural investments can offer useful estimates, yet should be 
viewed with these limitations in mind.  
 
1.3 Context counts: the many factors that affect job creation 
The number of jobs directly and indirectly generated from mining and large-scale 
agricultural investment depends heavily on a range of factors, further complicating 
efforts to understand the employment effects of such investment. This section reviews 
some of the key factors that affect job creation from mining investments, and then 
examines similar factors relevant for large-scale agricultural investments.  
In the mining industry, multiple factors influence the job creation potential of an 
investment. These include the type of ownership, the size of the mine, the mining life 
cycle phase, the type of mining operation, and the type of commodity being extracted.   
The type of ownership is relevant because state-owned mines often employ more 
workers than market-driven companies; reasons for this include “a ‘cradle to grave’ 
corporate responsibility welfare policy,”39 political patronage, pressure from interest 
groups, and fear of political upheaval that could result from layoffs. The higher 
                                                             
37 A distinction is sometimes made between Type I multipliers, which do not include induced effects, and Type II, 
which do.  
38 Richard C. Schodde and Jon M. A. Hronsksy, “The Role of World-Class Mines in Wealth Creation,” 12 Society of 
Economic Geologists (2006), p. 85. 
39 Economic Commission for Africa. “Minerals and Africa’s Development: the International Study Group Report on 
Africa’s Mineral Regimes” (November 2011).   
 24 
employment numbers of state-owned mines has meant that one of the consequences of 
privatization of state-owned companies in certain regions has been the widespread loss 
of jobs.  
The scale of a mining operation can also make a difference and the effect can be more 
than proportional. Since there are economies of scale in most industries, a large mining 
operation can, in principle, sustain more locally-based input-delivering activities than a 
smaller mining operation would be capable of. A study that compared “world class” 
mines - defined as mines with a net present value at the decision-to-build-stage of US$ 
250 million in 2004 dollars - with other mines found that the large-scale mines had 
significantly higher employment multipliers at the regional and national levels. There 
was no difference, however, at the local level.40   
In addition, job creation is much higher during the construction phase than during the 
production stage, because more employees are needed to develop a mine site and build 
the associated transport infrastructure than to operate a mine. After reaching its peak in 
the final stages of construction, employment begins to taper off during the production 
phase. For example, in the case of the Antamina mine, situated in the Peruvian Andes, 
50 contracting companies were engaged during the three-year construction phase, 
which created 9,795 jobs. Since transitioning to the production phase in 2001, however, 
the level of employment through contractors dropped to 2,107 jobs. 41 In turn, at the 
Diavik Diamond mine in the Northwest Territories, Canada, employment increased 
from 297 to 1,114 during the first three-year construction phase. Yet when production 
started, the employment numbers similarly dropped to 611.42  
Accompanying the typical downsizing effect from the construction to production 
phases is a shift in the makeup of employment. In South Australia, for example, the 
majority of workers during the course of construction tend to be tradespersons43 and 
related workers, comprising 68.6 percent of the workforce.44 During the production 
stage, this category drops to 21 percent, while the category of skilled labor—
professionals, associate professionals, and technicians— increases to 35 percent, up 
from 8.7 percent in the construction phase. 
                                                             
40 Richard C. Schodde and Jon M. A. Hronsksy, “The Role of World-Class Mines in Wealth Creation,” 12 Society of 
Economic Geologists (2006), p. 85. This is based on a survey of 22 prior economic studies that cover 51 different mines, 
industries and locations across a range of scales and time periods.  
41 Evelyn Dietsche, Paul Stevens, David Elliot, and Moortaza Jiwanji, The Challenge of Mineral Wealth: Using Resource 
Endowments to Foster Sustainable Development (London: International Council on Mining and Metals, 2007), p. 33. 
42 Diavik Diamond Mines Inc., 2011 Diavik Socio-economic highlights (London, 2 Feb 2012), p. 17. 
43 This term is British/Australian and corresponds almost, but not completely, to skilled workers.  
44 Michael O’Neil and Paul Huntley, “Mining the Labour Market: The Estimated Demand for Labour in the South 
Australia Mining Sector 2006 – 2014,” (Adelaide, Australia: The South Australian Centre for Economic Studies, Apr. 
2006), p. 7. The study is based on a survey of 19 mining companies in South Australia and on the Western Australia 
Minerals Institute Workforce Profile. 
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It should also be noted that most mines go through changes in production capacity 
during their lifetime. This is because production is generally expanded in stages, and 
with each expansion there is a temporary employment peak during the construction of 
the new facilities, as well as higher permanent employment overall once the expanded 
facilities are in operation 
The type of mining operation can also affect its employment impact. Underground 
mining typically generates higher employment numbers than open-pit mining, relative 
to production volume and value. This is because underground mining is more labor 
intensive. In addition, underground operations often require more skilled staff who are 
paid higher wages and thus have more to spend, which may increase the induced effect.  
In any particular context, factors related to the type of commodity may also affect the 
level of job creation. In a study carried out by the State Government of Utah, which 
includes the induced effect in multiplier calculations, commodities were determined to 
have various multiplier effects, with gold and potash having the least impact on the 
economy, and uranium having the most.45 Of course, to be accurate, any comparison of 
the employment effect of mines based on commodities should consider the size of 
mines, the type of mining operation (underground versus open-pit) and the project 
phase; those factors are not mineral-specific. Among the mineral-specific features, the 
most influential factors are the lifespan of the mining project and the mineral grade. Not 
taking other factors into account, a low-grade and long project (more than ten years, 
say) will generate more direct, induced and indirect jobs than a high grade, short 
project. Some commodities tend to have shorter life cycles than others. For example, 
gold projects are on average shorter by several decades than iron-ore projects, because 
gold ore bodies tend to be smaller in extension than iron ore deposits and because the 
cost of the large investments in transport infrastructure that are usually necessary for 
iron ore projects can only be borne by large, long-lived operations. Gold mines will thus 
generally bring about fewer indirect jobs, since it takes time to develop deep linkages 
with the local economy. While the impact of grade is a cross-mineral issue, grade 
variations differ for different minerals. For instance, the grade in bauxite mining varies 
relatively less from one mine to another than in copper mining.  
When the mine necessitates transport infrastructure, such as Rio Tinto’s Simandou 
project, the job impact and the multiplier effects are of course amplified. For instance, 
58% (9,100 Full Time Equivalent) of the job creation associated with the construction of 
the Simandou project will come from the construction of the railway being built to 
transport iron ore from the project site. According to Rio Tinto’s model, the 
                                                             
45 Utah, Governor’s Office of Planning & Budget Demographic & Economic Analysis Section, “Multipliers for Utah,” 
Utah State & Local Government Fiscal Impact Model Working Paper, 2001-1. Salt Lake City: Governor’s Office of 
Planning & Budget Demographic and Economic Analysis Section (July 2001), p. 2. 
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employment multiplier effect is 5.29, which will lead to the creation of 48,100 indirect 
and induced jobs.46 
As with mining projects, the number of jobs directly and indirectly generated by 
investments in large-scale agricultural projects will depend on a number of factors, 
varying with the context of each project and its operating environment. Types of crops, 
methods of production, specific project contexts, and links to agro-processing will 
drastically influence the number of jobs required, and thus created, by a project. This 
renders generalizations regarding the job creation impact of investment in agricultural 
projects fairly imprecise. 
The type of crop produced is one of the most relevant factors affecting the number of 
jobs created through agricultural investments.47 Indeed, the labor intensity linked to 
different crops can lead to widely divergent employment needs. In 2011, in a study on 
large-scale land acquisitions, the World Bank examined business plans for large-scale 
investments, and, using numbers included in the plans, developed estimates of jobs 
created per 1,000 hectares for a number of common commodities. The variation in the 
range is notable. As the least labor-intensive crops, grains supported an estimated 10 
jobs per 1,000 hectares, and soybeans an estimated 18 jobs per 1,000 hectares. On the 
higher end, oil palm supported an estimated 350 jobs per 1,000 hectares, and jatropha 
and rubber both required an estimated 420 jobs per 1,000 hectares.48  
While there is reason to suspect that these estimates are on the high side (see Box 2), 
they highlight the range in job creation potential held by different crop types. These 
different labor outcomes led the World Bank to conclude that “crop choice and 
organization of production will have far-reaching impacts on the scope for agricultural 
growth to reduce poverty,” and to counsel that, in areas where land is limited and 
employment needed, “crops with higher labor intensity … may need to be actively 
promoted.”49 
 
                                                             
46 Rio Tinto 
47 David Cheong and Marion Jansen, “Employment, Productivity, and Trade in Developing-Country Agriculture,” in 
David Cheong, Marion Jansen, and Ralf Peters, eds., Shared Harvests: Agriculture, Trade, and Employment (International 
Labour Organization and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2013), available at: 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ditctncd2013d2_en.pdf (last visited June 26, 2016). 
48 World Bank, Rising Global Interest in Farmland (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The 
World Bank, 2011), pp. 38-39. 
49 World Bank, 2011, op. cit., pp. 38-39. Note, however, that these job creation estimates do not explicitly explain what 
types of jobs are included: for example, there is no indication of whether the jobs created are permanent or seasonal, 
or whether they refer to an average number of jobs spread out over the lifecycle of the project, or simply to jobs 
required in certain phases of production. 
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Box 2: A closer look at job estimate numbers 
The World Bank’s estimates of job creation for different crops, found in a table in its 2011 
“Rising Global Interest in Farmland” report and discussed above, are based on a review of 
investment business plans. Yet investors, who generally tout job creation as one of the 
development benefits of their investment in a project, often have an incentive to overestimate 
the number of jobs that an investment will create. Indeed, a more recent field-based survey by 
the World Bank and UNCTAD of 39 agribusiness investments in Sub-Saharan Africa and South 
East Asia found that the projects created an average of one direct job per twenty hectares. 
Slightly over half were permanent jobs, while the rest were temporary, casual, or seasonal. Yet 
at least half of the projects were focused primarily on palm oil, rice, rubber, and sugar, which 
are some of the most labor-intensive crops, according to the 2011 estimates.50 Similarly, research 
conducted by the Oakland Institute has found that the jobs created through agricultural 
investment schemes are often much fewer than promised: for example, in South Sudan, one 
former parliamentarian claimed that a company had promised 6,000 jobs; however, at its peak, 
allegedly only an estimated 600 people were hired, later reduced to about 250 people after cost 
cutting.51  
Further, comparing the World Bank’s estimates of jobs with numbers found through field data 
also indicates that the estimates may be slightly inflated. One academic, in reviewing and 
responding to the World Bank’s Rising Global Interest in Farmland report, has argued that the 
report’s estimate for numbers of jobs generated by oil palm investment “is too high,” comparing 
the World Bank’s estimates with field data from Indonesia and Malaysia. This discrepancy 
might be partly explained by further examining both sets of numbers. The World Bank’s report 
provided two estimates for oil palm, ranging from 1 job per 2.86 hectares (in the table 
referenced above) to 1 job per 3.7 hectares (in a discussion of oil palm in Indonesia). The 
academic, in turn, cites a report that relies on two studies in Indonesia to estimate 83-85 person 
days per hectare during the operations phase, which leads to a calculation of roughly one job 
per four hectares, and a study that estimates one job per 10 hectares in Malaysia.52  While the 
two estimates of jobs for palm oil in Indonesia are thus fairly comparable, the Bank’s estimate 
for palm oil jobs generally and the academic’s estimate for palm oil jobs in Malaysia differ more 
significantly. One potential explanation for the differences could be that oil palms are cultivated 
both on plantations and by smallholder farmers, with the latter using more labor per hectare. 
This highlights the difficulties of generalized job creation estimates that are not distinguished 
by country, mode of production, or other relevant factors. 
                                                             
50 UNCTAD and World Bank, “The Practice of Responsible Investment Principles in Larger-Scale Agricultural 
Investments: Implications for Corporate Performance and Impact on Local Communities,” Agriculture and 
Environmental Services Discussion Paper 08 (2014). 
51 David Deng, “The Oakland Institute Country Report: South Sudan / Understanding Land Investment Deals in 
Africa,” (2011), pp. 30-32. 
52 Tania Murray Li, “Centering labor in the land grab debate,” 38(2) The Journal of Peasant Studies, 281-298 (2011), p. 
284 (citing studies by Friends of the Earth and Tunku Mohd Nazim Yakob finding that oil palm requires about one 
person per four to ten has, respectively). 
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A separate examination of the labor intensity of various crops reviewed data from 
studies on plantation and large-scale farming in Africa, focusing primarily on 
permanent or regular employment in tobacco, fruit and, horticulture—crops not 
included in the World Bank’s 2011 job estimates. As with those calculations, the 
findings from this review illustrate the varied job creation potential of different crops, 
ranging from 0.01 workers/hectare for maize production in Southern Africa to 7.93 
permanent workers/hectare for pineapple production in one province in South Africa, 
as well as up to 23 workers/hectare for cut flowers in Kenya when non-field labor was 
included.53 Similarly, the Africa Region of the World Bank, in a report on growth poles 
in Sierra Leone, examined the job creation potential of selected crops; while many 
estimates were similar to those found in the 2011 World Bank report, one exception was 
the claim that greenhouse tomatoes create an estimated 2000+ full-time employees per 
1,000 has.54 
In addition to the distinct labor intensity of different crops, differences in how a crop is 
grown and harvested can also result in different labor requirements. For example, the 
World Bank’s 2011 chart provided three different numbers for sugarcane-ethanol 
production: 150 jobs per 1,000 hectares for sugarcane-ethanol that was irrigated with a 
mechanized harvest in Mozambique, 153 jobs per 1,000 hectares when rainfed with a 
partly mechanized harvest in Brazil, and 700 jobs per 1,000 hectares when irrigated and 
manually harvested in Tanzania. This range illustrates the significance of 
mechanization as a factor in labor intensity and thus job creation potential: the higher 
the likelihood of mechanization, the lower the number of potential direct jobs.55  
Increased mechanization, as well as capital-intensive use of inputs, such as fertilizer, 
can clearly reduce labor needs and thus employment opportunities, and is more likely 
to occur on larger and more capital-intensive operations. Thus, agricultural growth 
based on highly mechanized and conventional, rather than organic,56 production will be 
                                                             
53 Peter Gibbon, “Experiences of Plantation and Large-Scale Farming in 20th Century Africa,” DIIS Working Paper 
2011:20 (2011) (internal citations omitted).  
54 Africa Region Vice Presidency, World Bank, “Sierra Leone Growth Pole Diagnostic: The Growth Poles Program 
[First Phase]" (July 2013), p. 41. 
55 The extent to which mechanization is used to produce or harvest crops depends, in turn, on other considerations, 
including the type of crop, the cost of labor, the cost of machinery, and, occasionally, the planned use for the 
harvested crop. Of course, methods of production might have other implications for indirect employment. For 
example, mechanized production that also is highly dependent on inputs could conceivably prove more significant 
for indirect employment potential than less mechanized and less input-intensive farming.  
56 Organic agricultural production methods are often more labor intensive than mechanized conventional methods, 
although this can depend on crops and other factors, including the labor-intensity of conventional methods in 
specific regions. For example, while organic agricultural production generally requires more labor than conventional 
production in Europe, in other places, organic farming has not always resulted in significantly higher labor 
requirements. “Evaluating the Potential Contribution of Organic Agriculture to Sustainability Goals,” FAO’s 
technical contribution to IFOAM’s Scientific Conference, 1998; see also Kees Jansen, “Labour, Livelihoods and the 
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unlikely to generate high levels of employment or provide significant poverty-reduction 
benefits, as the World Bank acknowledges in a review of the experience of “rapid 
agricultural growth” in the Brazilian cerrado. 57  Indeed, increasingly mechanized 
production in certain areas may end up imitating the historical progression in Europe, 
whereby labor was pushed off of farms and redirected towards industrialization. 
Conversely, however, the ILO and UNCTAD have argued that, while large commercials 
farms producing cash crops through mechanized and input-intensive methods 
generally have reduced labor intensity in terms of jobs per ha, “given larger output, 
market-oriented farming tends to increase the absolute level of employment.” 58  Of 
course, as Smalley points out, the shift towards more capital and less labor “has not 
occurred uniformly over time and the results are not necessarily straightforward. … 
The relative contributions of capital, land and labour thus varies across plantation 
sectors and systems, as does the overall level of mechanisation and capital 
investment.”59  
Aside from types of crops and methods of production, other factors specific to the 
production context also influence the amount of labor required for agricultural 
production, and the type of jobs generated by a specific investment. For example, as the 
ILO and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) explain 
in a joint report: “Labour demand and the set of required agricultural tasks also are 
influenced by land characteristics and irrigation. The size of plots determines the 
feasibility of animal or vehicle tractors (and less use of labour); soil fertility determines 
whether agricultural workers apply fertilizer; and the availability and quality of water 
determine if agricultural workers need to draw and carry water from tanks, wells, or 
rivers.”60 
While the size of plot relates to the feasibility of mechanization, the size of investments 
generally is not indicative of job creation potential. One review by the World Bank and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Quality of Life in Organic Agriculture in Europe,” Biological Agriculture and Horticulture, Vol. 17 (2000), pp. 251-54; 
David W. Crowder and John P. Reganold, “Financial competitiveness of organic agriculture on a global scale,” 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, vol. 112 no. 24, 7611-7616 (June 2015). 
Other factors tied to organic farming can also have labor implications. For example, organic farming methods are 
more likely to favor crop diversification, thus helping to spread labor requirements throughout the year. Organic 
farming methods can also provide health benefits to employees by reducing exposure to certain chemicals.   
57 World Bank, 2011, op. cit., p. 17. However, this is also context-specific, as higher labor productivity resulting from 
mechanization can sometimes lead to higher wages, which in turn can lead to higher induced employment, as well as 
reduced poverty.  
58 David Cheong, Marion Jansen, and Ralf Peters, eds., Shared Harvests: Agriculture, Trade, and Employment 
(International Labour Organization and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2013), p. 36, 
available at: http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ditctncd2013d2_en.pdf (last visited June 26, 2016). 
59 Rebecca Smalley, “Plantations, Contract Farming and Commercial Farming Areas in Africa: A Comparative 
Review,” Land and Agriculture Commercialisation working paper No. 055 (April 2013), p. 8. 
60 Cheong, Jansen and Peters, 2013, op. cit., p. 37. 
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UNCTAD of 39 large-scale agribusiness investments in sub-Saharan Africa and South 
East Asia found that, while job creation was the most common benefit associated with 
such investments, “[l]arge land allocations do not necessarily create the most jobs per 
ha.”61 Similarly, researchers found in a study of 150 Ethiopian land deals that “130 
offered fewer than 50 full-time equivalent jobs, and there was no trend towards higher 
levels of employment with higher capital investment.”62  
Yet the type of large-scale agricultural investment can be a factor in job creation, and 
investment in agricultural projects that incorporate some processing may generate more 
jobs. Although this may not be the case for bulk agricultural commodities,63 which by 
their nature are not processed or are minimally processed, coupling other types of 
products with value-addition or processing activities may help establish greater 
employment numbers. For example, as researchers found in the Kenyan horticulture 
industry, the shift towards producing prepared vegetables led to greater labor 
requirements. The researchers estimated that “prepared vegetable production is 
between 2.5 and 5 times more labour intensive than unprepared vegetable production. 
Data from one leading Kenyan exporter suggests that at the packhouse, prepared 
vegetables require four times as much labour for processing than unprepared.”64 In 
addition to the creation of direct jobs, upstream agro-processing of non-bulk 
agricultural commodities, or even more sophisticated downstream agro-processing, 
such as manufacturing food items, can generate indirect and induced employment, 
though the multiplier itself will vary.65  
As with mining, specific country or regional contexts will also influence the linkages 
that exist between agriculture and the rest of the economy, as well as the multiplier 
effect of investments. For example, researchers have estimated the general agricultural 
multiplier to be slightly higher in Asia than in Africa and Latin America, possibly 
                                                             
61 UNCTAD and World Bank, “The Practice of Responsible Investment Principles in Larger-Scale Agricultural 
Investments: Implications for Corporate Performance and Impact on Local Communities,” Agriculture and 
Environmental Services Discussion Paper 08 (2014). 
62 Lorenzo Cotula and Sonja Vermeulen, “Contexts and Procedures for Farmland Acquisitions in Africa: What 
outcomes for local people?” 54(1) Development 40-48 (Mar 2011), pp. 45-46 (citing Lorenzo Cotula, Sonja Vermeulen, 
Rebeca Leonard, and James Keeley, Land Grab or Development Opportunity? Agricultural investment and international 
land deals in Africa (London: International Institute for Environment and Development, 2009)). 
63 World Bank, 2011, op. cit., p. 38. 
64 John Humphrey, Neil McCulloch and Masako Ota, “The Impact of European Market Changes on Employment in 
the Kenyan Horticulture Sector” 16 Journal of International Development 63-80 (2004), p. 74. 
65 For an explanation of upstream (initial processing) and downstream (further manufacturing) agroprocessing, see 
FAO, “The State of Food and Agriculture: The Agroprocessing Industry and Economic Development” FAO 
Agriculture Series No. 30 (1997), p. 223. Aside from backward and forward linkages, there are also “sideway linkages” 
that arise “from the use of by-products or waste products of the main industrial activity.” P. 236. Though jobs can be 
created through agroprocessing, the FAO cautions that upstream agroprocessing vertically integrated into a 
plantation economy can engender “a production system that is often founded on forms of disfranchisement of 
labourers and small cultivators.” P. 237.  
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because of the “[h]igher population density and the labor-abundant nature of the Asian 
economies, which facilitate a larger supply response of the non-tradable sector.”66 In 
addition, agriculture and its linkages can have distinct impacts on the rest of the 
economy depending on a country’s stage of development, which researchers describe as 
“an evolving relation of agriculture to the rest of the economy, from encouraging 
growth elsewhere in the economy at low levels of development (still the case in many 
[Sub-Saharan African] countries), developing into a more mutually beneficial 
relationship as countries grow, to eventually ending up in a stage where growth outside 
agriculture drives growth (potentially even at the expense of agriculture).”67  
Compared to mining, relatively few papers have measured and analyzed the 
employment impacts of large-scale agricultural investments, particularly in terms of the 
specific numbers of jobs generated, even though job creation is frequently provided as 
one of the major benefits engendered by such investments. Yet the studies that have 
been undertaken regarding job creation linked to agricultural investment have not 
shown as many jobs, or benefits from those jobs, as one might expect. As the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) has noted, “[w]hile a number of 
studies document the negative impacts of large-scale land acquisition in developing 
countries, there is much less evidence of its benefits to the host country, especially in the 
short term and at local level. The main type of benefits appears to be the generation of 
employment, but there are questions as to the sustainability of the created jobs. In 
several projects the number of jobs has decreased over time and, in any case, was lower 
than what was initially announced by the investor.”68 Indeed, while the jobs generated 
by investments usually provide important opportunities for those who receive them, 
and while agriculture in general can provide important poverty reduction impacts, the 
overall job generation benefits of large-scale agricultural investments are less clear.  
                                                             
66 Luc Christiaensen, Lionel Demery and Jesper Kuhl, “The (evolving) role of agriculture in poverty reduction—An 
empirical perspective” United Nations University working paper No. 2010/35 (April 2010) (“Reviewing the multitude 
of studies calculating the agricultural multiplier effects Haggblade et al. (2007a, p. 167, our emphasis) conclude that 
‘best-guess generalizations (of the agricultural multiplier) probably lie in the range of 1.6 to 1.8 for Asia and 1.3 to 1.5 
for Africa and Latin America’. Every dollar in direct income generated in agriculture, triggers another 30 to 80 cents 
in second round income gains elsewhere in the economy.”) 
67 Christiaensen, Demery and Kuhl, 2010, op. cit., p. 245. 
68 FAO, “Trends and impacts of foreign investment in developing country agriculture,” (November 12, 2012), 
available at: http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/est/INTERNATIONAL-




1.4 Incentives and disincentives to exaggerate job creation 
A final complication in the quest to comprehend employment effects arising from 
mining and agricultural investments is the potential for governments, investors, or 
other stakeholders to exaggerate such effects. This complicates any efforts to glean an 
understanding of employment impacts through employment estimates, such as the 
World Bank agriculture study discussed in the section above. Perhaps more 
importantly, inflated estimates can lead to unrealized expectations that are unmatched 
by reality, which in turn can fuel disappointment or tensions on the part of stakeholders 
who expected more.  
Both governments and investors have incentives to inflate job estimates. One of the 
more easily understandable indicators of success in the area of economic policy is job 
creation.69 Governments are anxious to show that they have provided citizens and 
voters with a large number of jobs. Accordingly, when possible, they are inclined to 
favor investors who promise to create significant employment. Companies are quick to 
pick up on this, and they are also aware that job opportunities are the one factor that 
may swing the mood of an otherwise hostile or suspicious local population to 
acceptance of a mining project. There are therefore considerable incentives for both 
investors and governments to inflate employment numbers in plans and projections 
and to establish a common ground built on mutually supportive exaggerations of the 
number of future jobs. By themselves, these incentives are perhaps sufficient to explain 
a large portion of the discrepancy between reality and expectation.  
One reason why such collusion between governments and companies could be less 
common than expected at first glance, however, is because hype can have repercussions 
down the road when people are confronted with the reality. If projects proceed as 
planned, the companies are likely to still be around to suffer from the resulting damage 
to their credibility and relationship with local communities. Governments may be less 
likely to suffer the consequences of exaggerations: they may, for example, find it easier 
to drown the issue of employment in other issues. Moreover, governments change, and 
a new government might not be seen as accountable for failing to fulfill promises made 
by its predecessor.   
                                                             
69 For example, employment is commonly included among the objectives of mining policy and legislation. The 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act of South Africa, for instance, states as one of the objectives of the 
Act, to “promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of all South Africans” (MPRDA, 2002, 
Article 2). The Mineral Proclamation of Ethiopia uses exactly the same formulation: “promote employment and 
advance the social and economic welfare of all Ethiopians” (Proclamation 678/2010, Article 4.3).    
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While the incentives to overstate employment estimates may be offset by the risk to 
credibility, discrepancies between expectations and reality are also exacerbated by the 
failure of investors to communicate their intentions clearly and effectively. While 
companies may consider that they have been clear in their communication efforts, 
cultural, and linguistic factors may render their efforts useless.70 Obstacles related to the 
use of technology may also play a considerable role in failed communications.71   
In addition, other aspects of mining and agricultural investments also serve to widen 
the gap between expectations and perceptions of reality. These factors have to do with 
questions such as: When do the jobs come? What type of jobs will they be? Who will get 
the jobs?  Sections 2 and 3 discuss these and other issues in the context of mining and 
agricultural investments, respectively. 
  
                                                             
70 Mondoloko’s characterization of the problem is enlightening: “The prevailing feeling among the mining 
communities surveyed was mistrust and, in several cases, open hostility towards the mining companies. This 
sentiment was fed by several factors foremost of which was the uniform perception among ordinary people that the 
mining companies were reaping super profits at the expense of the economic and social wellbeing of the community. 
For their part, the mining companies interviewed seemed perplexed at the lack of appreciation for their CSR 
interventions and positive impacts on their communities. This mismatch of perceptions is partly fed by the lack of a 
process for managing expectations through community consultation, on the one hand, and monitoring and reporting 
services delivery, on the other.” Angel Mondoloka, “Job and Wealth Creation Impact of Mining Community 
Development Programmes in Zambia,” report prepared for the ILO (January 2014). 
71 Mondoloka, 2014, op. cit. (describing a situation in Zambia where community members were told to apply over the 
Internet and submit to phone interviews if they were seeking a job with the mining company in question, even 
though community members pointed out that most of them are either illiterate or semi-literate and that they had 
neither the Internet skills nor access to enable them to apply online or to field a phone interview).  
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Section 2. Mining Employment Numbers: Nuances and 
complications  
 
As discussed above, the direct, indirect, and induced employment numbers generated 
by investments in the mining sector need to be carefully analyzed to realistically assess 
the potential of local job creation in and related to the sector. Yet it is also important to 
examine what happens to the economic and social fabric of a mining region when 
investment, and local job creation, occurs. On the one hand, host communities often 
reap economic and social benefits due to, for example, higher incomes, as well as 
increased access to business financing, training, infrastructure, and education.  On the 
other hand, some consequences for the host economy and local communities can be 
negative. This section explores questions that governments, companies, and civil society 
should consider when assessing the local job creation potential from mining 
development, with a focus on some of the typical side effects related to employment 
impacts that can result from mining investments. Box 3 discusses the issue of whether 
new jobs in mining constitute a net addition to employment or are at least partly offset 
by job losses in other sectors. 
 
Box 3: Do new mining jobs constitute a net addition of employment? 
Concerns about job transfers linked to increases in mining sector revenues have sometimes 
centered on the effects of the so-called “Dutch Disease,” a term first coined by the Economist in 
in 1977 to describe the Netherlands’ negative experience in the 1960s when the manufacturing 
sector withered as natural gas exports grew. The Dutch disease results from the huge influx of 
foreign capital as a result of natural resource exports, which leads to a currency appreciation 
that in turn makes both a country’s other exports more expensive and uncompetitive, as well as 
its domestically produced goods that compete with imports.   
As a consequence of the change in relative competitiveness, labor will tend to shift from the 
non-resource tradable goods (products that are traded internationally) sector to the non-
tradable goods sector and to the prospering mining sector. The net impact of this shift will 
depend on several factors, including relative wages and productivity in traded and non-traded 
goods sectors.  
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Yet because the mining sector is typically capital-intensive, job transfer to the mining sector 
should have negligible effects on the lagging export sector.72 Job transfer to the non-traded 
goods sector is often more important.73   
However, the full effects of the Dutch Disease are only realized if an economy’s labor and 
capital are fully employed before the resource export boom. This is often not the case in 
resource-rich, low- and middle-income countries, which typically have significant labor 
surpluses, particularly in the informal sector. In such places, when the mining sector begins to 
develop and expand, unemployed job seekers could fill any jobs that become vacant in non-
mining sectors if their holders move to the mining sector. Accordingly, the increase in the cost 
of labor is likely to be limited and may not reduce the competitiveness of the traded goods 
sector significantly, unless mining and other traded goods sectors compete for scarce skilled 
labor. Moreover, appreciation of the real exchange rate due to the effect of increased liquidity 
on inflation could still prevent the development of a nascent manufacturing sector if skilled 
labor is scarce.  
 
  
2.1 When do the jobs come?  
Mining projects have a long gestation period. From the time a geologist first arrives in a 
village to inform the inhabitants about the possibility of a future mine until the mine is 
actually developing, one or more decades may pass. It is not surprising that during this 
long period, while the mining company is busy exploring for minerals, designing the 
mine, raising finance, and weighing its investment decision, some local community 
members may conclude that the talk about jobs was just talk. It might be the case in 
particular when companies carrying out exploration inform local communities (because 
they are obliged to by legislation or as a matter of company policy) on the potential job 
benefits even though most projects never lead to a mine.  Furthermore, those who do 
believe that the mine will eventually be built may be confused by changing estimates of 
employment that arise as different technical and infrastructural solutions are analyzed.  
As noted above, employment in large mining projects usually varies considerably over 
the life of the project, particularly during the initial stages. It is common for mining 
projects to exhibit a peak of employment during construction, when much more labor is 
needed than during production. Employees, who often may have only a sketchy idea of 
                                                             
72 W. Max Corden, “Booming sector and the Dutch disease economics: survey and consolidation,” 36(3) Oxford 
Economic Papers 359–380 (1984). 
73 See, e.g., J. Cust, “The Spatial Effects of Resource Extraction: Mining In Indonesia,” OxCarre discussion paper 
(2014) (describing such an effect in the 15-km radius around a mine in Indonesia). 
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the distinction between the construction and production phases, may expect the levels 
of employment during the construction phase to remain the same during operations. 
This is particularly understandable when large projects are in a phase of almost 
continuous expansion during the first several years. For instance, at the Tenke 
Fungurume project in Katanga province of the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
construction of the first phase started in 2006. When production began in 2009, 
construction of the second phase, which almost doubled the production capacity, had 
already started. When the second phase was completed at the end of 2012, construction 
of the third phase, which raised production capacity by 50 per cent, had begun.74 This 
example illustrates that over the first several years of a mine’s life, more than half of the 
people on the mine site may be working on construction tasks.  
The consequences of the confusion surrounding job numbers during different phases of 
a mining project are further exacerbated by skills requirements that vary over time. 
While a large proportion of unskilled labor is needed during the construction phase, 
there is much less need for such labor once production has started. Since the skilled 
labor needed to operate the mine generally will have been recruited and, if necessary, 
trained by the time construction work ends, there is often no room for retraining 
construction workers. 
 
2.2 Mining-related job creation: what jobs and for whom at the local level?  
Mining-generated employment has the potential to increase income beyond what could 
have been earned in alternative livelihoods. For example, in Tanzania in 2014, the 
average pay for mineworkers was Shs 200,000 to Shs 400,000 per month (US$ 120-240), a 
relatively high salary compared to other jobs (for instance for the same year, the 
minimum wage in “trade, industry and commerce” was Shs 100,000 and for “other 
domestic workers” it was Shs 40,000).75   
In Zambia, mine employees generally have much higher wages than other formal sector 
employees, while employees of contractors working for mines earn at least the formal 
sector minimum wage, which is higher than what people earn in the informal sector. 
For example, among four mining companies studied in Zambia, the lowest monthly 
salary for workers employed by the mining companies themselves was US$ 619.80 and 
                                                             
74 Tenke Fungurume Mining, personal communication 
75 http://www.africapay.org/tanzania/home/salary/minimum-wages; In Mark Curtis and Tundu Lissu, “A golden 
opportunity?: How Tanzania is failing to benefit from Gold Mining,” Second Edition (October 2008), available at: 
http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/407/goldenopp.pdf (last visited June 26, 2016), it is also said that “The 
average pay for mineworkers in Tanzania is Shs160,000 to Shs300,000 (US$128 to US$240) a month. This is a high 
salary compared to other jobs, in areas where few other jobs are available. “ 
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the median salary was about US$ 800; the minimum wage at the same time was US$ 
128.76  However, the privatization of copper mining in Zambia that took place from 1998 
to 2004 meant that when the new owners rehabilitated the mines in order to increase 
production, which resulted in increased employment, a higher portion of those hired 
were employed by contractors rather than by the mining companies themselves as had 
previously been the case. Those employed by contractors tend to have fewer benefits 
and lower salaries than mining company employees. Some of them are probably former 
employees of Zambian Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM), the state-owned mining 
company that used to operate the privatized mines, and consequently have experienced 
a large decline in living standards over the long term. The disappointment experienced 
by those mine workers has probably contributed to the negative image of the copper 
mining industry in Zambia that is given in much of the literature.77  
When mine workers have substantially higher incomes than other local community 
members, this disparity can lead to social friction over income differences and 
diminished local cohesion. Careful recruitment policies on the part of mining 
companies that spread the income more evenly can help reduce the friction. For this 
reason, at the Sepon mine in Laos, for instance, the company has taken care to not 
recruit more than one person from each household. Recruitment has also been 
distributed between the two linguistic groups in the area. As a result, income 
inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, has diminished to some extent.78  
Often, however, income inequality at the local level may remain unchanged or be 
exacerbated by the persistence of local unemployment as a result of the mismatch 
between the skills required by the mining company or its sub-contractors and the skills 
possessed by the local population. As has already been noted, skills requirements 
change over the life of a project, with low-skill labor needed primarily during the 
construction phase. Moreover, trends towards increased mechanization and automation 
                                                             
76 Chamber of Mines of Zambia and ICMM, “Enhancing mining’s contribution to the Zambian economy and society,” 
(April 2014). 
77 For instance, Zarina Geloo explains that now mine workers are “low-skilled casual labourers, who are often paid 
below the minimum wage and are not entitled to accommodation, health care or education allowances;” Z. Geloo, 
“Cursed by Copper: Mining Communities in Zambia,” OSISA (June 20, 2013), available at: 
http://www.osisa.org/openspace/zambia/cursed-copper-zambia (last visited June 26, 2016); James Ferguson uses the 
term “abjection” and explains that “abjection can be understood as the process by which mineworkers have been 
‘thrown aside, expelled or discarded’ during the economic liberalisation and privatisation of the Copperbelt, leading 
to a sense of ‘debasement and humiliation.’” J. Ferguson, “Abjection and the aftermath of modernism,” in 
Expectations of modernity: Myths and meanings of urban life on the Zambian Copperbelt (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California, 1999), pp. 234-54. 
78 International Council on Mining and Metals, 2011, op. cit. 
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mean both that less manual labor is needed and that the remaining jobs increasingly 
require sophisticated training.79  
For these reasons, the share of the local population that succeeds in finding 
employment with the mine is likely to be rather small. For instance, Rio Tinto has 
observed that in the case of the Simandou project in Guinea, less than 5% of the 
population in the local and regional area is literate and only about 5% are engaged in 
formal employment. Therefore, skilled positions will likely benefit experienced Guinean 
nationals from other regions or Guinean expatriates returning to Guinea if management 
jobs are available.80  
In this context, it is important to differentiate between the job creation in the local/ 
proximate economy surrounding the mine and national employment generation. Many 
projects commit to hiring local workers through preferential employment policies. 
However, the meaning of the term “local” varies. For instance, at the national level, the 
term “local” describes a citizen of the country; as such, all citizens – whether they reside 
in the project area or have migrated to it – are deemed “local.” Within the project area, 
however, the term is usually interpreted to describe a person originating from and 
habitually resident in the area in which the project is situated. In this context, 
recruitment may well be conducted locally, but it may not be a “local” who is recruited.  
Local disappointment with employment opportunities is common. Most local 
communities have no particular reason to judge the overall employment outcomes of a 
mining project. They instead will be interested in how many job opportunities are 
                                                             
79 The paradox is that with increased sophistication of mining techniques and technology and the trend towards 
frontier mining that is, mining taking place in areas that have not been exploited previously, the better jobs are 
becoming hard to fill with expatriates.  According to a PwC report analyzing recent mining trends, companies are 
growing increasingly concerned with the “labor crunch” (PwC, “Mine 2011, the game has changed: review of global 
trends in the mining industry” (2011).  In their concern of a skills shortage, some mining firms are claiming that 
automating certain processes will make a dent in this problem: “The lack of skilled mining professionals is likely to 
be one of the key drivers in next generation mining… leading mining companies to embrace mine automation to help 
solve their labor shortages and ramp up output.”  (PR Newswire, “Mine Site Automation an Answer to Mining Skill 
Shortages,” available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aPYMXCg.EwTo, August 1, 
2011 (last visited January 30, 2013.)) Shortages of skilled mining labor have been reported or forecast in Australia, 
Canada and the United States in the past several years. See, for instance, “Labour Shortage Threatens to Cripple 
Australian Mining,” International Business Times, October 19, 2011, available at: http://www.ibtimes.com.au/labor-
shortage-threatens-cripple-australian-mining-1287731 (last visited June 26, 2016); “Mining Industry embraces 
technology as skilled workforce diminishes, according to BDO study,” BDO International, March 13, 2013, available 
at: http://www.bdointernational.com/News/Pages/Mining-industry-embraces-technology-as-skilled-workforce-
diminishes,.aspx (last visited June 26, 2016); Sudbury & Manitoulin, “Sudbury Mining Hiring Requirements 
Forecasts,”(2012). As a result of the shortage, salaries of expatriate staff have gone up, which has made it more 
attractive for companies to train local personnel.  
80 Rio Tinto, “Employment and Economic Development,” in Simandou Social and Environmental Impact Assessments 
(SEIA), Volume II – Simandou Rail, available at: http://www.riotinto.com/documents/R_Ch16_EED_EN.pdf (last 
visited June 26, 2016). 
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available to people from their community. It is natural for people living near a future 
mine site to believe that they will have priority regarding job opportunities. They may 
understand their position to be one of quasi-contracting parties who are asked to 
tolerate a certain amount of inconvenience and, in return, will receive job offers. When 
it becomes clear that only some of the local population – and in some cases, only a very 
small share – will be employed, this is interpreted as a breach of faith. A further 
complication is that, as already mentioned, it is not always clear who is considered 
“local.” In-migration occurring because of the mining project may add to or create 
ethnic rivalries, particularly if it results in significant changes to the composition of the 
population. This in turn, further puts into question which group is “local.” 81 
A lack of requisite skills in local communities can also limit the magnitude of indirect 
employment creation. Furthermore, established mining supplier firms in one part of a 
country may have a competitive advantage when mining commences in another part of 
the country, and thus may account for a considerable share of indirect employment. In 
the Northwestern province of Zambia, for instance, where copper mining is relatively 
recent, many of the services to mining companies are supplied by enterprises based in 
the historical mining areas in the Copperbelt province.82 The fact that the Copperbelt is 
within easy commuting distance, at least on a weekly basis, means that the employment 
impact of these companies in Northwestern province is minimal.   
In some cases, companies may believe that their procurement needs cannot be met in 
the host country, due to a lack of skills or capacity. In this case, companies may look to 
source from neighboring countries. For instance, extractive projects in Mozambique 
have been known to invest large sums in procurement. However, there are more South 
African and Zimbabwean companies benefiting from these projects than local 
companies, because there are few Mozambican companies with the capacity to provide 
the needed services to the mega-projects.83 For example, South African firms provided 
electrical equipment and instrumentation for gas treatment centers, steelwork, and 
plant vehicles for the construction of the Mozal aluminum smelter in Mozambique.84 
                                                             
81 For instance, in the town of Tenke, located inside the Tenke Fungurume Mining concession area in Katanga, DRC, 
46% of the population defined themselves as Sanga, the dominant local ethnic group, in 2006. Most of the rest of the 
population came from other parts of Katanga and less than 10% from other provinces or abroad. In 2009, when 
mining started, the Sanga represented 31% and the share of people from other parts of Katanga had increased 
correspondingly (George Koppert, A. B. Kasongo, S. K. Manyong, P. N. Kalamu, and L. Day, “Tenke Fungurume 
Mining SARL (TFM), Socio-Economic Baseline Report,” Tenke Fwaulu Exclusion Zone, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Groupe d’Etude des Populations Forestières Equatoriales, Paris (2010)).  
82 ICMM, “Partnerships for Development Toolkit,” Mining in Zambia (2014).  
83 SymeMarmion &Co, “Extractive Industry and Sustainable Regional Development” (June 2010). 
84 Economic Commission for Africa, “Minerals Cluster Policy Study in Africa: Pilot Studies of South Africa and 
Mozambique,” (Addis Ababa: Economic Commission for Africa, December 2004), pp. 119 - 120. 
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The enabling environment can also block local companies from benefitting from 
companies’ procurement strategies. There is often a high cost associated with setting up 
a formal sector enterprise, and access to finance may be limited. In places with weak or 
unclear property rights, entrepreneurs can also not use their land titles as collateral to 
access loans. As a result of these factors, many entrepreneurs operate in the informal 
economy, which makes transactions with mining companies nearly impossible. 
 
2.3 Socio-economic change and net employment impact  
Large-scale mining will have a drastic impact on the socio-economic fabric of a mining 
area.  Employment, trade and business opportunities, improved infrastructure, and 
services around new mining projects often draw people to a mining region, and lead to 
economic, physical, environmental, and social transformation. Some of these changes 
will be seen as positive by some local residents, and negative by others. Other impacts, 
such as disruption of livelihoods, are generally negative and will need to be mitigated. 
These socio-economic changes have implications for employment and livelihood 
strategies in mining areas. 
 
In-migration 
According to an International Finance Corporation (IFC) study on project-induced in-
migration,85 the intensity of in-migration impacts depends largely on the assimilative 
capacity of the area, which is defined as “the rate and nature of project-induced 
increases in population that an area can absorb without development of significant 
adverse environmental and social impacts.”86  In-migration can bring benefits to local 
communities.  The population growth brought on by in-migrants generally drives a 
greater allocation of resources toward the area in the form of infrastructure and public 
services. The arrival of migrants increases the demand for goods and services, such as 
accommodation, transportation, and food, thereby providing a boost to local businesses 
and the local economy. In-migrants may also bring new skills and resources; by 
working with or employing locals, they could help host communities expand their 
capacities, skills and knowledge.87 Migrants who bring or set up businesses may hire 
                                                             
85 Project induced in-migration involves the movement of people into an area in anticipation of, or in response to, 
economic opportunities associated with the development and/or operation of a new project. International Finance 
Corporation World Bank Group, “Projects and People: a handbook for addressing project-induced in-migration,” 
(September 2009), p. 4. 
86 International Finance Corporation World Bank Group, 2009, op. cit., p. 19. 
87 International Finance Corporation World Bank Group, “Projects and People: a handbook for addressing project-
induced in-migration,” (September 2009), p. 26. 
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from the local workforce. Increased technical capacity, greater wealth accumulation, 
and access to new markets could create a virtuous cycle. Fungurume town in Katanga 
province of the Democratic Republic of Congo reflects this situation: since mine 
development started, its population has tripled and its economy has diversified from 
artisanal mining and smallholder farming to include more commerce. This is due partly 
to the rehabilitation by the mining company of the road linking Fungurume to 
Lubumbashi, the provincial capital, cutting the traveling time from two days to four 
hours. As a consequence, traders from other parts of the province can reach 
Fungurume, increasing local supplies of consumer goods; at the same time, local 
farmers now have an outlet for their produce.88 
Not all aspects of the in-migration related socio-economic changes are positive. 
Negative impacts include increased competition over jobs and resources; higher local 
inflation; and strain on infrastructure and on the environment. For instance, Rio Tinto 
notes that, in the context of its Simandou mine, increased spending by the mine 
employees and in-migrants might trigger inflation in local prices; it acknowledges that 
this inflationary pressure will be particularly deleterious for those who are 
economically vulnerable. 89  These negative side effects of shifts associated with the 
mining project can raise considerable tensions in the region. They can also negatively 
affect the project’s reputation and its “social license to operate.”90  
 
Displacement and disruption of livelihoods 
When mining companies appropriate inhabited land for their operations, local 
communities often are displaced and resettled. Legislation in most countries accords 
priority to mining rights over other land uses, which may leave local communities 
without legal grounds to refuse resettlement. The implications of resettlement can be 
wide-ranging and tragic. They may include “loss of physical and non-physical assets, 
including homes, communities, productive land, income earning assets and sources, 
subsistence, resources, cultural sites, social structures, networks and ties, cultural 
identity, and mutual help mechanisms.” 91 Resettlement initiatives – and particularly 
those that are not designed carefully – can severely disrupt livelihoods.92 
                                                             
88 Olle Ostensson and Alan Roe, “Sustainable Mining How good practices in the mining sector contribute to more and 
better jobs,” OPM, (December 2013). 
89 Rio Tinto, 2016, op. cit. 
90 Rio Tinto, 2016, op. cit. 
91 Theodore E. Downing, “Avoiding New Poverty: Mining-Induced Displacement and Resettlement,” (London, UK: 
International Institute for Environment and Development, Apr. 2002). 
92 One example of a resettlement with negative livelihood consequences comes from the Tete province of 
Mozambique, where the Benga mine forced the resettlement of a community from the fertile lands along the 
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For communities that use their lands as a means of financial sustenance, traditional and 
generational knowledge of the local ecosystems may not be transferable to their new 
lands and can hinder their livelihoods in agriculture, husbandry, or forestry.93 Certain 
groups, including the elderly and women, can be more acutely harmed by mining-
induced displacement and resettlement because they are more reliant on their natural 
environment as a means of survival and financial sustainability.  
Although mining projects may provide employment for some of the displaced, this may 
not be a welcome substitute for those who would have rather kept their homes, land, or 
traditional livelihoods. In addition, projects may not be able to absorb the numbers of 
people who have lost resources or work, and companies may not be interested in hiring 
individuals whose skill levels may not meet the needs of the mining operation. In some 
cases, individuals who were landless and depended on others’ land for cash-generating 
activities, such as crop production or forestry, may be particularly affected, since they 
have no property for which they can receive compensation, even though the mining-
related displacement may have displaced their livelihoods. Legislation or mining 
company policies, however, may require that landless individuals also receive 
compensation.94 
The type of compensation for displacement affects the long-term impact on those 
displaced. As the Asian Development Bank asserts, “[p]rojects that resettle people 
productively on land and in jobs restore income more effectively, after a transition 
period, than projects which hand out compensation only, without institutional 
assistance for resettlement.”95 This also accords with international human rights best 
practices, which note that cash compensation generally is not appropriate for 
individuals evicted due to development projects, such as large-scale mining; instead, 
individuals should be provided with land that is comparable to or better than that from 
which they were displaced.96 In addition to proper compensation through the provision 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Revuboe River to a remote location not suitable for agriculture use. The new location’s poor quality soil and insecure 
supply of water presented a problematic shift for the resettled community. Coupled with reduced access to 
employment opportunities, this led to food insecurity and negative impacts on community members’ livelihoods 
(Source: S. Lillywhite, D. Kemp and K. Sturman, Mining, resettlement and lost livelihoods: Listening to the Voices of 
Resettled Communities in Mualadzi, Mozambique. (Melbourne: Oxfam, 2015). 
93 Downing, 2002, op. cit. 
94 Companies are strongly encouraged by international frameworks, such as the IFC Performance Standards (see 
number 5: IFC, “Performance Standard 5: Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement,” (January 1, 2012), 
available at: 
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/3d82c70049a79073b82cfaa8c6a8312a/PS5_English_2012.pdf?MOD=AJPERES 
(last visited June 26, 2016)), to take into account landless populations in their compensation schemes. 
95 Asian Development Bank, “Handbook on Resettlement: A Guide to Good Practice,” (Manila: Asian Development 
Bank, 1998), p. 61. 
96 Sustainable Development Solutions Network, “Harnessing Natural Resources for Sustainable Development: 
Challenges and Solutions: Technical Report for the Post-2015 Development Agenda,” (September 2013), p. 12.  
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of land and jobs, assistance for resettlement may include providing vocational training, 
small business development or microcredit.97 
 
Artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) 
ASM is estimated to directly or indirectly employ over 100 million people around the 
globe and to account for over one-sixth of the world’s non-fuel mineral output.98   As 
such it can play a vital role in reducing poverty, diversifying the local economy, 
amassing community capital and increasing local purchasing power and demand for 
goods and services, particularly in regions that have little infrastructure.99 On the other 
hand, ASM is often associated with environmental damage, massive in-migration and 
associated social issues such as crime, drug use, prostitution and social conflict, and 
squeezing out of other land uses.  
The development and operation of a large-scale mine often restricts access to resources, 
thereby negatively affecting the livelihoods of people dependent on ASM. 100 
Competition between ASM and large-scale mining for the same deposits can lead to 
significant net losses of jobs. In Tanzania, for example, the ASM sector has provided 
significant employment since the 1980s, when state monopoly over mines ended. 101 A 
more recent increase in commercial mining has led ASM workers to complain that they 
are prevented from conducting their ASM activities.102  On the other hand, mining 
companies argue that, although they might not bring more jobs, they bring better ones, 
while also contributing to government revenue and local development. 103  In some 
places, ASM and large-scale mining co-exist, often under a system where artisanal 
miners sell their products to a large operation. Such arrangements are, however, fragile 
and rarely long-lived.104 
                                                             
97 Asian Development Bank, 1998, op. cit., p. 62. 
98 Communities and Small-Scale Mining, Working Together: How Large-Scale Mining Can Engage with Artisanal and 
Small-Scale Mining, (Washington: World Bank International Finance Corporation, January 2008), p. 5. In a 2013 report, 
the World Bank estimates that 13 million people in 30 countries work in micro and small artisanal mining. World 
Bank, “Artisanal and Small-scale Mining,” (November 21, 2013), available at: 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/extractiveindustries/brief/artisanal-and-small-scale-mining (last visited June 26, 
2016). 
99 Communities and Small-Scale Mining, 2008, op. cit., p. 5. 
100 S. Siegel and M. Veiga, “The myth of alternative livelihoods: artisanal mining, gold and poverty,” 41(3/4) in Int.J. 
Environment and Pollution (2010). 
101 ICMM, “Tanzania: Country Case study, The Challenge of Mineral Wealth: using resource endowments to foster 
sustainable development,” (July 2007). 
102 ICMM, 2007, op. cit. 
103 ICMM, 2007, op. cit. 
104 In one extreme example, AngloGold Ashanti, having suspended its operations in Ghana at the end of 2014, ceded 
more than half of its concession to the government, which was to use the land, inter alia, for small-scale mining. The 
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In many cases, small-scale miners who are pushed off a large-scale mining site do not 
leave the profession but go elsewhere. Declines in the absolute number of small-scale 
miners in any specific area are usually due to one of the following factors: (a) a price 
decline, (b) strengthened enforcement of bans on illegal mining, or (c) most importantly, 
improved access to alternative employment that is more attractive.105 More recently, for 
Africa’s Great Lakes region, requirements under the United States’ Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and similar legislation being introduced in 
the European Union, might also affect ASM negatively.106  
 
Depletion and pollution of resources  
Every phase of mining, from exploration to closure, poses potential environmental 
threats to local livelihoods. The readying of mine sites requires clearing land, and 
frequently requires displacing surface and groundwater. The extraction and 
beneficiation of ores and the subsequent disposal of waste use significant amounts of 
water; these processes also have the potential to contaminate water sources through 
acid mine drainage, soil erosion and contaminant leaching. 107  Deforestation, land 
degradation, erosion and loss of soil productivity, disruption of waterways, and 
depletion of natural resources are examples of the negative environmental spillovers of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
company continued feasibility studies with a view to eventually reopening the mine. However, small-scale miners in 
the area were not satisfied with the land that was ceded and invaded AngloGold Ashanti’s operations. In April 2016, 
the company filed a request for arbitration with the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID)(“AngloGold surrenders 60% of concession to gov’t,” GhanaWeb, March 10, 2016, available at: 
www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/economy/artikel.php?ID=422219 (last visited June 26, 2016))    
105 Bannock Consulting, “Vulnerability of Artisanal and Small-scale Mining to Commodity Price Fluctuations,” (2005), 
available at: http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/PDF/Outputs/C40PAPER5.pdf (last visited June 26, 2016) - Note that the paper 
finds that the correlation between price declines and the numbers involved in ASM is not obvious. While an increase 
in price is normally associated with an increase in the numbers involved in small-scale mining, a price decline could 
also lead to an increase in people seeking revenues from ASM as these people would suffer from the downsizing 
programs of large-scale mines. The paper argues that “since the capital and labour costs of ASM are less, they are 
arguably better able to survive periods of low commodity prices.”  
106 Section 1502 of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd Frank Act) requires SEC reporting 
companies to report their use of “conflict minerals,” that is, columbite-tantalite (coltan), cassiterite, gold, wolframite 
(tungsten) and their derivatives that originate in the Democratic Republic of Congo or an adjoining country. 
Although the requirement does not mean that companies are forbidden to use conflict minerals, most companies 
appear to avoid buying any of the minerals from the countries concerned that cannot be certified as not originating in 
conflict areas. Only a small portion of mine operations, mainly for tin, participate in certification schemes (“Conflict 
minerals law starts working despite poor industry response,” Reuters, quoted in Creamer’s Mining Weekly, July 1, 
2014). Certification schemes seem to be particularly ineffective in the case of gold, possibly because gold is relatively 
easy to smuggle and dissimulate compared to the other conflict minerals (“Map Shows Gold is Top Conflict Mineral 
in Eastern Congo,” Creamer’s Mining Weekly, November 21, 2013).      
107 Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide, “Overview of Mining and Its Impacts,” in Guidebook for Evaluating 
Mining Project EIAs, available at: http://www.elaw.org/files/mining-eia-guidebook/Chapter1.pdf, 2010 (Last visited 
February 5, 2013.)  
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mining projects which can disrupt traditional local livelihoods and therefore forms of 
subsistence and income.108 
 
Impact on women and gender disparities 
Large-scale mining projects generally offer disproportionately few direct employment 
opportunities for women, largely due to the need for skills that women often do not 
have, and the lack of accommodation for family and childcare responsibilities.109 Some 
indirect and induced jobs are filled by women, however, such as laundry, catering, and 
agricultural production.110 One study examining effects in Sub-Saharan Africa shows, 
for example, that the opening of a new mine leads to localized structural changes in 
labor participation for women, with a decline in agricultural self-employment in the 
area leading to women either shifting to the service sector or leaving the labor market 
altogether.111 This impact of a new mine on women’s labor was not felt beyond a 
distance of 50 km. Based on this, the study’s authors calculated that, as a result of large-
scale mining, more than 90,000 women get service sector jobs and more than 280,000 
women leave the labor force in Africa. And structural changes caused by a mine’s 
opening are not necessarily reversible: at the closure of the mine, women’s involvement 
in the service sector shrinks, yet women do not always go back to previous activities 
like farming.112 
The lack of better job opportunities for women in mining is especially problematic 
because women may be particularly affected by the land loss that results from 
resettlement, land appropriation, or environmental degradation linked to mining 
projects, and they frequently have few other livelihood alternatives. The limited 
mining-related job opportunities for women, coupled with the disappearance of 
productive land or sea, can lead them to undertake risky activities, including illegal and 
unsafe ASM or prostitution.113 In rural Mongolia, for instance, men traditionally take 
care of the herd, while women are involved in non-agricultural work. When men get 
                                                             
108 Aragon and Rud found that farmers located near large–scale gold mines in Ghana experienced a relative reduction 
in productivity of almost 40% between 1997 and 2005, most probably as a result of pollution (Fernando M. Aragón 
and Juan Pablo Rud, “Polluting Industries and Agricultural Productivity: Evidence from Mining in Ghana,” The 
Economic Journal (2015), DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12244). 
109 Economic Commission for Africa, Minerals and Africa’s Development: the International Study Group Report on 
Africa’s Mineral Regimes (Addis Ababa : Economic Commission for Africa, 2011). 
110 A. Eftimie, K. Heller and J. Strongman, “Mainstreaming Gender into Extractive Industries Projects,” Extractive 
Industries and Development Series, No. 9 (Aug 2009). 
111 Andreas Kotsadam and Anja Tolonen, “African Mining, Gender, and Local Employment,” World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 7251 (April 27, 2015), p. 11. 
112 Kotsadam and Tolonen, 2015, op. cit.  
113 Heller and Strongman, 2009, op. cit. 
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hired by the mining industry, women remain with the herd, working harder and with 
potential personal safety concerns. Sometimes the family sells or rents their herd and 
move into a more urban center. Women then become homemakers and lose their 
independence, social networks, and traditional knowledge.114 This issue is compounded 
when men have to leave the household to be employed in a remote mine, leaving 
women and children behind. The most dramatic example may come from South Africa, 
where, under apartheid, mine workers were recruited in the “homelands” or in 
neighboring countries and were not allowed to bring their families. While recruitment 
is now done locally, many miners continue to travel to the mining areas, leaving their 
families behind, partly due to the shortage of housing at mine sites, with complicated 
and sometimes negative impacts for the families.115 
In light of the disaggregated risks and benefits of resource extraction for men and 
women, there have been calls to mainstream gender into mining operations and to 
establish programs that economically empower women, both as employees of mining 
companies and in other economic activities. Such initiatives can be found, for example, 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo with the project WORTH;116 in South Africa with 
Lonmin’s Women in Mining Program;117 and in Chile with the Programa Mujer, a job 
initiative started by the copper company Minera Escondida and supported by the 
Chilean Ministry for Women’s Affairs.118 In several countries, regular conferences have 
been organized on “women in mining,” encouraging the sharing of experiences 
regarding the integration of women in mining.119 
 
                                                             
114 I. Cane, A. Schleger, S. Ali, D. Kemp, N. McIntyre, P. McKenna, A. Lechner, B. Dalaibuyan, K. Lahiri-Dutt, and N. 
Bulovic, “Responsible Mining in Mongolia: Enhancing Positive Engagement,” (Brisbane: Sustainable Minerals 
Institute, 2015). 
115 For a critical review of the system and its evolution, see X. Simelane and G. Modisha, “From Formal to Informal 
Migrant Labour System: the impact of the changing nature of the migrant labour system on mining communities in 
Lesotho and Mozambique,” (2008), pp. 17-18. Apart from the impacts on families when miners are away, there can 
also be complicated and negative impacts when ex-miners return to their community: for example, challenges for the 
family in caring for ex-miners who return with common work-related disabilities or illnesses. 
116 Pact, “Women in Artisanal Mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” available at: 
http://www.pactworld.org/galleries/default-file/Women%20in%20Artisanal%20Mining%20in%20the%20DRC.pdf 
(last visited July 11, 2016).  
117 World Bank International Financial Corporation, “The Lonmin-IFC Women in Mining Program,” (Washington: 
International Finance Corporation), p. 10. 
118 World Bank International Finance Corporation, “Promoting Gender Equality in the Private Sector – Hiring Women 
in Mining Production Jobs,” (Washington: International Finance Corporation, 2006). 
119 See for instance South Africa: http://www.intelligencetransferc.co.za/conferences/5th-annual-women-in-mining/, 




2.4  Closure of the mine 
Mining companies, governments and local communities should craft a post-mine 
closure strategy well in advance of the end of a mine’s operations. Such strategies 
concern environmental reclamation and after-effects such as economic decline, out-
migration that can have potentially serious consequences and pose further challenges to 
local communities in former mining areas.120 
Generating alternative employment for workers who lose their jobs due to a mine 
closure, and for those who lose business as a result of the declining demand as people 
leave the area, is challenging.121 Yet governments and companies can design measures 
to absorb or redirect newly unemployed individuals into other forms of suitable labor. 
One interesting initiative is Rio Tinto’s project closure plan for its Kelian mine in 
Indonesia (see Box 4).  
 
Box 4: Rio Tinto’s Kelian mine in Indonesia: planning for post-closure community livelihood 
Although Rio Tinto received international criticism regarding its social and environmental 
conduct of the Kelian mining project, the company’s approach to “sustainable project closure” 
around the mine has been recognized as an example of good practice. In 1996, four years after 
production started at Kelian, Rio Tinto established a foundation with the primary objective of 
supporting long-term community capacity-building. The foundation also sought to be self-
sustaining through income-generating activities and donations to ensure it could carry out its 
work sustainably once the mine ceased operations. The foundation’s programs covered 41 
villages, including the 28 villages estimated to be the most affected by the eventual mine 
closure. An example of one of the many programs implemented by the foundation included the 
provision of training, technical field support and a subsidy to cover the initial costs of land 
cultivation to approximately 600 mine employees to return to farming after mine closure. In 
addition, four years before closure, the foundation set up multi-stakeholder working groups 
and a steering committee to develop the closure plan and ensure that community needs would 
be met. The closure plan suggested that Self Help Groups, established by community members, 
be constituted and trained in small business management, with the objective of addressing 
various socio-economic problems.122 
 
                                                             
120 International Finance Corporation World Bank Group, “Projects and People: a handbook for addressing project-
induced in-migration,” World Bank Working Paper No. 62631 (Sept 2009). 
121 A. Liebenthal, R. Michelitsch and E. Tarazona, “Extractive Industries and Sustainable Development: an evaluation 
of the World Bank Group Experience” (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2005). 
122 Ray Subhasis, “Sustainable project management (and closure): The case of Rio Tinto at Kelian,” ICFAI Journal of 
Environmental Economics (2009). 
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2.5 Conclusion: Optimizing the job “impact” of mining investments 
Large-scale mining projects usually have certain positive outcomes regarding economic, 
social, and development opportunities. These benefits can support poverty alleviation 
in a region through the creation of direct, indirect, and induced job opportunities.  
At the same time, the negative consequences of mining on livelihoods must also be 
considered when assessing a mine’s impact on local job creation. Given these realities, 
companies and governments must strive to devise appropriate policies and strategies to 
reinforce the positive impacts of mining on employment creation and mitigate the 
negative impacts. This is particularly important given community expectations stoked 
by job creation estimates, and the reliance in certain areas on mining projects to provide 




Section 3. Numbers do not tell the whole story: the nuances of 
employment from large-scale agricultural investments  
 
In considering the employment-driven benefits of large-scale agricultural investment 
from a sustainable development perspective, policymakers and others should pose 
many of the same questions as in respect of the mining arena, discussed above. Most 
significantly, what types of jobs and for whom? Who usually benefits? And what 
impact on the local communities’ overall livelihood strategies? These issues, which can 
affect sustainable development outcomes, should be incorporated into any assessment 
of the potential job creation impacts of large agricultural investments.  
Any discussion of the impact of employment generated through agricultural 
investments, however, must be preceded by significant caveats. Most importantly, and 
the quantity and quality of jobs can be very context specific, and efforts to generalize 
often mask critical nuances. Whether working conditions on plantations developed 
through agricultural investments are “good” or “bad” depends on the operations of the 
specific plantation in question. Whether a formal job on a plantation represents a better 
or worse livelihood outcome for the employee is both subjective and context-specific—
for many smallholder farmers, waged labor is not as “good” a livelihood strategy as 
working on one’s own land (as explained below), but for others, particularly farmers 
who are closer to the “subsistence farming” end of the spectrum, a job on a plantation 
may offer more benefits or even security than independent farming. Additionally, a 
significant portion of rural dwellers may depend on both small-scale farming and 
waged labor for their livelihood strategies, seeking seasonal waged positions that 
supplement their own farming (or other livelihood) efforts. These context-specific and 
subjective considerations are further complicated by other factors: for example, over 
which timeframes should outcomes be measured, and from which perspectives should 
a situation be evaluated?  
Despite the difficulties in assessing job quality and impact, it is important for 
policymakers, investors, and other stakeholders to attempt to consider these different 
variables. Without an honest assessment of the impact and interplay of different 
variables affecting employment, any assertion that job creation on its own is a general 
benefit of large-scale agricultural investments will prove superficial. 
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3.1 What jobs and for whom? 
Claims around employment creation from agricultural investments rarely provide 
details on the types of jobs created, the beneficiaries of those jobs, and the associated 
working conditions. These are important factors, however, as a well-paid, full-time job 
is significantly different to a temporary, low-wage position. And there is reason to 
believe that the quality of jobs created through land investments is often less than 
optimal. Around the world, the majority of waged agricultural work is frequently 
casual, hazardous, low-skill, and low-paid.123 While the specific employment conditions 
may be shaped by the country context and labor regulations, the management of the 
farm, or even the type of crop grown,124 agricultural labor conditions on large-scale 
plantations or farms tends to look fairly similar across the globe. 
Security and duration  
The security and duration of jobs created through agricultural investments can vary 
widely, from permanent to casual, and year-round to seasonal. Job estimates are often 
silent as to these factors, as well as to whether the figures refer to an average number of 
jobs spread out over the lifecycle of the project, or simply to jobs required at certain 
phases, such as those that are anticipated during or after any establishment periods.125 
Estimates also rarely indicate whether the operations plan to shift to more mechanized 
and less labor-intensive work as the project continues.126  
Agricultural work is often seasonal, and research on the proportion of permanent and 
casual waged labor generated by agricultural investments indicates that casual or 
                                                             
123 The International Labour Organization classifies agriculture as one of the most hazardous occupations. 
http://www.ilo.org/safework/areasofwork/hazardous-work/lang--en/index.htm. See also Smalley, 2013, op. cit., p. 4 
(“There is widespread evidence of low wages, long hours, poor housing and health risks for plantation workers 
around the world.”) 
124 Smalley, 2013, op. cit., p. 56. 
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establishment period of large oil palm estates, 532-542 person days per hectare are needed, but, during the 
operational phase, only 83-85 person days per hectare are required. Friends of the Earth, LifeMosaic and Sawit 
Watch, “The human rights impacts of oil palm plantation expansion in Indonesia,” (February 2008), p. 78 (internal 
citations omitted). 
126 This points to the need to consider job creation impacts throughout the expected project cycle or length of the 
concession. For example, “[p]lantations have historically demonstrated a tendency towards progressive 
mechanisation (with sugarcane being a strong example).” S. Vermeulen and L. Cotula, “Making the Most OF 
Agricultural Investment: A Survey of Business Models That Provide Opportunities for Smallholders,” 
IIED/FAO/IFAD/SDC, London/Rome/Bern (2010), p. 24. 
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seasonal labor comprises a significant proportion of the jobs created.127 For example, in 
the World Bank and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) review of 39 agribusiness investments discussed in Section I, nearly half of 
the jobs created were temporary, casual, or seasonal.128 Investigations of specific projects 
have also found significant proportions of seasonal jobs. In Mozambique, for example, 
World Bank researchers have noted that “[l]ocal peoples’ appreciation for job-related 
benefits may also be reduced if these jobs are only seasonal or if they are taken up by 
migrants. Seasonality has been an issue in a project in Mozambique where 280 local 
people (56 of them women) are employed to plant and weed.”129 Similarly, the Oakland 
Institute asserts that one of the most prominent biofuels investments in Mozambique, 
which operates on 5,000 ha, had generated 1,500 jobs, “although many are seasonal.”130 
Substantial reliance on casual labor in agricultural investment schemes accords with 
commercial agricultural production generally, as well as broader trends towards the 
casualization and informalization of agricultural labor. 131  Indeed, the natural 
fluctuations of agricultural production, which requires larger numbers of seasonal 
workers to support harvesting or other work-intensive periods, render it difficult to 
avoid relying, at least in part, on some seasonal workers. Yet the creation of a seasonal 
job that lasts for several months is generally less transformative than the creation of a 
permanent year-round job, both for the individual employed as well as from a poverty-
reduction perspective. 
The creation of seasonal or non-permanent jobs is not inherently problematic: to the 
extent that such jobs offer a flexible means to supplement subsistence farming with 
wages, for example, they theoretically could be a complementary livelihood strategy for 
rural dwellers.132 Yet in practice, seasonal and casual plantation jobs are not always 
easily reconciled with smallholder production, which may have conflicting labor 
demands.  
                                                             
127 Anna Locke and Giles Henley, “Land,” in Evidence on Demand Topic Guide (February 2014), p. 7.  (“One common 
trend is that investments often provide fewer jobs than initially promised and instead depend heavily on casual 
labour.”) 
128 Table E.1 (“Employment, Descriptive Statistics”). Of the total formal employment, 19,832 were permanent jobs, 
while 18,348 were temporary, casual or seasonal jobs. (Note that the sum of these numbers is slightly different from 
the total formal employment number provided in the table.) UNCTAD and World Bank, “The Practice of Responsible 
Investment Principles in Larger-Scale Agricultural Investments: Implications for Corporate Performance and Impact 
on Local Communities,” Agriculture and Environmental Services Discussion Paper no. 08 (2014).  
129 World Bank, 2011, op. cit., p. 69. 
130 Oakland Institute, “Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa: Country Report: Mozambique,” (2011). 
131 See, e.g., Stephanie Barrientos and Andrienetta Kritzinger, “Squaring the Circle: Global Production and the 
Informalization of Work in South African Fruit Exports,”16(1) International Development 81-92 (2004), p. 83.   
132 This is somewhat debatable. As Smalley notes in a literature review, in the context of changing agrarian 
landscapes that feature increased plantation work and a decline in peasant farming, “[a]uthors disagree whether the 
increased dependence on wage work and external food sources increases vulnerability or increases resilience through 
diversification.” Smalley, 2013, op. cit., p. 38. 
 52 
For workers seeking full-time employment, rather than supplemental work, however, 
the provision of seasonal or temporary jobs is clearly sub-optimal. Even when workers 
are able to string together multiple seasonal or temporary jobs, this approach is almost 
always less secure and more tenuous than working in a full-time permanent position. 
Workers who lack permanent contracts may also be subject to worse labor conditions.133 
Additionally, the insecurity of casual or temporary labor means that workers are 
particularly vulnerable if accidents arise that impair them from continuing to work, and 
they generally have little support and few safety nets once they have stopped working. 
In Ghana, for example, casual workers on oil palm plantations have asserted that, 
“despite having worked for the investor for many years, they were still not offered a 
permanent contract …. Hence, they are concerned about not being able to maintain 
their livelihood in case of an accident as well as during their post-retirement periods.” 
134 In addition, contract work – work provided through middlemen or labor brokers – is 
another category of employment that is generally not disaggregated in job estimates 
tied to agricultural investments, but which is common in farming and leads to 
especially vulnerable job security.135 
 
Income, wages and benefits  
In many countries, agricultural jobs are among the lowest paid waged work.136 Wages 
from agricultural labor are also generally volatile; as a 2013 joint report by UNCTAD 
and the International Labour Organization (ILO) notes, “agricultural workers’ wages 
and earnings are subject to uncertainties in the weather, risks of land degradation or 
dispossession, fluctuating prices and availability of farm inputs and outputs, and 
personal and household ill health.”137  
Researchers have found that at least some farms created through agricultural 
investments pay low and inadequate wages. For example, a review of 39 projects found 
that “[s]ome investors were paying inadequate wages and offering unacceptable 
                                                             
133 Smalley, 2013, op. cit., p. 31.  
134 Susanne Johanna Vath, “Gaining neighbours or big losers,” LDPI Working Paper No. 24 (2013), p.14.  
135 For example, one study of farmworkers in South Africa’s export fruit industry found that contract workers “have 
little or no access to the benefits and protections provided by labour legislation.” Barrientos and Kritzinger, 2004, op. 
cit., p. 90. The authors asserted that contract workers are particularly vulnerable and “exposed to an intensified risk 
of poverty,” even when wages or length of employment were comparable for contract workers as opposed to 
permanent workers. Female contract workers were particularly vulnerable, and generally paid the lowest wages. P. 
91.  
136 UNCTAD and ILO, “Shared Harvests: Agriculture, Trade, and Employment,” (2013), p. 39.  
137 UNCTAD and ILO, 2013, op. cit., p. 41. The same study also noted that “[a]gricultural wages and working 
conditions are also related to the types of crops grown and tasks performed, a segmentation that has often emerged 
because of skill and socio-cultural barriers.” P. 10. 
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working conditions, leading to tension between staff and the investor.”138 Similarly, the 
Oakland Institute investigated more than 30 land investments in 7 countries, and 
concluded that “[t]he majority of land deals … offer basic wage labor employment, 
mostly low-paying laborer positions.” Although the Oakland Institute did not specify 
what those wages were for each deal, or how they compared to other local wages, the 
two examples they provided were of approximately USD $2.25/day and USD $1.65-
1.80/day on two different operations in Sierra Leone.139  
Of course, whether wages are more or less attractive than other existing options 
remains highly context-specific and individually subjective. In some contexts, 
plantation wages may be higher than the national minimum wage,140 higher than the 
average wage,141 or higher than those paid in other industries. For example, a 2012 
report by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) asserted 
that, in Cambodia, a review of seven large agricultural projects found that they 
“generated a large number of jobs and reported wages for unskilled workers far above 
the minimum wage for Cambodian garment workers.”142 (This example illustrates a 
point discussed further below: jobs and wages cannot be considered in a vacuum. As 
the FAO acknowledged, these same investments in Cambodia also caused displacement 
and loss of livelihoods. 143 ) In addition, wages for farmworkers on foreign-owned 
plantations sometimes are relatively better than wages for workers on other types of 
farms, even if they remain below the minimum wage.144 In such contexts, plantations or 
                                                             
138 UNCTAD and World Bank, “The Practice of Responsible Investment Principles in Larger-Scale Agricultural 
Investments: Implications for Corporate Performance and Impact on Local Communities,” Agriculture and 
Environmental Services Discussion Paper 08 (2014). 
139 Oakland Institute, “Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa: The Myth of Job Creation” (Dec. 2011).  
140 For example, in a case study of South African Illovo’s investment in Zambia, Ben Richardson notes that “[t]he 
company’s average wage of ZK 1.75m ($350) per month is far higher than the national minimum of ZK 300,000 
(Zambia Sugar 2009). While the average wage clearly hides inequality between the different fractions of labour – for 
example, a male research supervisor is paid three times more than a female weeder – it cannot be denied that a job 
with the company remains highly prized (Oxfam 2004, 23).”  (Ben Richardson, “Big sugar in southern Africa: rural 
development and the perverted potential of sugar/ethanol exports,” 37(4) Journal of Peasant Studies (2009), pp. 917-
938.) 
141 World Bank, 2011, op. cit., p. 68 (example of company in Ukraine that employs 5,000 workers “at wages some 50 
percent higher than the average”).  
142 FAO, “The State of Food and Agriculture: Investing in Agriculture for a Better Future,” (2012), box 19, p. 68, 
available at: http://www.fao.org/docrep/017/i3028e/i3028e.pdf (last visited July 13, 2016). 
143 FAO, 2012, op. cit., box 19, p. 68.  
144 Smalley, 2013, op. cit., pp. 58-59 (“[A]lthough the record of plantation firms as employers has been criticised, the 
wages and conditions for workers can be better or perhaps less bad on foreign-owned plantations than on large farms 
and smallholdings. There is evidence to suggest a spectrum in wages, with the worst pay on non-participating small 
farms at one end, improving on medium-scale and large-scale mixed and contract farms, somewhat better pay on 
modern horticulture contract farms and estates, and ending with the highest wages on specialised, foreign-owned 
plantations (Mackintosh 1989; Glover & Kusterer 1990; Foeken & Tellegren 1994; Porter & Phillips-Howard 1997; 
Dolan 2004; English et al. 2004; Cramer et al. 2008; Neven et al. 2009; Oya 2010; Richardson 2010). This is relative, of 
course — even the best wages might be below the national minimum wage (Cramer et al. 2008).”) 
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farms developed through large-scale investments might offer relatively better 
employment opportunities and wages for poor landless laborers (workers without 
access to ownership of land) than would exist in the absence of the investments. And to 
the extent that few waged opportunities previously existed in a rural area, the jobs 
created through an agricultural investment may provide a useful new source of 
monetary income. 
While waged opportunities created through agricultural investments may represent 
better options for landless laborers, they are generally less appealing for smallholder 
farmers. As some researchers have noted, the World Bank’s calculations of agricultural 
wages versus smallholder earnings for various crops show that smallholders can earn 
significantly more than waged workers producing the same crop.145 This suggests that 
the jobs created through agricultural investments do not offer significant wages from 
the perspective of many smallholders, who could earn more by continuing to farm their 
own holdings. The relatively paltry wages also suggest that in many places, as the 
World Bank notes, “improving the productivity of smallholder farmers will have a 
much larger impact on poverty reduction than promotion of large-scale land 
acquisition,”146 discussed further below. 
 
Type of labor and transferable skills 
 Most agricultural labor tends to be “low-skilled.” While this means that investments in 
agriculture might create jobs for low-skilled rural dwellers with few other 
opportunities,147 such investments generally fail to provide many skilled employment 
opportunities. 148  The relative dearth of skilled jobs generated through agricultural 
investments also means that the jobs created will not result in many transferable skills 
for workers,149 though to the extent that workers subsequently can acquire land, their 
experience working on agricultural concessions may help in establishing farms.150 
                                                             
145 Li, 2011, op. cit., p. 285 (citing World Bank, 2011, op. cit. report); Oakland Institute, Understanding Land 
Investment Deals in Africa: The Myth of Job Creation,” 2011, op. cit. p. 2 (citing World Bank, 2011, op. cit. report).  
146 World Bank, 2011, op. cit., p. 5. Based on this, Li argues that governments or donors concerned about poverty 
reduction should go further, undertaking land reform to break up large-scale farms, and, where possible, distributing 
land while providing support to smallholders. Li, 2011, op. cit., p. 285.  
147 The provision of low-skilled jobs is not insignificant, given David Cheong, Marion Jansen and Ralf Peters’ 
assertion that, in some developing countries, the majority of workers in rural areas “are low skilled and have few 
opportunities for employment except in agriculture.” Cheong, Jansen and Peters, 2013, op. cit., p. 19. 
148 Cotula and Vermeulen, 2011. op. cit., p. 47.  
149 Indeed, agricultural workers generally confront obstacles in trying to transfer their skills outside the agricultural 
industry. Cheong and Jansen, 2013, op. cit., p. 42.  
150 Smalley, 2013, op. cit., p. 36 “The theory that plantations will benefit local agriculture through technology transfer 
and other spillover effects is commonly argued by plantation advocates, and evidence suggests that this has occurred 
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3.2 Who usually benefits? 
As with mining investments, the jobs created through investments in land for 
agriculture may not always benefit workers from the local community. 151  This is 
particularly true for the relatively limited number of higher skilled jobs that are created, 
which are often offered to foreigners or non-local workers. For example, one large South 
African investment in Zambia engendered allegations by Zambians – including 
university graduates – that they had been passed over for jobs that were given to South 
African expatriates.152 Another example from an Egyptian investment in South Sudan 
found that the highly mechanized production created few jobs, and that “[m]ost of the 
permanent staff are migrant workers from Southern Africa,” although the CEO has 
asserted that the number of local workers employed has increased as more skilled 
workers return to South Sudan.153 These examples align with a 2012 FAO report, which 
noted that operations established by foreign investment in agriculture often employ 
expatriates or non-locals for management positions.154 Although investors sometimes 
claim that higher skilled jobs are not suitable for local residents due to mismatched 
skills, training programs can help reduce the skills gap, as discussed further in Section 
4. 
Depending on the context, even significant numbers of low-skilled jobs might be taken 
by domestic or foreign migrants. Indeed, migrant labor in agricultural production is 
common in most countries; in many cases, migrant workers are willing to work for less 
pay or under more exploitative conditions. For example, one of the largest rice 
concessions in Liberia, situated on the border of Sierra Leone and Guinea, created 400 
fulltime unskilled jobs, but there were “concern[s] about hiring foreigners who [were] 
willing to work for lower wages.” 155  Reliance on migrant labor can upset local 
communities, and also engenders particular concerns from the perspective of migrant 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
in many cases. If they can acquire land, former workers might attempt to establish independent operations using 
their plantation crop experience, as reported in Indonesia with oil-palm and colonial Côte d’Ivoire.” (internal 
citations omitted). Conversely, “But in other cases farmwork offers little labour mobility and the workers are unable 
to accumulate enough savings or skills to get off the farm ….” p. 44. 
151 The High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition, “Land tenure and international investments in 
agriculture,” (2011), p. 34 (“Employment opportunities are often used to justify taking land, water and other 
resources from local people. Yet, the promise is often empty, and even when these jobs do eventuate they are often 
taken by people from outside the area.”) 
152 Richardson, 2009, op. cit. p. 934.  
153 Deng, 2011, op. cit. p. 40. 
154 FAO, “Trends and impacts of foreign investment in developing country agriculture,” 2012, op. cit. pp. 181 and 336.  
155 World Bank, 2011, op. cit., Table A2.2.  
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workers from other countries, who may suffer some of the worst working conditions 
yet may be afraid to seek help from local authorities if they are undocumented.156 
Just as with in-migration encouraged by mining investments, in-migration generated by 
large-scale agricultural investments can have both positive and negative effects. 
Potential positive impacts include greater demand for local goods and services, with 
migrant workers purchasing food or other goods from local producers and in local 
markets.157  
On the flip side, in rural contexts with high unemployment, the arrival of migrant 
workers competing for jobs—even poorly paid and insecure ones—can generate tension 
or conflict with local communities. 158  For example, in Sulawesi and Kalimantan, 
Indonesia, “‘failed’ transmigrants and their offspring make up the bulk of the ‘locally 
recruited’ labor force on oil palm plantations, where they compete with the ‘local’ 
population, also desperate for work as they are progressively squeezed off the land. The 
potential for conflict between locals and transmigrants over both land and jobs is clearly 
very high ….”159 In addition, the competition from migrant workers can depress wages 
or affect the establishment or effectiveness of trade unions.160 To the extent that an 
investment attracts a significant number of migrants, this can also lead to potentially 
negative social impacts,161 as seen in the mining sector. 
                                                             
156 Tania Murray Li describes another disturbing problem, whereby companies recruit migrant workers who must 
work for a set period of time if they want their passage home paid. Companies keep workers’ identity cards, which 
means that workers are unable to leave, or may face harassment from authorities if they do. (Li, 2011, op. cit., p. 286). 
Indeed, both forced labor and child labor have been found on plantations in some places, such as for palm oil 
production in Malaysia and Indonesia. Verite, “Palm Oil,” available at: http://www.verite.org/Commodities/PalmOil 
(last visited July 13, 2016); see also Syed Zain Al-Mahmood, “Palm-Oil Migrant Workers Tell of Abuses on Malaysian 
Plantations,” The Wall Street Journal, July 26, 2015; E. Benjamin Skinner, “Indonesia’s Palm Oil Industry Rife with 
Human-Rights Abuses,” Bloomberg Businessweek, July 20, 2013. 
157 See Smalley, 2013, op. cit., pp. 37 and 58. High levels of remittances may tamper this effect, however, if migrant 
workers send significant portions of their earnings back to their families rather than spending those wages locally. 
158 See, e.g., World Bank, 2011, op. cit., p. 69 (“Investors bringing in migrants from elsewhere was a frequently cited 
social issue particularly in Liberia, Indonesia, and Ukraine. While in-migration should not be a problem as long as 
land rights are compensated independently, in many instances jobs were supposed to partly compensate for loss of 
access to local resources. The fact that these jobs failed to materialize or were taken by outsiders led to conflict and 
accusations of cheating.”)  
159 Li, 2011, op. cit., p. 288. This potential for conflict may be exacerbated by the history of Central Kalimantan, which 
has witnessed waves of ethnic violence in the 1990s and early 2000s between indigenous and local groups, on the one 
hand, and domestic migrants, on the other. Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Indonesia’s Transformation and the Stability 
of Southeast Asia (Rand Corporation, 2001), p. 45. 
160 Smalley, 2013, op. cit., p. 58.  
161 Smalley, 2013, op. cit., p. 37 (“[M]igrant recruitment is associated with a growth in local prostitution, money 
leaving the area as remittances and heightened vulnerability of workers to exploitation (Epale 1985; Nyanda 1989; 
Loewenson 1992; Richardson 2010; Julia & White 2012). Furthermore, if migrants stay in the area there can be tension 
and competition over land and jobs (Friends of the Earth et al. 2008; Li 2011).”  
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Even when local workers are offered the low-skilled positions created through 
investments, the benefits of jobs are not always distributed equally throughout the 
community. Unsurprisingly, stronger workers, or those with better skills, are more 
likely to be favored. Some researchers also have noted that workers with a better 
education are more likely to be hired for even low-skilled jobs, and thus to benefit from 
the job creation that might arise from agricultural investments.162  
 
Impact on women and gender disparities  
In many low- and middle-income countries, women play significant roles in 
agricultural production, giving rise to what has been described as the “feminization” of 
agriculture.163 Women’s agricultural work includes both independent food production 
and waged agricultural labor. While it is clear that women may be affected differently 
by large-scale agricultural investments than men, whether women will benefit from 
employment opportunities generated by such investments is quite context specific. 
The distinct employment impact of such investments on women is linked in part to 
their roles in respect of agriculture, livelihoods, and household responsibilities before 
an investment occurs. As researchers have argued, “[t]he gendered effect of plantation 
agriculture on labor and employment will depend not only on the actual practices used 
to hire labor but also on the prevailing gender division of labor prior to the beginning of 
the land deal.”164 To the extent that an agricultural investment creates jobs, and the 
positions are filled by local workers—which, as noted above, is not always the case—
whether and how women benefit thus may be influenced by preexisting social norms 
and practices around labor. For example, if formal-sector jobs are presumed to be for 
men, women simply may not be offered or may not accept newly available jobs.165 
Similarly, when women’s traditional roles require them to prioritize reproductive 
responsibilities or household tasks, they may confront obstacles in combining such 
duties with paid labor opportunities, and thus may not benefit from the generation of 
                                                             
162 See e.g. Vath, 2013, op. cit.; World Bank, 2011, op. cit., p. 69.  
163 See, e.g., Olivier De Schutter, “The agrarian transition and the ‘feminization’ of agriculture,” International 
Conference, Yale University, September 14-15, 2013, available at: 
https://www.tni.org/files/download/37_deschutter_2013.pdf (last accessed July 13, 2016) (discussing the meanings 
attributed to “feminization of agriculture,” as well as role of women as food producers and farmworkers). 
164 Julia Behrman, Ruth Meinzen-Dick and Agnes Quisumbing, “The Gender Implications of Large-Scale Land Deals,” 
International Food Policy Research Institute Discussion Paper 01056 (January 2011), p. 10. 
165 Behrman et al. provide an example from Duvane’s research in Mozambique, which found that men benefited from 
job creation arising from land deals, as women did not work in the formal sector. Behrman, Meinzen-Dick and 
Quisumbing, op. cit., p. 10.   
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employment through investment.166 These situations may also shift responsibility for 
household food production away from women, potentially disrupting their established 
roles and relative status within the household.  
In addition, when women do benefit from job opportunities arising from agricultural 
investments, they may be affected differently from men, due to the gendered ways in 
which some commercial farms employ women and men, both with respect to the types 
of contracts and the types of tasks for which they may be considered eligible. In some 
contexts, men working on commercial farms are more likely to receive permanent jobs 
and contracts, while women are more frequently considered non-permanent workers167 
or brought in as supplemental seasonal or temporary labor on an as-needed basis. This 
renders women’s job security more tenuous, although in some cases such an 
arrangement may be mutually beneficial, enabling women to earn supplemental wages 
while fulfilling other duties.168 Even when women are provided permanent contracts, 
however, they may be paid lower wages than men, including non-permanent male 
workers.169 In respect of differentiated tasks, commercial farms sometimes favor women 
for certain types of work. The effect of “gendered” roles may have both positive and 
negative impacts, perhaps encouraging increased employment of women, but limiting 
such employment to work that is more hazardous or less compensated.170  
Whether an increase in employment of women due to agricultural investments is 
generally empowering has been debated. The differences in views might partly be due 
to framing and perspectives on what constitutes empowerment. For example, research 
by a coalition of five workers’ organizations, which interviewed 970 workers about 
                                                             
166 See e.g. Stephanie Barrientos, Catherine Dolan and Anne Tallontire, “Gendered Value Chain Approach to Codes of 
Conduct in African Horticulture,” 31(9) World Development 1511-1526 (2003), p. 1523.  
167 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, “Ripe with Abuse,” (2011), fn. 17. However, this may be changing in some places. 
See, e.g., B.I. Conradie, “What Do We Mean When We Say Casualisation of Farm Work is Rising? Evidence From 
Fruit Farms in the Western Cape,” 46(2) Agrekon (June 2007), p. 192. 
168 See e.g., Behrman, Meinzen-Dick and Quisumbing, op. cit., p. 10. (“This type of plantation labor is often low 
skilled, temporary, and seasonal, which is reported to be a mixed blessing for women. On the one hand, it allows 
women to balance productive and reproductive responsibilities; on the other hand, it comes with frequent 
uncertainty about income generation.”) (internal citations omitted). 
169 See, e.g., Barrientos and Kritzinger, 2004, op. cit., p. 89 (finding “a clear gender differentiation” between wages 
paid to male and female farmworkers. But see Miet Maertens and Johan Swinnen, “Are African high-value 
horticulture supply chains bearers of gender inequality?,” Paper presented at the FAO-IFAD-ILO Workshop on 
Gaps, trends and 
current research in gender dimensions of agricultural and rural employment: differentiated pathways out of poverty 
Rome, 31 March - 2 April 2009, available at: http://www.fao.org/uploads/media/Gender%20issues.pdf (last visited 
July 13, 2016) (two case studies of high-value horticulture production in Kenya found gender bias in provision of 
permanent versus temporary jobs, but no gender bias in wages for temporary workers generally).  
170 Behrman, Meinzen-Dick and Quisumbing, op. cit., p. 10. In addition, as noted by the High Level Panel of Experts 
on Food Security and Nutrition, “women sometimes suffer greater exploitation than men in wage labour, and sexual 
exploitation in return for employment opportunities is not unknown (Longley 2011).” High Level Pane of Experts on 
Food Security and Nutrition, 2011, op. cit., p. 35. 
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horticulture farms in Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania, and Uganda, concluded that 
horticulture employment did not lead to economic empowerment for women, but 
rather “female working poverty.”171 Conversely, other researchers have argued, based 
on surveys in Senegal, that “the growth in high-value agricultural production and the 
emergence and spread of modern supply chains across developing countries is 
associated with direct beneficial effects for rural women and reduced gender 
inequalities in rural areas.”172 As the authors acknowledge, however, this conclusion 
“contradicts much of the literature which claims modern supply chains entail 
detrimental gender effects.”173  
Aside from questions of waged labor, large-scale agricultural investments can have 
particular impacts on women’s livelihoods. Indeed, investments that impede access to 
productive resources can be particularly problematic for women whose traditional 
responsibilities encompass household tasks or independent food production that rely 
on such resources. For example, in the World Bank’s examination of 19 large-scale 
agricultural investment projects, it concluded that  
“[m]any of the projects studied had strong negative gender effects, either 
by directly affecting women’s land-based livelihoods or, where common 
property resources were involved, by increasing the time required of 
women to gather water or firewood and take care of household food 
security. In many cases, it was presumed that land rights were in the 
name of men only, and consultations were limited to males in the 
community, leaving women without a voice. Bargaining power within the 
household was affected in unpredictable ways.”174  
Any specific investment may have mixed impacts for local women, providing some 
benefits while simultaneously producing certain harms. For example, a case study of 
the large-scale Bechera Agricultural Development Project in Ethiopia found that the 
project provided a new source of cash income for local women, who were hired for the 
majority of seasonal jobs—including some supervisory positions—but that local women 
also suffered “substantial losses in relation to livelihoods,” particularly by restricting 
access to common lands used for grazing livestock, which also affected their ability to 
earn cash income through selling livestock products. In addition, the reduction of access 
                                                             
171 Women Working Worldwide, “Promoting Women Workers’ Rights in African Horticulture: Overview of research 
into conditions on horticulture farms in Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania and Uganda, available at: http://www.women-
ww.org/documents/www_research_overview_final.pdf (last visited July 13, 2016), p. 14. 
172 Maertens and Swinnen, 2009, op. cit. p. 14. 
173 Maertens and Swinnen, 2009, op. cit. 
174 World Bank, 2011, op. cit., pp. 69-70. 
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to such lands affected women’s ability to fetch housing materials and water, which 
added significantly to their labor burdens.175  
In short, the gendered impact of increased job opportunities and the gendered impact 
on livelihood strategies due to large-scale agricultural investments depend on context. 
This is one area in which investments in mining and investments in agriculture may 
have distinctly different potential impacts, as women are more frequently employed in 
agricultural jobs than in mining ones. Yet the opportunities may still have distinct 
implications for women. While such positions hold the potential to augment women’s 
access to waged employment in rural areas 176  or help distribute resources more 
equitably,177 these opportunities may be shaped by a range of social and cultural factors. 
To the extent that governments are concerned about the quality and impact of jobs 
created, particular attention should be paid to the potential gender implications of any 
proposed investment.178 
 
3.3 What impact on local communities’ overall livelihood strategies? 
Focusing on job creation in the abstract, without simultaneously considering the impact 
of the investment on the livelihood strategies that existed before such investments 
occurred, provides a false picture of how beneficial such job creation is. Rather than 
viewing “job creation” as a positive benefit of investment and “displacement from 
land” or “loss of livelihood,” for example, as a negative outcome of investment, a more 
robust assessment also would consider whether the waged job creation itself arises at 
the cost of destroying non-waged labor opportunities. In other words, in some cases the 
“job creation” generated by agricultural investments might not necessarily be a positive 
benefit at all, as the net number of livelihoods supported by the investment might be 
diminished rather than augmented. 179  In these cases, displacement from land can 
                                                             
175 Elizabeth Daley and Sabine Pallas, “Women and Land Deals in Africa and Asia: Weighing the Implications and 
Changing the Game,” 20(1) Feminist Economics pp. 178-201 (2013), available at: 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/landesa_production/resource/1940/Daley_Women-and-land-deals-in-Africa-
Asia_2013.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAICR3ICC22CMP7DPA&Expires=1468454941&Signature=T9zbZZFFhnhZN6js
oqBRE%2BA8tpc%3D (last visited July 13, 2016), p. 8-9. 
176 See e.g., High Panel Level of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition, 2011, op. cit., p. 35. (“improved access to 
wage employment, provided by plantations, will increase women‘s ability to earn and control their own incomes. 
Paid agricultural work can also be a way for women to work outside their domestic setting and interact with other 
women.”), though also acknowledges problems women may confront on farms.  
177 Behrman, Meinzen-Dick and Quisumbing, op. cit., p. 21.  
178 See e.g. High Panel Level of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition, 2011, op. cit., p. 29 (“Employment provision 
should include hiring of local women as well as men, including the training of women to enable them attain higher 
wages in supervisory roles.” 
179 While this section focuses primarily on the need to examine “net livelihood impact” to determine whether the jobs 
created equal the livelihoods lost due to an investment, this more holistic way of evaluating the job creation claims 
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frequently serve as a proxy for disruptions of previous livelihood strategies, given the 
importance of land and productive resources for many rural dwellers’ livelihoods. 
Unfortunately, little robust research to date has focused on holistically assessing the 
change in labor and livelihood from large land-based investments, or quantifying the 
loss of smallholder livelihood options and gain of formal waged jobs due to a specific 
agricultural investment. 180  Understanding the longer-term labor impact of such 
investments is particularly difficult, 181  as direct jobs may increase or decrease as 
operations are established, while indirect and induced employment creation will help 
shape, and in turn will be shaped by, an increasingly monetized local economy. 
However, qualitative assessments, anecdotal evidence, and extrapolation from certain 
data highlight the real possibility, in certain cases, of net livelihood losses—at least in 
the short-term—when agricultural investments establish large-scale commercial 
operations on areas of land that were previously used for smallholder agricultural 
production or other livelihood purposes.182  
For example, even when operations on large land concessions promise significant 
numbers of jobs, simply comparing those numbers with the number of people 
estimated to be affected by the same project may show that more livelihoods might be 
negatively impacted than positively influenced. In the case of the Addax investment in 
Sierra Leone, the company initially asserted that it would create over 2,000 jobs,183 a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
linked to agricultural investments ignores other intangible characteristics that distinguish “between working on one’s 
own farm and working on another, and any inherent virtues of peasant life.” Smalley, 2013, op. cit., p. 15. In addition, 
this more robust way of calculating the potential employment impacts still does not provide sufficient information 
for determining whether an investment is “responsible” or “sustainable,” as there are many other factors that host 
governments should consider. Thus, even in a situation where the net livelihoods are positive—when the direct, 
indirect, and induced jobs created are greater than the livelihoods destroyed or diminished—there may be many 
other reasons why the particular investment would not be useful from a sustainable development perspective, or 
why greater safeguards would be required.  
180 For an excellent explanation of the current research gaps and lack of empirical evidence despite the “literature 
rush” regarding the “land rush,” see C. Oya, “The land rush and classic agrarian questions of capital and labour: a 
systematic scoping review of the socioeconomic impact of land grabs in Africa” 34(9) Third World Quarterly 1532-1557 
(2013).  
181 Oya, 2013, op. cit., p. 1540 (noting that “time matters, as negative outcomes may be more common in the initial 
stages, whereas positive outcomes, like employment creation and spill-over effects from new production and 
infrastructure may only materialise after some time.”) 
182 As Peter Messerli and colleagues have shown, it is not uncommon for large-scale investments to occur on land that 
could be categorized as densely populated cropland. Peter Messerli ,Markus Giger, Michael B. Dwyer, Thomas Breu, 
and Sandra Eckert, “The geography of large-scale land acquisitions: Analysing socio-ecological patterns of target 
contexts in the global South,” 53 Applied Geography 449-459 (2014). And, of course, the former use of allocated land 
can affect whether displacement occurs. See, e.g., Smalley, 2013, op. cit., p. 58. However, even concessions on 
previously alienated land may confront lingering concerns about displacement by the previous concessionaire, or, if 
the land had not been claimed for a long period of time, affect people who began relying on it in the meantime. 
183 Press Release, “Addax Bioenergy Signs Loan Agreement for €258 Million Renewable Energy Project in Sierra 
Leone,” Business Wire, June 17, 2011, available at: 
 62 
fairly significant number that actually increased after operations began, with estimates 
of approximately 3,600 people employed in the high season as of 2015.184 However, the 
same company’s Environmental, Social and Health Impact Assessment (ESHIA) 
estimated that 13,617 people would be subjected to “economic displacement.”185 The 
company has implemented compensation processes, including a farmer development 
program, designed to “adequately deal with impacts related to food and livelihood 
security,” 186  although the effectiveness of such programs has been contested. 187  Of 
course, these numbers are not necessarily comparable, as each employee could support 
multiple other people. (This project also highlights the fragility of relying on 
employment generated by risky agricultural projects, as operations were “downscaled” 
less than five years after securing project financing, leaving those jobs in jeopardy.)188  
Along similar lines, efforts to compare the number of jobs promised with the size of a 
concession, or with the number of individuals living on a concession area (even without 
investors’ estimates of potentially affected people, as found in the above ESHIA), also 
indicate that the job numbers promised may be lower than the number of people whose 
livelihood options may be affected. This has led some researchers and advocates to 
warn that touted potential job creation benefits are not significant compared to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20110617005346/en/Addax-Bioenergy-Signs-Loan-Agreement-
%E2%82%AC258-Million (last visited July 13, 2016). 
184 Press Release, “Update on Addax Bioenergy operation in Sierra Leone,” June 25, 2015, available at: 
http://www.addaxbioenergy.com/data/news/Update_on_Addax_Bioenergy_operation_in_Sierra_Leone_24_June_201
5.pdf (last visited July 13, 2016).  
185 http://www.addaxbioenergy.com/uploads/PDF/Addax-Bioenergy-ESHIA-summary.pdf  ESHIA also notes that 
“[l]ocal communities subsist off the land and the project will result in the loss of access to an area of 14,300ha.” 
African Development Bank Group, “Executive Summary of the Environmental, Social and Health Impact Assessment 
/ ADDAX Bioenergy Project: Sierra Leone,” p. 18. 
186 African Development Bank Group, op. cit. p. 19.  
187 See, e.g., Action Aid, “Broken Promises: The impacts of Addax Bioenergy in Sierra Leone on hunger and 
livelihoods” (September 2013), available at: 
http://www.actionaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/brokenpromises_0.pdf (last visited July 13, 2016); but see 
Addax response to such allegations, available at: http://www.pangealink.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/ABSA_ActionAid_RedLine-for-Broken-Promises_V1_20130902.pdf (link no longer 
working). 
188 The employment implications of this suspension are unclear at the time of writing; Addax’s press release in June 
2015 that it was downscaling operations noted that it was reducing expatriate consultants but that “most local 
employees will be maintained.” Press Release, “Update on Addax Bioenergy operation in Sierra Leone,” 2015, op. cit., 
supra note 184. A newspaper article a couple of weeks later quoted a senior company official estimating that “it is 
feared that close to 2,000 jobs will be lost during this six months period.” Abdul R. Thomas, “Addax Bioenergy 
operations in Sierra Leone is in serious financial trouble,” Sierra Leone Telegraph, July 6, 2015, available at: 
http://www.thesierraleonetelegraph.com/?p=9669 (last visited July 13, 2016). Addax’s most recent announcement, in 
March 24, 2016, that the review process of the project was continuing made no mention of the job implications of its 
downscaling. Addax Bioenergy, “Latest update on Addax Bioenergy operation in Sierra Leone,” March 24, 2016, 
available at: http://www.addaxbioenergy.com/en/news.php?pages=1&idnews=40 (last visited July 13, 2016). 
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potential number of individuals affected.189 Yet here, some caution must be used, for 
two main reasons. First, these calculations may only incorporate estimates of direct jobs 
generated by agricultural investments, rather than indirect or induced jobs (although 
investors and host governments are often not clear in terms of how they develop their 
estimates, or what types of jobs are included).190 Second, for some crops, investors with 
large concessions may only conduct operations on certain parts of the concession area, 
thus leaving the possibility that only a percentage of those living on the concession area 
would actually be displaced at any given time. This also depends on whether the 
investor allows individuals or communities to continue living on or accessing unused 
parts of the concession area, or whether the investor denies the right to use allocated 
concession land even when it is not in use by the investor.  
Despite these caveats, trying to understand the net job creation impact of agricultural 
investments in contexts where displacement of smallholder farmers has occurred due to 
the investment is quite important when considering the sustainable development 
impacts of such investment. Indeed, host governments concerned about generating 
livelihood options should assess the potential waged employment benefits offered by 
large-scale investments against the fact that smallholder agriculture is sometimes more 
labor intensive than large-scale commercial farming, particularly when the latter uses 
high levels of mechanization. Thus, the same parcel of agricultural land found in a 
concession could potentially support more smallholders than permanent waged 
workers under a plantation-style model.191 
Moreover, not only might livelihood loss lead to fewer individuals being able to sustain 
their livelihood strategies, but it may also mean that former smallholder farmers who 
                                                             
189 See, e.g., Lorenzo Cotula, Sonja Vermeulen, Rebeca Leonard, and James Keeley, Land Grab or Development 
Opportunity? Agricultural investment and international land deals in Africa (London: International Institute for 
Environment and Development, 2009), using an example of a deal in Madagascar promising 4,500 part-time jobs for a 
concession of 450,000 to argue that the jobs are “small in number relative to the size of the investment.” See also 
Oakland Institute, “Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa: The Myth of Job Creation,” 2011, op. cit. (“In 
Mali, Petrotech-ffn Agro MALI-sa (“Petrotech-ffn”) claims it will create 100 jobs on a holding of 10,000 has (ha). Yet, 
the Oakland Institute estimates a population density of 1 to 2 people per hectare in this lease area, which translates 
into at least 10,000 to 20,000 people who will be affected by the Petrotech-ffn land deal. The creation of only 100 jobs 
for 10,000 to 20,000 people is negligible.“) (footnote omitted).  
190 A further complication is that the rough estimates generally are not be able to take into account whether those 
direct jobs are year-round or seasonal, secure or insecure, or, on the other side, the importance of those affected 
livelihood strategies—for example, whether they constituted individuals’ primary livelihoods or provided 
supplemental support to other types of work. 
191 As Li points out, this is particularly true when considering an employment to land ratio that includes allocated 
land that is not used. For example, Li calculates that “[i]n Sambas district of West Kalimantan in 2006, for example, 15 
such corporations held 199,200 ha, and employed only 1944 people, a ratio of 1:100. In contrast, non-oil palm 
smallholdings in Sambas covered 80,000 has and provided livelihoods for 207,350 people (Milieudefensie et al. 2007, 
20–21). If we exclude children, the per ha employment ratio for working adults is roughly 1:1.” Li. 2011, op. cit., p. 
284.   
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have transitioned to waged work on the plantations created by the investment earn less 
than they had as smallholders, which is clearly sub-optimal from a sustainable 
development perspective. While this is very context specific, as noted above, the World 
Bank’s examination of large-scale land acquisitions found that, generally, 
“[s]mallholders’ income is 2 times to 10 times what they could obtain from wage 
employment only.” 192  This helps explain the findings of a case study of oil palm 
plantations in Ghana, in which workers articulated their unhappiness over poor wages, 
noting that “what they now earn as workers does not equal their earlier benefits from 
farming oil palm, cocoa, citrus or food crops.”193 
This comparison examines the situation of smallholder farmers who are displaced by an 
investment and then become waged workers employed by the project or by a similar 
project. The situation is rendered more complex, however, given that the jobs created by 
an investment simply may not be offered to those who lose the most due to it.194 Thus, 
some individuals may be better off as waged workers, while others in the same area 
may be worse off, having lost land or suffered “economic displacement” or loss of 
livelihood. Thus, depending on whom one asks – the worker with a job or the displaced 
person with neither a job nor the productive resources to which she once had access – 
the picture might look drastically different.195  
For example, the 2012 FAO report, discussed above, that highlighted the job creation 
from agricultural investments in Cambodia that paid better wages than the minimum 
wages offered for garment workers also noted that “the benefits came at the expense of 
loss of land holdings and associated livelihoods by local communities.”196 Indeed, this 
may be a substantial understatement, as large-scale agricultural investments in 
Cambodia often occur in highly controversial contexts of forced evictions and human 
rights abuses. This example underscores yet another problem with considering the 
benefits of job creation in a vacuum, and also highlights that, at the very least, full 
                                                             
192 World Bank, 2011, op. cit., p. 35. Based on the World Bank’s data regarding smallholder earnings versus waged 
work, Li agrees that smallholders who can viably produce should not seek to become waged workers on plantations, 
but argues further that this data indicates that, from a poverty reduction perspective, more should be done to move 
away from large-scale farms, both through land reform that breaks up large farms and land distribution programs in 
less populated areas that supports smallholders to produce viable crops. Li, 2011, op. cit., p. 285. 
193 Vath, 2013, op. cit. (parentheses omitted).  
194 Cotula and Vermeulen, 2011, op. cit. – “There is no guarantee that benefits will accrue to dispossessed rights-
holders, but broader communities may gain, particularly in three areas: employment, supply chain involvement and 
infrastructure.”  
195 As the World Bank has noted, “even the creation of large numbers of jobs may not always be perceived as an 
unmitigated benefit. This was particularly pronounced in cases where jobs were expected to provide compensation 
for land and where vulnerable groups lost access to some livelihood resources but did not benefit in terms of jobs.” 
World Bank, 2011, op. cit. p. 69 
196 FAO, “The State of Food and Agriculture: Investing in Agriculture for a Better Future,” 2012, op. cit., box 19.  
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compensation of displaced or otherwise affected individuals should be required.197 In 
that regard, the creation of employment opportunities does not serve as appropriate 
compensation.198  
Aside from direct displacement from land, large agricultural investments can also 
disrupt access to land or productive resources in other ways that negatively affect 
livelihoods. Large concessions can block common routes to farmland, water, or other 
resources, significantly restricting access or increasing time burdens. This may occur 
even when projects are not fully implemented, if access to productive resources is 
restricted.199 Furthermore, just as mining operations can indirectly destroy livelihoods 
due to pollution or other negative environmental impacts, as discussed above, 
agricultural operations on concessions can detrimentally affect nearby resources on 
which individuals rely. These potential negative impacts also should be considered in 
evaluations of the net livelihood gain or loss from investments. 
 
Closure or failure of a project  
Many agricultural investments could theoretically last indefinitely, given the renewable 
nature of land and water resources (assuming ecologically sound practices). Yet 
agricultural projects do close for various reasons. Some projects are designed for a 
limited duration, while others simply fail. Indeed, agricultural production is risky, and 
the failure of agricultural investment projects is not uncommon.200  
These closures affect linked employment opportunities. The human costs of closed or 
failed projects can be great, ranging from job losses for those who had been employed, 
to continued livelihood disruptions for those who were previously displaced from the 
land. These negative impacts are not confined to projects that were completely 
                                                             
197 Human rights norms provide guidance on development-based evictions such as those instigated by large 
agricultural investments; generally, cash compensation is not appropriate. Rather, for persons who relied on the land 
and who do not want cash, compensation should take the form of land that is equal or better to that taken in respect 
of quality, size and value. United Nations, “Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions and 
Displacement,” available at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Housing/Guidelines_en.pdf (last visited July 
13, 2016); see also United Nations SDSN, “Harnessing Natural Resources for Sustainable Development: Challenges 
and Solutions,” available at: http://unsdsn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/TG10-Final-Report.pdf (last visited July 
13, 2016), p. 12. Of course, even robust compensation cannot assuage more intangible losses related to socio-cultural 
impacts; for many people, particular areas of land have significance that cannot be calculated. 
198 Aside from equity and rights reasons, there is a business case to avoid this, too, as disappointment with the 
paucity of employment options can create conflict. See, e.g., World Bank, 2011, op. cit., p. 69.  
199 See, e.g., World Bank, 2011, op. cit., p. 68. 
200 Lorenzo Cotula, “Addressing the human rights impacts of ‘land grabbing’” 15 (2014) (“evidence suggests that 
failure rates in the latest wave of agribusiness investments have been high”). 
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operational and then stopped; similarly negative effects may flow from projects that 
were never fully implemented.  
Just as with mining investments, post-closure planning thus constitutes an important 
best practice for agricultural investments. This can include ensuring that sufficient 
safety nets exist to mitigate the negative impacts of closure or failure. Host governments 
and other stakeholders should also pay particular attention to what will happen to the 
land once a project ends. Providing mechanisms for formerly displaced residents to 
gain renewed access to the land may be the most appropriate option in many cases.201 
This could include “policies … that allow the transfer of [failed projects’] … productive 
assets (including land) to more productive uses to prevent speculation.”202 
 
3.4 Conclusion  
The debate around large-scale agricultural investments is contentious. Such investments 
are sometimes justified primarily based on their potential to generate waged 
employment, and investments that promise high numbers of jobs may be perceived as 
attractive to host governments or other actors. Yet critics raise a number of concerns 
about these types of investments, particularly when they require displacement of 
previous land users. This points to the need to unpack the job claims, including what 
types of jobs are being created, and how the net livelihood impacts of investments may 
affect sustainable development. This question becomes particularly important when 
assessing whether other models of agricultural investments may be more appropriate 
than large-scale land-based investments. 
 
  
                                                             
201 See, e.g., Kaitlin Cordes, Lise Johnson and Sam Szoke-Burke, Land deal dilemmas: Grievances, human rights, and 
investor protections, Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (March 2016), p. 26, Box 16. 
202 Klaus Deininger, “Challenges posed by the new wave of farmland investment,” 38(2) Journal of Peasant Studies 217-
247 (March 24, 2011) p. 235 (noting also that “[t]here are many examples, from rubber in East Asia to Australia and 
the US Midwest where mega-farms were eventually replaced by much smaller owner-operated units of production”). 
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Section 4. Government policies for job creation  
In light of the previous discussion, the following section examines the various policies 
that governments have implemented or could implement to support the job creation 
potential of investments in mining and agriculture. This includes policies that aim to 
increase the number of direct jobs supported by an investment, as well as policies that 
seek to generate indirect or induced employment, or to tie investments to local 
development more generally. Taken together, these policies provide a number of tools 
that policymakers can employ in their efforts to optimize the impact of large-scale 
investments in mining and agriculture for employment and livelihood. 
 
4.1 Maximizing the long-term development impact of and employment 
creation from mining investment 
Traditionally, and partly due to the influence of various economic development 
theories, strategies aiming to maximize the development impact of mining have focused 
on either “the fiscal linkage” or “production/consumption linkages” along with 
employment generation. At the root of this dichotomous vision has been the image of 
mining as a capital-intensive enclave activity with limited connections to the rest of the 
economy but with large potential for generating fiscal revenue (unlike agriculture, 
which is assumed to have opposite characteristics). Depending on which side of the 
dichotomy dominates policy formulation in a given context, governments generally 
choose to focus on either maximizing fiscal revenue, including through a combination 
of investment attraction and fiscal design, or to strengthening linkages, thereby raising 
employment and local content.    
 
The apparent contradiction between revenue maximization and employment creation 
From the point of view of most low- and middle-income country governments, the 
strategic choice identified above manifests itself as two sets of objectives that dictate 
policies with respect to the mining sector: fiscal objectives—most importantly, 
maximizing government revenue—and broader developmental goals, including 
maximizing employment creation. 203  The two sets of objectives are not necessarily 
contradictory: in the long run, success under one set of objectives may be closely 
                                                             
203 Other developmental objectives that are relevant in this context may be poverty reduction, a more equal income 
distribution, and improved health and education. While increased employment tends to be correlated with all of 
these, the causal relationships may be complex.    
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correlated with success under the other. Superficially and in the short term, however, 
governments may view them as opposing goals. This section discusses this point. 
Arguably, governments seeking to raise employment and tax revenue from mining over 
the long term could increase the attractiveness of their investment regimes, with 
attendant benefits to development. However, low- and middle-income country 
governments have found it difficult to follow this strategy for a number of reasons.  
First, governments may doubt that measures intended to attract investment—
specifically, lower or more appropriately designed taxes—will succeed. In particular, 
they may not be convinced that tax revenue forgone in the short to medium term as a 
result of a tax regime that is attractive to investors will be offset by long-term gains. 
This may be the case in particular if the country in question already has significant 
mining activity. Lower taxes and other incentives intended to attract new investment 
that also benefit existing mines could result in losses of significant tax revenue.  
Second, the harsh budget constraints facing poor countries and the perceived limits to 
job creation in mining will tend to influence governments in the direction of 
emphasizing short-term gains in revenue. 
Third, as experience shows, a government that implements policies aimed at attracting 
mining investment will have to be prepared to face strong criticism. This is so, in 
particular, since some of the most important measures that were typically included in 
legislative changes in the 1990s and early 2000s were interpreted by public opinion as 
providing unfair advantages to mining firms.204 This is not to say that governments in 
some cases did not conclude costly or otherwise problematic agreements. However, 
those agreements, which sometimes included inefficient and expensive elements such 
as tax holidays, were usually the outcome of direct negotiations over individual projects 
shrouded in opacity and corruption rather than the result of broader changes to mining 
regulations. Accordingly, the fault lay not with the investment regime as such but 
rather with the government negotiators’ lack of experience or integrity.  
As a result of these factors, many, and maybe most, governments have designed 
investment and tax regimes that attract less mining investment than would otherwise 
be possible. For instance, governments rely less on profits taxes and more on royalties, 
which provide earlier and more stable revenues but which raise operating costs and 
                                                             
204 Typically, these measures included accelerated depreciation and amortization, whereby companies can write 
down investments more quickly than normally. This is an important advantage to investors, who are anxious to 
recover capital costs quickly, and is usually considered a minor cost to governments, who will receive the same tax 
payments, only distributed over a longer period. In the early years of projects, however, an outside observer may 
think that companies are paying disproportionately little in taxes, and the explanation that they will pay more in the 
future may not always be believed. 
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therefore result in lower than economically efficient exploitation of deposits.205 Ideally, 
in order to maximize revenues and achieve an optimal rate of exploitation, 
governments should tax rents 206  rather than turnover. Given the difficulties in 
accurately assessing rents and practical complications such as allocating common costs 
among several different deposits operated by the same company, however, very few 
governments have chosen to attempt to tax rents. At the same time, many governments 
have offered stable conditions to investors, usually through formal stability clauses in 
agreements or legislation.207 An offer of stability is attractive to investors since it reduces 
risk significantly, provided, of course, that the offer is regarded as credible, including 
by the investor’s creditors.   
For all the reasons described, employment in practice often becomes a second order 
objective that is mainly met by introducing conditions on mining investment and by 
more general development policies rather than by attempting to increase investment in 
mining. 
Moreover, for reasons having to do with the time horizons relevant to governments and 
uncertainty with respect to longer-term developments and the dynamic effects of 
mining investment on employment, government policies sometimes do not attempt to 
exploit the full potential for job creation around mining. In particular, governments 
may be unwilling to invest political capital in promoting linkages that in the long term 
may result in higher revenue. The dilemma is illustrated by Figure 1. The graph on the 
left of the figure shows the shares of revenue from a mining project that accrue to 
different parties.208 The graph on the right shows how the 55 percent of total revenues 
that are collected by suppliers are distributed among different types of enterprises. The 
numbers are representative of a low- to medium-income country with a relatively low 
capacity to supply goods used in mining. It is seen from the two figures that the share 
of local suppliers of services at 22 percent (40 percent of 55 percent) is larger than that of 
the government. If suppliers of locally produced goods are added, the local suppliers’ 
share of the total increases to 24.75 percent. If it is conservatively assumed that half of 
the suppliers’ revenues go to wages and salaries (most suppliers’ businesses being 
                                                             
205 According to an overview of mining tax rates, the trend is that countries have increased royalty rates in recent 
years (PWC, “Corporate income taxes, mining royalties and other mining taxes: A summary of rates and rules in 
selected countries,” (2012)). 
206 Rent is commonly defined as being the profit that is made above the rate of return necessary to attract capital in 
the mining project. 
207 Several governments have found that such clauses need to be limited in time, since they risk becoming 
increasingly out of line with other legislation over time. From the point of view of investors, the need for a stability 
clause also declines once the original capital outlay has been recovered. It is generally agreed that stability clauses 
should be limited to fiscal aspects. 
208 It should be noted that although the figure illustrates a specific mine, a medium-size gold mine, the shares usually 
vary remarkably little from one mine to another, at least in the authors’ experience.   
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much less capital intensive than mining), then labor income from the project represents 
about 22 percent (half of 24.75 percent plus 10 percent for mining company employees) 
of the project revenue, significantly more than the tax revenue.  
 
Figure 1. Shares of mining project revenue and suppliers’ revenue, percent 
  
Source: Authors’ estimates 
 
These numbers illustrate that it may be in a government’s interest to pay particular 
attention to indirect job creation, as even a relatively small increase in the share of local 
suppliers to the mining project will have a significant impact on both employment and 
on government tax revenues—suppliers to the mining industry and their employees 
also pay taxes.209 These numbers also illustrate that the main employment return from 
mining investment comes from the activities linked to mining rather than from mining 
itself. This employment return may be even higher if complementary investment in, for 
instance, infrastructure and training is included. Moreover, mining tax revenue may 
create the fiscal room of maneuver to invest in other employment promoting measures.  
Governments may, however, hesitate to pursue policies that place employment 
generation ahead of short-term maximization of tax revenue, given the possible political 
costs of appearing to yield too much to investors. From the government’s point of view, 
the returns to a policy aimed to attract investment are uncertain and will materialize 
                                                             
209 An indirect illustration of the potential importance of taxes on employees’ salaries is provided by the example of 
Zambia. Taxes on mining employees’ salaries (Pay As You Earn, or PAYE) accounted for 3-5 per cent of total 
Zambian tax revenues in the years 2007-2012. Until 2009 they represented the most important tax revenue from 
mining, until rising metals prices and the exhaustion of depreciation allowances raised the amounts of royalties and 
corporate income taxes (Chamber of Mines and ICMM, “Enhancing mining’s contribution to the Zambian economy 






















only in the longer term. Nevertheless, if the objective is sustainable long- term growth, 
policies that support the establishment of linkages and the development of a diversified 
local economy around mining may in the long run yield a higher return in terms of 
employment and growth than revenue maximizing policies focusing on raising the 
government’s share of total revenues. While the two policy directions are in principle 
not contradictory, in practice most governments have emphasized short-term revenue 
generation. When the two policy objectives clearly point in different directions, as in the 
case of whether and how much to require in royalties paid to the government, it is rare 
to see employment creation gain the upper hand.210   
The following section explores how some countries have chosen to pursue employment 
creation from mining investments, even when such strategies may require that they 
give up some revenue, either to attract investment or to share revenues with local 
communities in areas affected by mining.  
 
Policies targeting direct employment of local workers 
Although governments are usually anxious to maximize the number of their nationals 
employed in a mining operation, most governments tend to accept that the total 
number of all employees, irrespective of their origin, is determined by technology and 
deposit characteristics and cannot be too tightly regulated without jeopardizing the 
economic viability of the mining operation. Moreover, even where governments believe 
that it might be possible for a given company to employ more local individuals, their 
leverage with investors is limited.  
Nevertheless, more or less binding targets can be established for local employment in 
either legislation or negotiated contracts. Agreements or legislation may provide less 
quantitative objectives with respect to specific kinds of employment. For example, it is 
quite common for countries to require that nationals of the country be given priority in 
hiring and that the number of foreign employees be kept to a minimum. For example, 
the Mining Operations Proclamation of Ethiopia states that “a licensee shall have the 
obligations to (…) give preference to the employment of Ethiopian nationals, provided 
that such persons have the required qualifications.”211 Kazakhstan uses a more explicit 
                                                             
210 Most royalties are a tax on volume or value of production. Thus, they add directly to production costs, with a 
typical royalty of 5 percent per valorem adding as much as 10 percent to operating costs, thereby making lower grade 
parts of mineral deposits unprofitable to mine. Consequently, output and employment will be lower than it would 
otherwise have been.   
211 Ethiopia, Mining Operations Proclamation No. 678/2010, Article 34.1/h. 
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and demanding rule, requiring 95 percent of employees to be citizens of Kazakhstan.212 
Similarly, Ghana requires mining companies to observe precise limits on the percentage 
of expatriates at different stages of the project.213  Quantitative targets for employment 
are also usually contained in Mineral Development Agreements (MDAs), which may 
specify additional conditions with employment implications, such as sourcing of inputs 
from local enterprises. 
While legislation and MDAs provide ways for governments to set out local 
employment requirements, their effectiveness may be limited by a government’s lack of 
in-depth knowledge of the operations in question and by the lack of adequate financial 
and human resources to monitor and enforce their requirements. Close monitoring of 
companies’ activities requires significant staff resources, which governments may not 
have. In addition, governments may lack the competence to evaluate claims by 
companies that their operations cannot employ more people economically. Moreover, if 
the necessary skills are not present, the company might be obliged to add non-
productive jobs, possibly undermining project economy and providing less lasting 
benefit to the employees. Companies may also choose to circumvent the requirements. 
For example, in order to adjust to the local employment requirements in Ghana, some 
companies have found it easier to relocate company divisions outside of Ghana than to 
recruit a sufficient number of nationals to satisfy regulations.214 
Accordingly, although many governments do set targets for employment, they often 
find it more effective to focus on how companies may be persuaded that it is in their 
own best interest to train and employ local individuals.  
 
Policies targeting employment directly through increased investment 
In some high-income countries, where the creation of employment in disadvantaged 
regions is a high priority but where direct negotiation or regulation of the number of 
employees may conflict with international obligations and does not form part of the 
political culture, at least not explicitly, governments may try to achieve results through 
                                                             
212 A. M. Esteves, V. Ogorodnikova, C. Putz, and B. Coyne, “Increasing Domestic Procurement by the Mining 
Industry in Central Asia,” report prepared for the World Bank (2013). 
213 Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, “Local Content: Ghana – Mining,” (2014) available at: 
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/07/Local-Content-Ghana-mining-CCSI-June-2014.pdf (last visited July 13, 2016). 
214 Sustainable Development Strategies Group (SDSG), “African Mining and Mining Administration Skills Gap 
Analysis,” prepared by Sustainable  Development Strategies Group for the Australia-Africa Partnership Facility 
(AAPF) (October 18, 2012). This includes the relocation of Gold Fields’ West African Head Office from Ghana to 
South Africa. 
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the promotion of investment.215 Thus, countries in northern Europe, particularly Finland 
and Sweden,216 have created attractive environments for mining investment precisely 
because mining investment tends to target parts of the countries (the northern parts in 
these two cases) with high unemployment.217 Since mining is unlikely to ever become a 
very important source of government revenue for these governments, generous taxation 
policies218 can be used to attract mining investment to sparsely populated areas without 
any great sacrifice. The thinking behind such policies reveals an awareness of the 
importance of induced employment to ensure that the population in sparsely populated 
areas does not fall below a critical level needed to maintain commercial and public 
infrastructure. 
As far as is known, there has been no attempt to formally evaluate the effectiveness of 
the policies pursued in the two countries. However, the number of employees in the 
mining industry in Sweden, which had been on a rapidly declining trend, levelled out 
after reforms in 1992 and increased from 4,446 in 2000 to 5,922 in 2012, while the 
number of mines declined slightly. Perhaps more important than this relatively modest, 
although increasing, number is the fact that more than 80 percent of the employment 
increase occurred in sparsely populated areas in the two northern counties, where, 
including multiplier effects, the employment effect, particularly in terms of induced 
employment, was significant.219 Another possible indication of the degree of success of 
the policy with respect to investment attraction is that the number of new exploration 
permits in Sweden more than doubled between 1992 and 2012. Much higher peaks, at 
four and five times the 1992 level respectively, were reached in 1999 and 2006.220 While 
the number of mines, as already mentioned, declined slightly, the dramatic rise in 
exploration activity would be expected to eventually, with a relatively long time lag, 
result in new mines being opened. Several new mines are now at the permitting stage.    
                                                             
215 The Swedish government’s mineral strategy states in its preamble “The mining industry is of great importance for 
the country’s growth and economy. It creates employment opportunities in surrounding areas, contributes to 
strengthened attraction and creates growth in parts of the country that have long had declining populations.“ 
(Government of Sweden, “Sveriges mineralstrategi,” (“Sweden’s mineral strategy,” author’s translation) 2013). 
216 Sweden and Finland placed first and second respectively in the Fraser Institute 2013 Policy Perception Index. The 
ten highest ranked jurisdictions were all developed country ones.  
217 Sweden has a relatively low rate of corporate income tax at 22 percent. The only mining specific tax is a royalty at 
0.2 per cent of gross value of production, three quarters of which goes to the landowner. A new mining law in 1992 
eliminated a number of restrictions on mining investment.  
218 It should be noted that it is common practice to levy more taxes on mining than on other industries so that 
“generous investment conditions” usually means that mining companies do not pay more taxes than, for instance, 
manufacturing companies. 
219 See, for instance, Thomas Ejdemo and Patrik Söderholm, “Local economic impact assessment of the Tapuli and 
Stora Sahavaara mining projects,” Raw Materials Group (2008); Tommy Lind, “Modelling socio-economic impacts of 
new mines in the interior of Västerbotten,” Department of Social and Economic Geography, Umeå University (2009). 
220 Swedish Geological Survey, “Bergverksstatistik” (Mineral statistics) (2012).  
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As was noted above, for most low- and middle-income countries, tax revenue from the 
mining sector is seen as potentially or actually too important to allow governments to 
focus exclusively on raising employment by attracting investment through tax 
incentives. Although such countries do adopt employment promotion policies that 
focus on the creation of special trade zones and similar arrangements associated with 
large tax exemptions, these arrangements often exclude mining. This does not mean 
that fiscal incentives are never offered for mining projects, however. Rather, mining 
usually qualifies—along with other sectors—for broad general investment incentives, 
such as accelerated depreciation, loss carry forward provisions, duty free imports, and 
VAT exemptions.  
Revenue sharing 
In many countries, tax revenue from mining is shared between national and lower-level 
governments. There is often strong political pressure for revenue sharing; it is 
sometimes argued that such sharing is necessary to ensure that the local communities 
affected by mining are able to benefit or that local communities receive additional 
public expenditure to help mitigate mining’s negative side effects.221 Sharing the tax 
revenues will, it is argued, allow more jobs to be created locally, as local authorities may 
be better at identifying opportunities than the central government, both because they 
may be more aware of specific needs for public services and because they have more 
detailed knowledge of the capacity of local enterprises. 
 Arrangements for revenue sharing can be categorized according to two criteria:222   
x The degree of fiscal decentralization, affecting the way a nation empowers various 
parts and levels of its government to impose and collect taxes and fees from the 
private sector. 
x The degree of revenue sharing, affecting how revenues collected by one or more 
parts of government are allocated for distribution to other governmental entities or 
for various investments or expenditures to non-governmental entities. 
Fiscal decentralization is more common in federal states such as Australia, Canada, and 
the United States, where it is a direct consequence of the jurisdiction that states or 
provinces hold over mineral legislation and taxation. In other countries, fiscal 
decentralization is an exception and revenue sharing is more common.  
                                                             
221 ICMM, “Minerals Taxation Regimes: A review of issues and challenges in their design and application Minerals 
Taxation Regimes: A review of issues and challenges in their design and application” (Feb 2009). 
222 James Otto, “Fiscal Decentralization and Mining Taxation,” for the World Bank Group Mining Department (March 
2001). 
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In general, revenue sharing has become more widespread in recent years. In Africa, the 
governments of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ghana, Mozambique, and 
Uganda share royalties and/or corporate income tax proceeds with lower level 
governments and local communities, while Botswana, Burkina Faso, the DRC, and 
Madagascar share license fees.223 However, revenue sharing is not yet the rule in mining 
economies. In some mining countries, such as Chile and Tanzania, the central 
government does not share mineral revenues with lower-level authorities.  
Peru provides an interesting case study, with a rich and varied history of applying 
revenue sharing in different ways. The approaches used are also well documented. Box 
5 provides more information on the Peruvian experience. 
 
Box 5 - Revenue sharing in Peru: the Canon Minero  
The most significant mining revenues in Peru flow from corporate income taxes, which are 
collected at the central government level. Through the “Canon Minero” mechanism, part of this 
revenue is directly redistributed to sub-national governments. The rules governing this 
mechanism have been subject to change over the years. This has been partly in reaction to 
efforts to push for greater government decentralization, and partly to demonstrate to sub-
national governments the benefits of accepting mining operations in their jurisdictions. Since 
2003, the proportion of corporate income tax paid by mining companies that is redistributed has 
been 50 percent. Transfers through the Canon Minero increased dramatically from 81 million 
Nuevos Soles (US$ 29 million) in 2001 to 5,097 million Nuevos Soles (US$ 1.82 billion) in 2012. 
The criteria for distribution have changed several times. 224  
In addition, in 2005, a royalty tax was introduced, which accrues to sub-national entities in 
whose jurisdictions mining takes place. However, most large mining companies operating in 
Peru signed contracts with stabilization clauses with the government in the 1990s; as a result, 
few of them pay any royalties.  To address this, a “Voluntary Support Fund” (Programa Minero 
Solidaridad con el Pueblo) was negotiated with the industry in 2006. Under this arrangement, 
participating companies are expected to contribute 3.75 percent of after tax profits to local 
development projects. 
In respect of job creation, the most important question is whether the additional financial 
resources provided to sub-national governments have had a positive effect on employment and 
incomes. For example, a visible increase in construction employment could be expected, 
because the Canon Minero funds can in principle only be used for capital investment. Much of 
the investment of these resources has been made in buildings for social services, such as 
education and health care, however, where effects would only be expected in the longer term. 
                                                             
223 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, “Comparative royalty table,” mimeo (2008). 
224 Sociedad Nacional de Minería, “Petróleo y Energía,” available at: http://www.snmpe.org.pe/pdf/183/que-es-el-
canon-minero.pdf (last visited November 19, 2013). 
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A few studies have tried to assess the effects of revenue sharing on employment outcomes.225 To 
the authors’ knowledge, there is no evidence that revenue sharing has had a significant impact 
on employment or incomes in mining areas.  A recent study of one particular mine, the 
Yanacocha, concluded that the only significant effects of the mine on employment could be 
attributed to the mine’s and its employees’ local purchases (indirect and induced employment). 
These effects were concentrated in the neighborhood of the mine and declined with distance.226 
Accordingly, it would appear that the investments financed through the Canon Minero have 
contributed little to the development of local economies or to job generation. One reason may be 
that, as can be concluded from the study just cited, in spite of the impressive amounts that have 
been redistributed in some cases, the sums are still modest compared to the impact of the 
mine’s and mine workers’ spending.  
 
Very few if any systematic efforts have been made to evaluate the outcome of revenue 
sharing schemes in other countries. Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that the 
employment impact is modest. For instance, one report summarizing the results of four 
country case studies (including Peru) found that the two countries that implemented 
revenue sharing (Ghana and Peru) showed less progress in reducing poverty in the 
regions surrounding large-scale mines than the two countries that did not (Chile and 
Tanzania). 227  An oft-mentioned reason for this is the limited capacity of local 
governments to plan and to spend revenue productively.228   
Cooperative efforts for training 
As already mentioned, some governments negotiate targets for employment of 
nationals, although it is uncertain whether such policies have positive long-term 
benefits.  
                                                             
225 Some such studies are quoted in E. Baca Tupayachi, “Generación, distribución y uso de la Renta de las Industrias 
Extractivas,” presentation by Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana, (January 2012). 
226 Fernando M. Aragón and Juan Pablo Rud. "Natural Resources and Local Communities: Evidence from a Peruvian 
Gold Mine,"  5(2) American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 1-25 (2013); Alfredo M. Loayza, and Teran Jamele 
Rigolini, “Poverty, Inequality and the Local Natural Resource Curse,” Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit; 
IZA DP No. 7226 (2013). 
 
227 ICMM, “Synthesis of Four Country Case Studies,” (April 2006). 
228 See, for instance, the literature review conducted by Jim Cust and Steven Poelhekke in “The Local Economic 
Impacts of Natural Resource Extraction,” 2015, leading to the same finding. In particular, they mention the work 
done by Perry and Oliveria (2009) that document the experience of Colombia, where the oil and coal royalties are 
shared between the federal level and the region. There, a study showed that royalty sharing increased income only in 
regions that already had a strong capacity to generate tax income, thereby illustrating the correlation between the 
governments’ capacity to raise taxes and the government’s capacity to spend effectively to improve development 
outcomes (source: G. Perry, M. Olivera, “Natural Resources, Institutions and Economic Performance,” Fedesarrollo 
Working Paper (November 2009).  
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For this reason, most governments emphasize training as a measure that is more 
productive in the long term. Government policies usually focus on providing or 
facilitating training and vocational education or requiring mining companies to do so. 
Experience seems to show that training programmes for the mining sector work best 
when designed and implemented in cooperation between mining companies and the 
government.229 While mining companies have detailed knowledge of the skills required, 
governments usually know more about general skills levels and have the means to 
directly influence school curricula.  
The more impressive programs have been carried out in places where the existing skill 
levels were very low, although programs developed in areas with higher skill levels 
have also been successful. One example from a region with higher skill levels is an 
effort associated with the Diavik Diamond Mine in Canada’s Northwest Territories, 
where an integrated approach to local training, employment, and procurement was 
applied, with commitments formalized in a series of agreements and policy 
statements.230 The approach included a Socio-Economic Monitoring Agreement (SEMA) 
negotiated with the Government of the Northwest Territories and five neighboring 
Aboriginal groups in 1999. The mine also signed five Participation Agreements (PAs) 
directly with neighboring indigenous communities, which covered training and 
employment. By 2008, the mine employed about 800 people and had met its target of 
having 67 percent of its work force comprised of Northern residents. Although the mine 
did not meet its Aboriginal employment commitment, reaching 34 percent instead of 
the targeted 42 percent in 2008, the absolute number of people hired was far higher than 
the original estimate.  
Another example is provided by the Sepon Mining Project, a gold and copper mine 
located in southern Lao PDR.231 MMG Sepon is committed to giving preference to 
employing people from the communities and areas closest to its operations. 
Recruitment, at least in the mine’s initial stages was specifically to be based on 
“aptitude” rather than “formal education qualifications”—a tactic designed to bypass 
the lower levels of schooling of one of the two linguistic groups in the area. Between 
2004 and 2006, more than 50 percent of job vacancies were filled by people living in the 
vicinity of MMG Sepon’s operation. In 2007, this rate started to decline, and seems to 
                                                             
229 In northern Chile, for instance, a vocational school set up by a mining company after consultation with the 
government was turned over to the government and has continued educating skilled staff for the local mining 
industry (ICMM, “Chile. The Challenge of Mineral Wealth: using resource endowments to foster sustainable 
development,” (March 2007)). Other examples, particularly with respect to training programs for local communities, 
are cited in OPM, 2013, Sustainable Mining: How good practices in the mining sector contribute to more and better 
jobs, Report to ILO.  
230 The description is based on ICMM, “Mapping in-country partnerships,” (2010).  
231 The description here is mainly based on ICMM, “Utilizing mining and mineral resources to foster the sustainable 
development of the Lao PDR,” (2011), and on personal communications from MMG Sepon officials.  
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have stabilized in 2008 and 2009 at around 35 percent. In addition to giving priority to 
people from the local communities, MMG Sepon also gives priority to women, and the 
percentage of female employees has varied from 15 to 19 percent, somewhat higher 
than normal in the industry.232  
We will now address the various policies used to influence the ways in which linkages 
can be supported and finally, we will conclude by discussing policies that aim at 
supporting the establishment of a diversified local economy. 
Policies targeting linkages 
Many government policies for more and better employment in mining rely on 
traditional industrial policy prescriptions, with an emphasis on providing incentives 
that will drive structural change and industrial transformation. The intellectual roots of 
these policies, which all emphasize the importance of establishing and strengthening 
various types of linkages, can be found in theories about supply chains and clusters.233 
However, where the theories attempt to describe and explain the processes by which 
industries are established, the policy formulations rest on the conviction that these 
processes can be influenced by governments. Although this is likely possible, methods 
of doing so are as of yet not well developed. Two frequently used types of policies 
relate to encouraging local content and increased processing.    
Local content policies 
A number of countries have introduced legislation intended to encourage the 
establishment and strengthening of backward linkages from mining that will increase 
local content (see section 1.1 for definitions).234 A first difficulty for these countries is to 
define local content, particularly for goods. In most cases, local content is assumed to be 
represented by goods bought from local companies. However, that a company is owned 
by nationals of the host country or that its facilities are located in the host country does 
not necessarily mean that its merchandise is locally produced. Yet to analyze the 
proportion of local value added for each potential producer is usually too time 
consuming and burdensome for most investors or government monitoring 
                                                             
232 According to the World Bank, women seldom account for more than 10 percent of mining employees, and usually 
this proportion is below 5 percent. World Bank, “Gender Dimensions of the Extractive Industries,” Mining for Equity 
Extractive Industries and Development Series No. 8 (2009). 
233 See, for instance, Michael E. Porter, “Clusters and the New Economics of Competition,” Harvard Business Review 
(November-December 1998); Raphael Kaplinsky and Mike Morris, “A Handbook for Value Chain Research,” 
prepared for the IDRC, (2001). 
234 Local content policies usually include employment and training requirements. Given that this paper is focused on 
job creation, however, we separated out the direct employment question from the topic of local content, and focus 
our discussion here on local procurement that generates indirect employment. 
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authorities.235 Accordingly, most countries choose a less laborious way of classifying 
suppliers to mining companies. For suppliers of services, the task is of course less 
complicated, since it is easier to determine the nationality of somebody carrying out a 
particular service. 
Most countries are, in principle, constrained by World Trade Organization (WTO) 
commitments in terms of the requirements they can impose with respect to local 
content. Members of the WTO are bound by the national treatment obligation (NTO) 
clause under which foreign companies cannot be forced to buy goods236 from local 
suppliers or hire suppliers of certain services237 if a better alternative in terms of price or 
quality exists abroad. Legislation can still require investors not to discriminate against 
local suppliers. Additionally, under one interpretation, legislation can also require 
investors to accord local suppliers preferences if their prices and quality are equal to 
those of foreign suppliers. 238 To the authors’ knowledge, this interpretation has not been 
tested under the WTO dispute settlement procedures.  
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are exempted from these WTO rules, but the 
exemption will expire in 2020. In addition to the WTO rules, international investment 
agreements, including bilateral investment agreements – or BITs – between a host and 
home state, can limit the possibility to legislate in favor of local content or restrict the 
employment of foreigners. Indeed, some agreements go further than the WTO 
                                                             
235 There are exceptions, where governments have gone to the trouble of measuring actual local content. For instance, 
the government of Kazakhstan has formalized the measurement of local content in goods, works, and services, using 
the “Uniform Method of Kazakh Content Calculation” (Government’s Decree No. 367/2010). 
236 All World Trade Organization (WTO) Members must adopt and abide by the obligations of the Trade Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMs). The TRIMs Agreement clarifies existing rules contained in Articles III (National 
Treatment Obligation (NTO)) and XI (Prohibition on Quantitative Restrictions) of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), 1994. The following types of local content requirements are covered by TRIMS: requiring a 
company to purchase or use products of domestic origin (TRIMs prohibits discrimination  between goods of 
domestic and imported origin); limiting the amount of imported products that an enterprise may purchase or use 
depending on the volume or value of local products that the enterprise exports; restricting foreign exchange 
necessary to import (e.g., restricting the importation by an enterprise of products used in local production by 
restricting its access to foreign exchange); and restricting exports.  
237 A separate WTO agreement, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”), covers investment measures 
related to services (in Article XVI). GATS only applies to those service sectors that the country chooses to include in 
its Schedule of Commitments.  
238 For instance see the wording of the MMDA project: “The Company shall, when purchasing goods and services 
required with respect to Mining operations, give first preference, at comparable quality, delivery schedule and price, 
to goods produced in the State and services provided by the State citizens or businesses, subject to technical 
acceptability and availability of the relevant goods and services in the State” (International Bar Association, Model 
Mine Development Agreement, April 4, 2011, available at: www.mmdaproject.org). 
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provisions, prohibiting all types of measures related to local content and performance 
requirements in general.239 
Some countries use legislation or contracts to express a general preference for local 
content, but without mandating specific requirements. This includes relatively 
successful mining countries, such as Peru and Australia, and, in the past, Chile.240 Other 
countries have more specific requirements stated in legislation or regulatory 
instruments—in some cases applying fairly “blunt” industry-wide requirements. 
Kazakhstan, for instance, has required mining investors to negotiate a binding 
agreement with the government establishing a certain percentage of local content; it 
also has required that companies issuing tenders reduce the price in bids of local 
suppliers by 20 percent.241 Following its admission to the WTO in November 2015, 
however, Kazakhstan committed to take measures to review and amend, including 
through legislation, all of its “blunt” requirements that are inconsistent with the WTO 
by the end of its transitional period.242  
Many countries require mining companies to submit their own plans to increase 
domestic content over time. This approach recognizes both the time it takes to build 
capabilities and skills, as well as the fact that issues may vary across different types of 
mining companies and at different stages in the life cycle of a particular mine. In some 
countries, including Australia, Tanzania, Guinea, and Indonesia, legislation requires 
that such plans be developed as part of a company’s licensing procedure.  
In conclusion, local content policies exist on a spectrum that ranges from broad policy 
priorities to industry-wide “blunt instruments,” and may be included in legislation or 
in specific contracts. In part because more assertive mandated local content is relatively 
new, there is limited evidence of its impact on business decisions. Experience from 
Kazakhstan, which has a firm policy in this area, with targets and stiff penalties for not 
achieving them, is not extremely encouraging. During the period from 2010-2012, for 
                                                             
239 Performance requirements are measures in law, regulation, or contract that require investors to meet specified 
goals when entering, operating or expanding in, or leaving a host country. Some are strictly mandatory; others are 
imposed as a condition for receiving some sort of added benefit or advantage. For an explanation of the nexus of 
international law and local content, please visit CCSI’s legal profiles: http://ccsi.columbia.edu/work/projects/local-
content-laws-contractual-provisions/ 
240 After achieving its objectives, Chile phased out all legal requirements regarding local content. Norway did the 
same (McKinsey Global Institute, “Reversing the curse: Maximizing the potential of resource-driven economies,” 
(December 2013)). 
241 Esteves, Ogorodnikova, Putz, and Coyne, 2013, op. cit.   
242 Kazakhstan will introduce amendments to its Law "On Subsurface and Subsurface Use" aimed at removing 
measures inconsistent with the WTO TRIMs Agreement; it will also sign supplementary agreements with subsurface 
users that remove from inconsistent measures from investment contracts. These actions will be undertaken before the 
transitional period ends in 2021. World Trade Organization, Accessions Commitments Database, Article 0889, 
available at: http://acdb.wto.org/tabs.aspx (last visited July 14, 2016). 
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example, local content in goods was between 13 and 14 percent, which is perhaps less 
than one would have expected and not significantly more than in other countries at a 
similar income level. Local content in services rose from 81.5 to 92.1 percent during the 
same time period, but this also is not markedly better than in other similar countries.243 
Many local content regulations—Kazakhstan’s are a good example—require significant 
monitoring and reporting that carries costs for both government and companies. Such 
monitoring and reporting requirements are unlikely to be consistently enforced by 
government administrations with limited resources or capacity.  
Aside from explicit local content requirements, another policy that could promote local 
suppliers, but that is not frequently used in low- and middle-income countries, is to not 
allow mining investors to import equipment free of duty. Where such equipment can be 
sourced locally it may appear somewhat misplaced to give mining companies preferred 
treatment compared to other users of the same equipment (much of the equipment and 
inputs used in mining is used also in other industries). Because the possibility of 
importing equipment duty free is common in mining countries, to the extent that 
investors have come to expect it, the government may have to take other steps to ensure 
that the overall attractiveness of the country as an investment destination is not 
negatively affected.  The cost of such steps, however, would be at least partly offset by 
additional local sourcing of inputs.  
Policies for further processing 
Many countries attempt to influence mining companies with a view to increasing 
downstream processing. Various methods have been used, from soliciting relatively 
vague commitments by investors to give such possibilities careful consideration to 
imposing export taxes on unprocessed products or even establishing outright bans on 
such exports. The idea underlying export taxes and bans is that policies encouraging 
downstream processing can improve trade performance and speed up the structural 
transformation of the economy. It is often also claimed that these policies favor 
employment.  
However, in practice some mining companies probably have good reasons not to 
process raw materials into processed products. If companies are not already doing it on 
their own initiative, they may consider the associated risks too high or the investment 
insufficiently profitable, for instance, where the costs of local inputs such as energy are 
too high, there is no scope for economies of scale, or the location of such downstream 
processing facilities would be too far from consumers.  
                                                             
243 Esteves, Ogorodnikova, Putz, and Coyne, 2013, op. cit.   
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It is, of course, possible that the cost to the mining company may be offset by benefits 
accruing to the rest of society, for instance, in terms of economic diversification and an 
improved skills base. Export taxes or bans based on an analysis showing that the 
benefits outweigh the costs might thus be justified. It is, however, very rare that such 
analyses are carried out in order to establish a strong economic case for the introduction 
of export taxes.244 Instead, export taxes on unprocessed materials are introduced “on 
trust,” resulting in either reduced production of the raw material or the establishment 
of processing facilities that exist primarily because the export tax pushes down the price 
of the raw material sufficiently that the processors can cover their costs. 245  Such 
processing facilities that depend on the continuation of the tax for their survival clearly 
lead a fragile existence. Moreover, since mineral processing is usually even more capital 
intensive than mining, the employment generated is often negligible.  
 
Policies promoting local economic development 
Induced employment, which results from mine employees spending their wages, is 
often much more important in terms of job creation numbers than either the direct (on 
the mine site) or indirect (in the supply chain) employment created by a mining 
project.246 This employment is often important also from the point of view of poverty 
reduction, because it generates jobs in the informal sector and for those who would 
otherwise not be employed—for instance, household employees. Induced employment 
is usually also strongly concentrated in spatial terms, with most of it occurring very 
close to the mine site, where mine employees spend their income. This means that 
induced employment adds to the possibility of building a diversified local economy 
around mining. Increased demand for the output of service sectors and agriculture 
provides employment opportunities for those who do not secure a job in mining, 
including women and less skilled individuals. While these effects are local, the local 
area may be quite large in terms of population. For example, the province of Katanga in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, which is building an economy based on mining and 
                                                             
244 According to an analysis of the effects of the recently introduced export taxes on unprocessed minerals in 
Indonesia, large welfare losses, on the order of US$ 33 to 34 billion cumulative net value over six years, can be 
expected, due to the loss of income from raw materials exports and high processing costs. While all such calculations 
are based on assumptions, and the reality can only be assessed ex post, the basic argument will commonly hold true: 
obliging companies to embark on commercial operations that they would otherwise not undertake can involve a 
(potentially large) opportunity cost for the country. (USAID, “Economic Effects of Indonesia’s Mineral-Processing 
Requirements for Export,” produced by Nathan Associates Inc. (April 2013)) 
245 OPM, “Sustainable Mining: How good practices in the mining sector contribute to more and better jobs,” Report to 
ILO (2013). 
246 See Östensson, 2014, op. cit.  
 
 83 
where most livelihoods are touched by the development of mines, has 6 million people 
and is the most prosperous part of the country.  
Particularly important in this regard is to exploit opportunities to strengthen linkages 
between different sectors. Most obviously, the increase in local food demand and the 
improvement in road transport that usually accompany mining provide opportunities 
for local farmers to increase their output, reduce marketing costs, and mobilize revenue 
for investment in inputs and equipment. Less obviously, but almost equally important, 
is the stimulus to the demand for services, including health care, transport, and 
business and financial services that accompany a growing ability to pay. The 
availability of such services improves the environment for small businesses.      
Despite the opportunities for building viable local economies around mining through 
leveraging induced employment, national governments sometimes prefer focusing on 
industrial policies, such as raising local (which often means national rather than local) 
content and downstream processing. Indeed, the mineral policies of most countries fail 
to include the objective of local economic diversification. Lack of certainty with respect 
to the duration of mining may be one factor—if the mine is only going to operate for ten 
years, is it worthwhile to invest in social infrastructure? The fact that mines often 
operate much longer than initially planned may be of little help to the government 
when trying to decide where to allocate scarce resources. In addition, there is often no 
established procedure for formulating rural development policies specifically for 
mining communities. In the absence of a policy manual, national governments may 
prioritize “easier” policies, such as local content.    
Local governments, which experience the problems and also see the opportunities of 
mining investments close at hand, are usually much more aware of the possibilities tied 
to local economic development. They generally have little influence on policy, however, 
and have scarce financial resources to implement any supportive policies on their own.  
In spite of these obstacles, there are several ways that governments, investors, and other 
stakeholders can encourage and promote local economic development linked to mining 
investments.  
The first is to support local governments in developing capacity to plan for rapid and 
diversified economic development, as well as to deliver the public services that are both 
needed by citizens and required for economic growth. Sharing mineral revenues, while 
not the most efficient way of creating employment, may help local authorities respond 
to the demand of a growing and wealthier population. Efforts by donors and by civil 
society organizations can also be important in this context.  
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Second, investment in infrastructure is important to allow sectors other than mining to 
grow. Mining often brings considerable improvements in infrastructure, but specific 
and supplementary governmental measures may be needed to ensure that non-mine 
users also benefit from such infrastructure. For instance, while a mining company may 
build a paved road to the nearest port, secondary feeder roads may also be needed to 
allow farmers to bring their produce to markets. Similarly, although a mining company 
may be able to operate while using banking services only in the capital, local 
entrepreneurs need banks that can handle small business loans. Accordingly, support to 
infrastructure investment, either in the form of government funding or investors’ 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) projects, is crucial. The mining company may be 
willing to include road building in its CSR programs and can use its bargaining position 
with service providers such as banks to persuade them to offer services that are useful 
to the local population. Cooperation between mining companies and the government, 
including at the local level, can also prove beneficial. 
Third, consultation mechanisms to underpin local development planning are needed. 
The provision of local services and infrastructure investment must be coordinated with 
mining company investment plans to ensure coherent development. Consultation is 
also necessary to avoid the exclusion of politically marginalized groups. An important 
element of this process is to manage expectations, which is the subject of the next 
section. 
 
Managing expectations  
As in most human endeavors, there are often large differences between expectations 
and reality when it comes to investment and job creation. It appears that failed 
expectations with respect to job openings for local residents are usually the most 
important source of dissatisfaction and conflict between mining companies and local 
communities.247 Mining companies are often perceived, sometimes probably rightly so, 
as making inflated promises about future jobs and later not living up to their promises.  
In this context, it is critical for the government and the mining company to manage 
expectations. This becomes a pre-condition to establishing a sound and depoliticized 
debate around the challenge of optimizing large-scale investment for employment and 
livelihoods. This is particularly critical given the risks of commodity price downturns. 
Box 6 explores the consequences of the 2014-2015 decline in commodity prices on job 
                                                             
247 See, for instance, Angel Mondoloka, 2014, op. cit., for a description of experiences from several mining 
communities in Zambia.  
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creation, and highlights some strategies that companies, often in partnership with 
governments and communities, have adopted to weather the downturn. 
 
Box 6 – Employment impacts of a mineral commodity price downturn 
The world recession and credit crunch of the second half of 2008 caused the prices of 
most commodities to fall drastically. Prices rose again in late 2009 to mid-2011; for most 
minerals and metals, they remained at historically high levels until 2014, when they 
collapsed following the decline in Chinese demand growth.  
This downturn has obligated mining companies to review their business strategies and 
to contemplate laying off workers or even closing down their least profitable 
operations. For instance, Anglo American Platinum is actively considering exiting joint 
ventures that operate two Platinum mines in South Africa, Pandora and Bokoni; the 
restructuring plans at Bokoni is expected to result in a cut of 2,500 employees and many 
contractor job losses. 248  Also in South Africa, gold producer Lonmin PLC has 
announced a cut of 6,000 workers. 249  In Chile, the state-owned mining company 
Codelco has laid off more than 4,000 employees over the last eighteen months. 250 
Copper–rich Zambia is similarly suffering from job losses, with Chinese-owned 
Luanshya Copper Mines suspending operations, turning some 1,600 workers jobless, 
and Vedanta Resources Plc doing the same regarding 133 employees at its Konkola 
Copper Mines (KCM).251 Glencore, which is Zambia’s largest private sector employer, 
with a direct workforce of 10,000 and an estimated 10,000 others employed by mining 
contractors, has suspended all production at its Mopani mine for 18 months, resulting 
in an estimated loss of 4,000 direct jobs alone.252 It has suspended most of its production 
                                                             
248 Alexandra Wexler, “Anglo American Job Cuts Strike at Core of South Africa’s Mining Industry,” The Wall Street 
Journal, December 15, 2015, available at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/anglo-american-job-cuts-strike-at-core-of-
south-africas-mining-industry-1450174147 (last visited July 14, 2016). 
249 Scott Patterson and John W. Miller, “Mining Companies Slash Jobs as Commodities Prices Slide,” The Wall Street 
Journal, July 24, 2015, available at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/miners-shed-thousands-of-jobs-as-commodities-
prices-slide-1437740084 (last visited July 14, 2016). 
250 Cecilia Jamasmie, “Codelco eyes $600 million in savings, more job cuts in 2016 as copper in the pits,” available at: 
http://www.mining.com/codelco-eyes-600-million-in-savings-more-job-cuts-in-2016-as-copper-in-the-pits/ (last 
visited July 14, 2016). 
251 “Zambia govt to meet mining firms over looming job cuts: minister,” Reuters September 26, 2015, available at: 
http://www.timeslive.co.za/africa/2015/09/26/Zambia-govt-to-meet-mining-firms-over-looming-job-cuts-minister (last 
visited July 14, 2016). 
252 Sibongile Khumalo, “Africa mining stumbles, raising fears of job loss chaos,” AFP, September 13, 2015, available 
at: http://news.yahoo.com/africa-mining-stumbles-raising-fears-job-loss-chaos-041718196.html (last visited July 14, 
2016). 
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in the DRC as well.253 The consequences of the price downturn also affect developed 
economies. For instance, BHP Billiton has suppressed hundreds of jobs at its giant 
copper, gold, and uranium Olympic mine in South Australia.254 
Mining job loss is generally inevitable in the face of such a severe downturn, 
highlighting the risk of heavy reliance on a single industry. Yet some companies 
cognizant of the implications of cyclical commodity markets have established initiatives 
to help mitigate the impact on communities and provide “a buffer during 
downturns.”255   
For instance, the Rossing Foundation in Namibia,256 which was established 36 years ago 
by Rossing Uranium in partnership with government ministries, continues to focus on 
education and SME development. Another example comes from the experience of 
Xtrata corporation in Chile, which set up a fund financed by a percentage of profits 
during more profitable years and dedicated to continuing the company’s investment in 
the community during leaner periods, which could include providing training on 
transferable skills to other economic sectors or limiting job cuts. Similarly, at its 
operations in Australia’s New South Wales, Rio Tinto is involved in community funds 
managed by community, company, and local government representatives; it is 
currently deploying a similar scheme at its Heavy Mineral Sands operations in Richards 
Bay, South Africa. Other companies in the Bowen Coal basin in Australia have decided 
to join forces to continue making funds available to mitigate the impact of the downturn 
on communities’ livelihoods. 257 
 
Failures of communication are often an important cause of conflicts concerning 
employment outcomes. Investors may believe that they have been doing useful things 
and are perplexed by hostile reactions from local populations, which in turn may be 
                                                             
253 Andy Hoffman and Matthew Hill, “Glencore to Invest $950 Million Upgrading Zambia Copper Mine,” Bloomberg, 
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Journal, July 24, 2015, available at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/miners-shed-thousands-of-jobs-as-commodities-
prices-slide-1437740084 (last visited July 14, 2016). 
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visited July 14, 2016). 
256 The Rossing Foundation, available at: http://www.rossingfoundation.com/ (last visited July 14, 2016). 
257 Ali, 2015, op. cit. 
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unaware of employment creating projects or upset that such projects fail because 
investors are ignorant of local conditions.258 While conflicts over employment outcomes 
will never be wholly eliminated, their number and seriousness can be considerably 
reduced if a few simple rules are followed: 
x Investors should never attempt to sugarcoat facts and should be conservative 
when communicating estimates of employment.  
x Investors should tailor the way information is presented to the specific 
stakeholder and to the specific situation. In addition to asking themselves what 
they want to communicate, they should ask what the audience is interested in 
knowing and how best to communicate that information. 
x Investors should make particular efforts to communicate clear answers to the 
questions When do the jobs come?, Who will get the jobs?, Where will the jobs be? and 
What type of jobs will they be?   
x Investors should prepare their training programs in consultation with local 
authorities and communities to ensure that they respond to the needs and skills 
of the local population. 
x Governments, both national and local, should analyze and clarify local needs and 
conditions to investors, and should adapt local development planning to include 
realistic estimates of future net employment and net livelihood impacts of 
investments.    
 
4.2 Maximizing the impact of agricultural investment for sustainable 
development: support for “jobs” and support for livelihoods 
As mentioned in Section 3, government policymakers seeking employment benefits 
from investment in agriculture should fully assess the job creation estimates attached to 
potential investments, including the quality of jobs created and the potential net 
livelihood impacts based on the specific ex ante situation in the concession area. Such an 
assessment may not be easy. Investors seeking to receive concessions may have an 
incentive to inflate their job estimates, while government agencies tasked with 
attracting investment may not have an incentive to dig too deeply into the numbers 
presented.  
Yet more critical assessments are important. To this end, government policymakers 
evaluating potential agricultural investments should require that any job estimates 
provided by the company are supplemented with additional information: for example, 
an explanation of how the estimates were calculated, a description of the types of jobs 
                                                             
258 Mondoloka, 2014, op. cit. cites several examples. 
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anticipated (permanent, seasonal, managerial, etcetera), and evidence showing similar 
employment numbers generated through comparable projects. Policymakers should 
also consider the investment model proposed, and the viability of such a model in the 
local context. Because the number of livelihoods negatively affected may be greater than 
the number of waged jobs created in places where a land-based investment results in 
high levels of resource displacement, in some situations governments may find that 
other options, such as different types of investment models, may be more appropriate 
avenues for meeting their goals of generating employment and improving livelihood 
impacts.  
Indeed, large-scale agricultural investments are only one of many approaches for 
investment in agriculture, and the type of agricultural investment model used may 
affect its impact on employment, livelihoods, or poverty reduction. Other options for 
public or private investment include investing in smallholder production, or investing 
in “inclusive business models” that incorporate smallholder farmers, such as through 
contract farming arrangements or outgrower schemes. In some cases, such 
investments—for example, nucleus estates that include both a central plantation and 
outgrower arrangements through which the operator purchases crops for processing—
can be viewed as specialized methods of local procurement. These inclusive business 
models are not without their own sets of potential drawbacks, and must be structured 
equitably and with sufficient safeguards—including potentially through the careful 
development and implementation of government policies—to ensure that benefits are 
shared. In some contexts, such models may also require support from third parties. Yet 
they often hold the potential to support greater numbers of livelihoods than agricultural 
projects that simply rely on waged labor in combination with mechanized operations. 
For example, investments in outgrower schemes may produce lower numbers of direct 
waged jobs, since much of the expected production comes from smallholder farmers 
rather than from waged laborers. However, depending on how they are structured, 
such investments could potentially support more labor overall while displacing fewer 
people, thus altering the net livelihoods calculation. Indeed, in the World Bank and 
UNCTAD review of 39 agribusiness investments, discussed above, the projects that 
included outgrower schemes supported many more livelihoods than the number of 
total direct jobs created through land-based investments: while the 39 projects directly 
employed around 40,000 people in total, the 11 projects that included outgrower 
schemes also engaged nearly 150,000 contract farmers. 259  As the report notes, 
“[o]utgrower schemes can be effective in supporting livelihoods while allowing people 
to retain their most valuable asset -- their land. Governments should consider which 
                                                             
259 World Bank and UNCTAD, “The Practice of Responsible Investment Principles in Larger Scale Agricultural 
Investments: Implications for Corporate Performance and Impact on Local Communities,” Table E.1 and Table E.2. 
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investors and business models are likely to maximise direct and indirect employment as 
these are key benefits of agricultural investment.”260 
The relevance of such schemes for employment and livelihood outcomes is particularly 
important to keep in mind given the tendency of some governments and stakeholders 
to count only waged labor in job estimates. From that perspective, plantation 
investments with relatively large numbers of waged jobs but even higher levels of 
livelihood displacement might be seen as preferable to outgrower schemes with 
relatively few waged jobs but greater livelihood support, even when the “net livelihood 
impact”—or what we would consider the net employment impact, given our more 
expansive definition of “employment”—is negative in the former and positive in the 
latter.  
Aside from the numbers of direct jobs created, it is conceivable that, in general, 
investments that distribute the benefits more widely, rather than those that lead to 
increased land concentration, may have greater multiplier effects and thus higher 
induced employment numbers. For example, researchers have pointed out that “broad-
based agricultural growth tends to generate greater second-round expenditures in 
support of local goods and services in rural areas and towns. These multiplier effects 
are much weaker when the source of agricultural growth is concentrated in relatively 
few hands.”261 
This section briefly reviews the different policies that governments may implement to 
try to improve the employment generation of large-scale agricultural investment. As 
with mining investments, governments have a range of policy options to try to augment 
the local job creation potential of agricultural investment, including through “local 
content” policies targeting direct employment, linkages, and local processing, as well as 
policies geared towards supporting wider local economic development.  
 
Policies targeting direct employment of local workers 
Governments seeking to increase the employment opportunities generated by 
agricultural investments may want to consider the types of crops that investors are 
encouraged to grow, as well as their intended method of production. As noted in 
section 1, crops have varying labor requirements, while the level of mechanization also 
affects the number of jobs are generated. Although employment is only one of multiple 
factors with which host governments may be concerned in respect of agricultural 
                                                             
260 World Bank and UNCTAD, op. cit., p. 49. 
261 T.S. Jayne, A. Chapoto, C. Nkonde, J. Chamberlin, and M. Muyanga, N. Sitko, “Is the Scramble for Land in Africa 
Foreclosing a Smallholder Agricultural Expansion Strategy?” (2013), p. 22.  
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investment, to the extent that governments wish to maximize employment from such 
investment, they may want to promote crops that provide more jobs.262 Similarly, if 
governments are more interested in agricultural investment that allows small-scale 
farmers to earn seasonal wages while maintaining their own crops, the type of crop will 
also be relevant, as noted in Box 7.   
 
Box 7: Supplementing smallholder farming with seasonal or temporary labor through 
investments 
Whether smallholder farming can be supplemented with seasonal waged labor on 
plantations (or with temporary jobs in mining) depends on multiple factors. In respect 
of waged labor on plantations, for example, it will depend in part on which crops are 
grown on the plantation and by the smallholder. When the crops have similar harvest 
seasons, reconciling both types of work might be difficult. When the plantation work 
has distinct seasons that are not in conflict with the smallholder’s production cycle, 
these dual strategies might work better. Oil-palm crops, for example, “require most of 
their labour at peak times,” enabling farmers to receive seasonal wages and also grow 
their own crops.263 
 
Regardless of the type of crop grown, the direct jobs generated by agricultural 
investment are not always allocated to local community members, as described in 
section 2. This may be the case even though host governments generally have an 
interest in ensuring that “locals”—either from the nearby community members, or 
others within the country—benefit from the jobs created from an investment, given that, 
for governments, one primary attraction of agricultural investments is the potential for 
job creation. 
Similar to the approach with mining investments, some governments thus create 
employment targets to prompt investors to employ national or local workers. These 
seek to ensure that, within the total direct employment, a certain number or percentage 
of positions is filled by local workers. Governments may couple these targets with 
training programs to reduce the skills gap and facilitate the hiring of local workers for 
managerial positions.264  
                                                             
262 World Bank, 2011, op. cit. 
263 Smalley, 2013, op. cit., p. 42. 
264 See, e.g., UNCTAD and World Bank, “The Practice of Responsible Investment Principles in Larger-Scale 
Agricultural Investments: Implications for Corporate Performance and Impact on Local Communities,” Agriculture 
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Governments may establish targets or require training programs in multiple ways, 
including through agreements incorporated into investment contracts. For example, the 
government of Liberia has frequently included sections on employment practices in its 
large-scale agriculture and forestry contracts, which often state that preference will be 
given to qualified Liberian citizens for skilled positions, and that senior management 
positions should include a certain percentage of Liberian citizens after a certain number 
of years. 265  These contracts sometimes require the investor to provide training to 
nationals of the host state in order to help them qualify for more skilled positions.266 
Some investment contracts also include explicit requirements to hire national citizens 
for some or all of the unskilled positions created by an investment.267  
Yet local hiring requirements are not always implemented or enforced, 268  and 
governments must think critically about the monitoring and enforcement systems that 
are necessary to ensure that investors adhere to their commitments. Furthermore, as 
noted in section 2, even when local workers are offered jobs, the benefits are not always 
distributed equally within a community, with more highly skilled and educated 
workers at an advantage, even for low-skilled positions. There are obvious reasons why 
an employer would favor such workers when provided the choice, and this raises the 
question of whether there is more that governments can do to assist their least 
advantaged citizens in benefiting from new job opportunities. One possibility could be 
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the expansion of educational or training programs provided either by investors or 
jointly by investors and the government that could assist a broader set of community 
members in attaining even low-skilled positions, rather than programs focused only on 
managerial positions. Yet governments could also think creatively about other ways to 
spread job benefits more widely, including quotas for members of groups that may 
otherwise be at a disadvantage. 
 
Policies targeting linkages and additional employment  
Agricultural investments that are designed to generate backward linkages, including 
through outgrower schemes that supply products for processing, or downstream 
employment, for example through packing or processing, provide another avenue for 
generating additional direct or indirect employment. The usefulness of such an 
approach is highlighted by the Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture 
and Food Systems (rai), which were adopted by the Committee on World Food Security 
in October 2014 and note that responsible agricultural investment includes “fostering 
entrepreneurship and equal access to market opportunities both on-farm and for 
upstream and downstream stakeholders.”269  
As highlighted above, outgrower schemes generate indirect employment and can 
greatly increase livelihood support, by linking smallholder farmers with investors who 
serve as buyers of the smallholders’ products. Some outgrower schemes also support 
agricultural development more generally, by providing smallholders with technical 
assistance and credit that promotes better farming practices generally. Schemes that 
support smallholders rather than or in addition to waged employment could also 
potentially increase induced employment, given that smallholders’ income is often 
significantly greater than that of waged farm laborers. 270  Governments can design 
policies that encourage investors to implement such arrangements. While promoting 
inclusive business models over a land acquisition model will often have better 
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development outcomes and can help minimize negative livelihood impacts on 
communities affected by investments,271 policies intended to promote the integration of 
smallholders can also be established for investments that are not, at their core, an 
inclusive business model. For example, incentives to incorporate outgrower schemes 
into large-scale land-based investments may include the ability to acquire additional 
amounts of land upon implementation of an outgrower scheme,272 or the automatic 
extension of the duration of a contract if outgrower obligations are met.273 
Outgrower schemes and other inclusive business models are only as good as their 
structure and implementation, and governments interested in promoting such models 
should take care to establish appropriate safeguards. This includes ensuring that 
smallholder farmer participation is voluntary, that smallholders are able to negotiate 
equitable arrangements, and that such schemes are not used to unreasonably shift risks 
away from the investor onto the smallholder participants.274  
Moreover, policies to promote outgrower schemes or other backward linkages should 
be gender-sensitive. In some cases, women may be particularly vulnerable to the arrival 
of contract farming or outgrower arrangements. For example, the arrival of horticulture 
contracting schemes in Kenya led some men to shift land use away from household 
production controlled by women, thereby reducing their access to resources and 
independence.275 In addition, because contract farming or outgrower schemes are often 
signed with male heads of household, the arrangements can disempower women, even 
if they provide the bulk of the labor under the contract.276 Conversely, policies that 
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encourage gender-sensitive approaches can help mitigate the potential negative impacts 
on women. For example, government policies encouraging women to form cooperatives 
in Rwanda has helped strengthen their ability to engage in outgrower schemes, even if 
such schemes have had variable outcomes. 277  Undertaking concurrent policies to 
strengthen women’s access to resources can help improve their opportunities to benefit 
from any policies that promote outgrower schemes or other linkages.278 
Aside from outgrower schemes or similar models, governments can implement other 
local procurement policies that urge investors to source goods or services needed for 
production, in order to increase the indirect and induced employment generation 
potential of investments. Similar to the above discussion regarding mining-related 
policies, governments may be somewhat constrained in their local content policies by 
WTO rules, which except least developed countries until 2020. Yet, at a minimum, 
governments can encourage investors to give preference to local goods and services—
although what constitutes “local” can also be debatable—and abstain from granting 
investors the right to import inputs duty free where these goods are available locally. 
In addition, governments sometimes enact policies to encourage local processing of 
agricultural products. Just as with mining, governments may undertake a range of 
efforts to promote further processing, from simple suggestions incorporated into 
contracts that urge investors to consider further processing279 to, at the other end of the 
spectrum, regulations banning exports of certain types of raw products. While 
increased local processing of products—particularly non-bulk commodities—should 
create more employment opportunities in general, as noted in Section 1, extremely 
restrictive regulations that are not complemented by targeted policies can have 
unintended consequences that limit the potential benefits of requiring more local 
processing.  
In Mozambique, for example, the government enacted an export ban on non-processed 
first-class timber (i.e., in the form of logs) in “an attempt to generate greater domestic 
value-added and employment through local processing of roundwood.” 280  Yet a 
confluence of factors— including the dominance of Chinese buyers who strongly prefer 
logs to sawn timber—has meant that the local processing requirements in Mozambique 
                                                             
277 Daley and Pallas, 2013, op. cit., pp. 10-11. 
278 Daley and Pallas, 2013, op. cit., pp. 17-19, including citing Clancy (2008). 
279 See, for example, LIBINC Oil Palm Inc. contract with Liberia, which states that the investor shall “explore the 
possibility of establishing manufacturing and/or processing facilities … within Liberia.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Monrovia, Liberia, An Act Ratifying the Concession Agreement Between the Republic of Liberia and LIBINC Oil 
Palm Inc., 2008, op. cit., Art. 11.1. 
280 Sigrid-Marianella Stensrud Ekman, Huang Wenbin and Ercilio Langa, “Chinese trade and investment in the 
Mozambican timber industry: A case study from Cabo Delgado Province,” CIFOR Working Paper 122 (2013), 
available at: http://www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/WPapers/WP122Ekman.pdf (last visited July 15, 2016). 
 95 
have rendered Mozambican timber less valuable to the primary buyers. Researchers 
have argued that, while the impact on processing is “debatable,” its overall negative 
impact has increased expenses for Mozambican timber companies, while incentivizing 
illegal exports that consequently deprive the government of revenue. Although fully 
lifting the ban might not augment job creation, doing so could decrease the amount of 
illegal logging, with positive benefits for both government revenue and the 
environment. Alternatively, to the extent that the government wants to continue the ban 
in order to generate more jobs through further processing, it could undertake 
supplementary policies that support processors in supplying processed timber that is 
more valuable to Chinese buyers, or that increase exports of sawn logs to non-Chinese 
markets.281 
 
Policies promoting local economic development 
In addition to undertaking policies that target direct employment and those targeting 
linkages and indirect and induced employment, host governments can also consider 
policies that promote local economic development linked to agricultural investments. 
As with the mining-related policies discussed above, such development policies can 
have employment and livelihood impacts by supporting increased economic activities 
in the local/proximate economy surrounding the investment.  
Perhaps most relevant are policies related to infrastructure. Like job creation, 
infrastructure development tied to investment is often heralded as a primary benefit of 
large-scale agricultural investment. 282  Such infrastructure can include, for example, 
roads, irrigation, trading centers, and agro-processing facilities. Yet, in contrast to 
infrastructure linked to mining investments,283 it is less common to find examples of 
large-scale agricultural investors financing and building shared-use road, power, or 
water infrastructure. In some contexts, host governments have negotiated agreements 
under which investors must share any infrastructure, such as roadways or waterways, 
that they have developed outside of the concession area,284 although such shared-use 
may be limited to use of excess capacity that does not unreasonably interfere with the 
investors’ operations.285 Although such caveats can be easy to manipulate, the general 
                                                             
281 Ekman, Wenbin and Langa, 2013, op. cit. 
282 See, e.g., Cotula, Vermeulen, Leonard, and Keeley, 2009, op. cit., pp. 58, 81-83. 
283 For an overview of the issue and examples see CCSI’s research available at 
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/work/projects/leveraging-infrastructure-investments-for-development/. 
284 Some of the Liberian agricultural contracts include such provisions. See, e.g., Golden Veroleum, 4.4(b); LIBINC Oil 
Palm Inc., 3.3(a)(ii).   
285 For example, the Golden Veroleum contract also notes that if the investor builds a new port, the government may 
authorize third-party use of excess capacity so long as it “does not unreasonably interfere with the efficient and 
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approach of making infrastructure publicly available and non-exclusionary can help 
promote economic development in areas near large-scale investments. Indeed, greater 
access to roads, irrigation, or other infrastructure can benefit local farmers and other 
stakeholders, by, for example, raising their own productivity or facilitating easier access 
to markets. To the extent that host governments can encourage investors to build 
shared-use infrastructure, or can require investors to share any infrastructure that they 
do build,286 this can have useful consequences for local economic development.287  
In respect of agricultural investments and shared-use infrastructure, a more common 
approach that governments have taken is to try to leverage agricultural investment and 
investor demand to enter into public-private partnerships for infrastructure 
development, or to gain third-party support from donors, multilateral institutions, or 
financing groups for infrastructure funding.288 Public-private partnerships, including 
those benefiting from public service financing, can raise concerns, however, when the 
infrastructure may be exclusionary or beneficial for only a small percentage of the 
public.289 Third-party financing also relies, of course, on the willingness of donors to 
provide such support, and must be undertaken carefully to ensure sustainability once 
donor funding has concluded. Thus, while host governments can seek infrastructure 
development through leveraging investor interest, such arrangements should be 
carefully designed and regulated to ensure that they are beneficial for local economic 
development as well as financially sustainable. 
Explicitly designating infrastructure as “shared-use” is not always necessary, however: 
for some crops, the establishment of processing infrastructure by an investor may be 
enough to stimulate and support local production, even outside of any formal 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
economic conduct of the Investor’s port operations.” 4.13(c). Ministry of Foreign Affairs Monrovia, Liberia, An Act to 
Ratify the Concession Agreement Between the Republic of Liberia and Golden Veroleum (Liberia) Inc., 2010, op. cit. 
286 As the World Bank notes, “[w]here [public] investment [in infrastructure] is not available, private operators can to 
some extent substitute by establishing networks of their own. But proper regulation will be needed to prevent 
monopolistic abuse.” The World Bank, 2011, op. cit., p. 42. One example from an FAO publication illustrates this 
concern, describing road construction built by an investor in Cambodia “mainly for the company’s use and not for 
the public, who are not allowed to intrude on the company’s property.” FAO, “Trends and impacts of foreign 
investment in developing country agriculture,” 2013, op. cit., p. 185. 
287 A couple of caveats are in order. First, increased infrastructure in certain sensitive areas can lead to ecological 
damage, with, among other things, potential consequences for traditional livelihoods.  For example, roads can 
contribute to deforestation, while irrigation infrastructure can impact water supply if not based on a sustainable 
water source. Second, if governments require shared-use infrastructure to be provided by the investor, the investor 
may seek to compensate for this when negotiating other aspects of the deal. Governments and local communities 
should thus be aware that requiring shared-use infrastructure may engender trade-offs. 
288 Several models exist, including when the infrastructure investment is anchored on the investor’s demand without 
the investor necessarily participating in the funding of the infrastructure. 
289 See, e.g., Michael Warner, David Kahan and Szilvia Lehel, “Market-oriented agricultural infrastructure: appraisal 
of public-private partnerships,” Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2008), p. xx, available at 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/011/i0465e/i0465e00.pdf (last visited July 15, 2016). 
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requirement to share infrastructure or any formal agreement to work with or buy from 
smallholder farmers. Crops that must be milled soon after harvest—for example, oil 
palm or sugarcane—require adequate transportation and extraction infrastructure. 
Where an investor establishes such infrastructure for its own operations, this can also 
create opportunities for smallholder farmers to produce and sell such crops, even in the 
absence of formal agreements with the investor.290 Investments that incorporate such 
infrastructure can thus generate livelihood benefits for smallholders, although such 
benefits are not without accompanying risks, including related to the monopsony 
power of mills, poor bargaining power of smallholders, and fluctuating commodity 
prices passed on to the farmer.291 To this end, governments seeking to ensure better 
outcomes tied to new infrastructure can develop policies and programs that assist 
smallholders in managing these risks, such as improved pricing systems and greater 
negotiation and technical support to farmers.  
In some contexts, additional government policies may also indirectly lead to the 
development of infrastructure linked to agricultural investments, even without the 
government requiring it directly of the investor. For example, some governments may 
require investors to negotiate agreements with affected communities. These community 
agreements, in turn, sometimes include an agreement by the investor to construct 
physical or social infrastructure. For example, the government of Liberia requires 
forestry, but not agricultural, investors to undertake such community agreements; these 
have led to the construction of roads and bridges, as well as social infrastructure such as 
schools.292 
Aside from infrastructure policies, governments and other stakeholders can also 
encourage local economic development linked to agricultural investments in other 
ways. For example, just as with mining investments, discussed above, national 
governments and other stakeholders can support local governments in planning for 
economic development and in delivering necessary public services. Although overall 
revenues from agricultural investments are much less significant than those from 
mining investments, national governments can still explore revenue sharing with local 
governments, which can be used to further economic development efforts—or even 
                                                             
290 See, e.g., Stéphane Bernard and Jean-François Bissonnette, “Oil palm plantations in Sabah: Agricultural expansion 
for whom?” in De Konick, Rodolphe, Stéphane Bernard, and Jean- François Bissonnette, eds. 2011, Agricultural 
Expansion in Southeast Asia: Borneo at the eye of the storm, National University of Singapore Press, p. 130 (explaining 
that “smallholders must be considered in many respects as an epiphenomenon of plantation and state scheme 
development, for they are dependent upon palm oil extraction and transportation infrastructures provided by 
powerful companies”). 
291 See, e.g., Sonja Vermeulen and Nathalie Goad, “Towards better practice in smallholder palm oil production,” IIED 
(2006), pp. 33-36. 
292 World Bank, 2011, op. cit., p. 107 (noting Liberia’s requirement of forestry investors). 
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infrastructure development. 293  Similarly, just as consultation mechanisms for local 
development planning are necessary when linked to mining investments, such 
mechanisms are also needed for development planning when linked to agricultural 
investments. Coordination between local governments and investors is useful, but 
consultation is crucial to ensure that planning supports local economic development 
that delivers real benefits for local communities. 
  
                                                             
293 See, for example, World Bank, 2011, op. cit., p. 126 (explaining that the DRC’s Forest Code enumerates how the 
government shares forestry taxes and fees; this includes “25 percent [of area fees] to the province and 15 percent to 
the local government, all to be used exclusively for basic infrastructure development.”) 
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Conclusion  
The employment impacts of mining and large-scale agricultural investment can be 
considerable, particularly if indirect and induced employment is taken into account. 
The number of jobs directly and indirectly generated are contingent, however, on a 
range of factors. In mining, these factors include ownership, the size of the mine, the 
mining life cycle, technology, and the type of commodity being extracted. The recent 
drop in commodity prices also highlights the significance of macroeconomic factors for 
employment outcomes. In agriculture, factors relevant to the number of jobs created 
include types of crops, methods of production, specific project contexts, and links to 
agro-processing. And although agricultural investments have been less dramatically 
affected by changes in commodity prices, the relatively high project failure rates in 
recent agribusiness investments demonstrate the importance of project viability for 
sustainable employment impacts.  
As described in this report, various elements complicate efforts to understand 
employment impacts. For one, the lack of a universally implemented standard for 
describing or measuring job creation, whether in absolute numbers or through 
multipliers, creates opportunities for obfuscation and obstacles for comparisons. In 
addition, estimating multiplier effects is complex, rendering employment estimates 
uncertain. 
Moreover, analysis of the employment impact of large-scale mining and agricultural 
investment cannot stop at quantification. Policymakers and other stakeholders need to 
consider qualitative factors and additional nuances, such as the quality of jobs, 
including job security and wages; distributional impact and who benefits; and the net 
livelihood impacts of investments.  
For example, large-scale mining projects that generate employment can also provide 
additional opportunities that support poverty alleviation. These include improvements 
in infrastructure and communication, which can lead to improved links to the national 
economy and greater access to public services; increases in purchasing power of those 
benefiting from new employment or business opportunities; and enhancement of the 
local skills base. When mining companies invest in local employment, through 
consultations with local communities, local hiring, and provision of training, as well as 
linkages with local services, businesses, and products, the employment and income 
impact for local populations tends to be positive.  
However, the negative consequences of mining on livelihoods, including local price 
increases, crowding out of traditional livelihoods, and conflicts resulting from in-
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migration, must also be considered when assessing a mine’s impact on local job creation 
and living conditions of local communities.  
The employment impacts of large-scale agricultural investment are similarly complex. 
Both host governments and investors often tout the waged-employment potential of 
such investment. Yet critics raise a number of concerns, particularly when such 
investment causes displacement and resettlement of previous land users, as is often the 
case in some countries. In assessing the employment impacts of a potential investment, 
policymakers should thus contrast the direct, indirect, and induced jobs expected to be 
created by such investment with the livelihood losses that may be associated with the 
investment. This will help them consider whether the “net livelihood impact” of an 
investment is indeed positive or negative. Additionally, because investment requiring 
the acquisition of large swathes of land is not the only option for agricultural 
investment, it is important for policymakers to carefully consider, for specific situations 
as well as more broadly, whether such a model is the best way to invest in agriculture. 
It often is not. 
Against this backdrop, governments and companies should cooperate to design 
appropriate policies, plans, and strategies to strengthen positive employment (and 
other) impacts and mitigate negative ones associated with investment in mining or 
agriculture. Although some negative outcomes may be inevitable, such as 
environmental change, or resettlement in the context of mining projects,294 governments 
and companies can seek to develop frameworks that minimize negative outcomes and 
safeguard rights, while maximizing employment opportunities, particularly for local 
communities. The expectations fueled by job creation estimates, and the reliance in 
certain areas on mining and agriculture projects to provide jobs, render such efforts 
particularly important. 
In this regard, there are several avenues that governments in particular should explore.  
 
To maximize the creation of direct jobs tied to mining and agricultural investment: 
1) Governments should focus not only on potential revenues generated by an 
investment (particularly pertinent for mining projects), but also on whether 
policies are in place to maximize the direct, indirect, and induced job impact, 
                                                             
294 Although both types of investment cause displacement and resettlement, this is harder to avoid in the context of 
mining, which is more location-sensitive. Displacement and resettlement are arguably avoidable altogether for 
agricultural projects, which are generally less location-sensitive and which also can often occur without the transfer 
of land use rights.  
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including cost–effective policies to attract responsible investment that leads to 
increased employment.  
2) In some countries, revenues from investment are shared between the national- 
and subnational-level governments. In those cases, it is important to support 
subnational-level governments in managing their share of revenues effectively, 
including through the implementation of policies that promote positive 
employment impacts. 
3) Governments and companies should cooperate on training programs that 
support individuals’ ability to benefit from the job opportunities offered by 
investment projects. Training programs can be coupled with agreed targets that 
encourage the employment of local or national workers. 
 
To maximize the creation of indirect jobs tied to mining and agricultural investment: 
4) Governments should take care that policies aimed at increasing linkages, either 
backward through local content requirements or forward through measures 
intended to increase further processing, are based on realistic assessments of the 
capabilities of local enterprises, are in conformity with relevant international 
rules, and do not lead to undue administrative burdens for either companies or 
regulators.   
5) Governments should refrain from granting investors the right to import inputs 
duty free where such goods are available locally. 
 
To maximize the creation of induced jobs tied to mining and agricultural investment: 
6) National-level governments should support subnational-level governments in 
developing capacity to plan for diversified economic development, as well as to 
deliver the public services that are both needed by citizens and required for 
economic growth.  
7) Governments should support or encourage infrastructure investment tied to 
mining or agricultural projects. Investment in shared-use infrastructure can help 
other sectors grow and/or support improved livelihood activities. For instance, 
while a mining company may build a paved road to the nearest port, the 
establishment of secondary feeder roads, perhaps supported by the company, 
can enable farmers to bring their produce to markets. Or when an agricultural 
investor constructs a processing facility, this may open up a new opportunity for 
smallholder farmers to sell products to the investor. Cooperation between 
companies and the government, including at the local level, can prove beneficial 
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in assessing the need, demand, and appropriateness of linked-infrastructure 
investment. 
8) Governments and companies should ensure that appropriate consultation 
mechanisms underpin local development planning as needed. For example, a 
company’s investment plans should be coordinated with local governments’ 
plans to ensure coherent development. As discussed below, consultation and 
participation of local communities in local development planning is also 
important.  
 
To maximize all three types of employment impacts: 
9) Any job-creation policies selected by the government should be grounded in a 
sound strategy for consulting with communities. Such consultations can help 
ensure that community needs are incorporated into policy design and 
implementation. In addition, such consultations provide an opportunity for the 
government to provide more detailed responses to relevant questions, such as 
When do the jobs come?, Who will get the jobs?, Where will the jobs be? What type of 
jobs will they be? What efforts on the part of both the company and the government are in 
place to maximize the job impact and minimize the negative outcomes on livelihoods? 
Frank discussions on these issues can help ensure that community expectations 
related to job creation tied to investment are realistic. This, in turn, can help 
communities make more informed decisions when applicable (for example, 
during free, prior, and informed consent processes), and can also help avert or 
mitigate tension that can arise when unrealistic expectations cannot be met.  
10) Governments should also ensure that sustainable closure plans are developed for 
any large-scale investment, addressing how the negative employment impacts of 
project closure or failure will be mitigated. Governments and mining companies 
should also consider establishing programs that focus on mitigating job loss in 
commodity price downturns. 
 
In addition, in the context of agricultural investment, policymakers should also keep in 
mind that agricultural investment predicated on land acquisition is only one of many 
approaches for investment in agriculture. As the type of agricultural investment model 
used may affect its impact on job creation, livelihoods, or poverty reduction, 
governments should think carefully about the type of investment they wish to attract 
and encourage. Apart from investments that require land transactions, other options for 
public or private investment include investing in smallholder production, or using a 
more inclusive business approach to incorporate and support smallholder farmers. Such 
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models may be more beneficial from a number of perspectives, including employment 
outcomes, provided that they are structured equitably and with sufficient safeguards. 
Of course, as employment impacts are context-specific, so are policy solutions. Efforts to 
optimize the employment impact of investments thus must be tailored to the particular 
contexts for which they are proposed. This is easier to say than to do. In some 
situations, this may require a more nuanced understanding of the margins of maneuver 
for investors in terms of adapting their employment practices to national and local 
needs. In other situations, governments may need to undertake more targeted efforts to 
ensure that local development planning is used to maximize the potential employment 
and growth impact resulting from induced employment, which is not always 
sufficiently incorporated in such planning. In any case, a thorough understanding by 
governments of the relevant contextual variables related to employment from natural 
resource investments can help both in designing policies and evaluating potential 
investments. 
The context-specificity of policies extends to policymaking as well. The effective design 
and implementation of natural resource-based employment policies is largely a political 
question, and will be influenced by the political landscape. As has been concluded 
elsewhere, any recommendations on linkage policies must “reflect a ‘good fit’ with local 
contexts, institutions and politics, and not only the ‘best practices’ that donors typically 
advocate.”295 
With this report, our first objective was to clarify the processes and impacts of job 
creation driven by large-scale mining and agricultural investments. Such investment 
creates jobs, but how many and with what impact is not always clear. A deeper 
understanding of the topic helps policymakers, citizens, and others assess employment 
claims made in the context of investment in mining or large-scale agricultural projects. 
Our second objective was to suggest ways in which public sector actors can implement 
policies to improve employment outcomes from such investments. These suggestions 
provide a starting point for policymakers to reconsider existing policies and consider 
new ones, but they do not constitute a one-size-fits-all blueprint. 
A fuller accounting of the employment impacts of investments presents governments 
with a difficult task: developing approaches that are aligned with best practices but 
fine-tuned to local contexts, that improve the direct, indirect, and induced job creation 
outcomes of investments while addressing the disparate needs and expectations of both 
                                                             
295 L. Buur, O. Therkildsen, M. Hansen, and M. Kjær. Extractive Natural Resource Development: Governance, 
Linkages and Aid, Danish Institute for International Studies Working Paper No. 28 (2013). 
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investors and citizens. Although complicated, such efforts are important for ensuring 
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